Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis Property Management Services, Inc.

Citations: 801 F. Supp. 2d 12; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90237; 2011 WL 3489119Docket: Civil Action 3:09-CV-1037 (JCH)

Court: District Court, D. Connecticut; June 23, 2011; Federal District Court

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Drita and Florim Gashi filed a lawsuit against Grubb Ellis Property Management Services, Inc. and Prospect Grove Condominium Association, alleging discrimination based on familial status under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHA). They claim in Count I that the defendants engaged in intentional discrimination and interfered with their right to fair housing, while Count II asserts that the occupancy policy disproportionately impacts families with children, violating the FHA.

The Gashis sought partial summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts showed a violation of the FHA through discriminatory statements and the occupancy policy. The court partially granted their motion. The case background reveals that Mrs. Gashi purchased a one-bedroom condominium in 2003, and after the birth of their son in 2006, the defendants enforced an occupancy policy limiting residents to two persons per bedroom. The Gashis were notified of the violation and subsequently vacated their apartment. Grubb Ellis lacked knowledge regarding the occupancy policy's rationale, and Prospect Grove could not provide documentation supporting the necessity of the policy. Additionally, neither the Stamford Fire Code nor the housing code mandates a two-person occupancy limit per bedroom.

A motion for summary judgment is granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be tried, allowing the moving party to obtain judgment as a matter of law. The district court's role is to determine the existence of factual disputes, resolving ambiguities in favor of the non-moving party. The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment, after which the opposing party must present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial. An issue is deemed genuine if a reasonable jury could favor the non-moving party, requiring more than a minimal amount of evidence to defeat the motion.

In the case at hand, partial summary judgment is granted to the Gashis regarding their disparate impact claim, as the defendants failed to present a genuine factual dispute concerning the impact of Pleasant Grove's occupancy policy on families with children. However, summary judgment is not granted concerning the alleged discriminatory statement, as a reasonable jury could potentially side with the defendants despite undisputed facts.

Under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), it is illegal to refuse housing based on familial status. A disparate impact claim under the FHA evaluates whether a neutral policy disproportionately affects a particular group. Plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case showing that the policy results in discrimination without needing to prove discriminatory intent, often using statistical evidence for comparison. Once a prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that their actions serve a legitimate interest and that no less discriminatory alternatives exist. Courts are skeptical of subjective justifications unless supported by objective evidence, and they must balance the defendant's justifications against the adverse effects shown by the plaintiff.

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory effect resulting from a neutral policy, plaintiffs must identify affected members of a protected group and similarly situated individuals who are not affected. Courts should utilize proportional statistics for comparison rather than absolute numbers, as demonstrated in cases like Huntington Branch, where disparities were noted in the impact on minorities versus whites. The Gashis present statistical evidence from the U.S. Census Bureau showing that three-person households with children in Stamford constitute 30.76% of all such households affected by the occupancy policy, compared to only 9.88% for three-person households without children, thereby establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Defendants argue that the analysis should focus on absolute numbers of affected versus unaffected three-person households, contending there is no disparate impact due to the higher number of households without children. However, this interpretation misapplies Second Circuit law, which emphasizes proportionality. Additionally, defendants claim Dr. Bradford's use of city-wide data is inappropriate, suggesting only census tract data should apply. This too contradicts established precedent allowing for city-wide statistics in assessing policy impacts. The court dismisses the defendants' arguments due to a lack of legal support and evidence contesting the Gashis' statistics, thus affirming the Gashis' prima facie case.

Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendants to justify the policy by demonstrating it serves a legitimate interest and that no less discriminatory alternative exists.

The court is required to resolve ambiguities in favor of the defendants but emphasizes that mere assertions of disputed material facts or speculation are insufficient. The defendants cite the Stamford Fire Code as justification for their occupancy policy but fail to provide evidence or support for their claims regarding its binding nature or its connection to the NFPA Life Safety Code. They also claim that "building infrastructure concerns" necessitate the occupancy policy but admit lacking documentation to support this assertion, thereby failing to raise a material issue of fact. 

Furthermore, the defendants reference HUD guidance stating that occupancy policies may be "presumptively reasonable," yet this guidance clarifies that compliance with the Fair Housing Act (FHA) cannot be determined solely by occupancy limits. The Prospect Grove policy limits occupancy to one family not exceeding two times the number of bedrooms, but the defendants do not demonstrate that this policy is based on bedroom size or overall unit size as suggested by HUD. 

Finally, the defendants do not address whether an alternative policy could achieve their interests in a less discriminatory manner. They are required to prove that their actions further a legitimate interest and that no less discriminatory alternative exists. The lack of evidence on these points means they have not established a material issue of fact to challenge or rebut the plaintiffs' prima facie case regarding the discriminatory nature of the occupancy policy.

The court grants summary judgment to the Gashis regarding the Prospect Grove occupancy policy, finding it has a disparate impact on families with children, violating the Fair Housing Act (FHA). However, the court denies the Gashis' claim concerning a discriminatory statement made by the defendants under 42 U.S.C. 3604(c). The FHA prohibits statements that indicate preference or discrimination based on familial status. A statement may be deemed discriminatory if it suggests an impermissible preference, even if it is not facially discriminatory. The defendants argued that their statement about the Gashis' occupancy violation was a necessary explanation, not discriminatory. The court noted that context is crucial in determining discrimination and found that this isolated statement raises a material issue for trial regarding how an ordinary reader would interpret it.

In conclusion, the court grants the Gashis' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment concerning the disparate impact claim but denies it regarding the alleged violation of the discriminatory statement. The ruling specifically pertains to Count II of the Amended Complaint, as Count I was not addressed. The defendants also claimed the Gashis' statement violation was time-barred, but the court previously ruled the suit was timely.