United States v. Langford

Citations: 641 F.3d 1195; 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7411; 2011 WL 1368548Docket: 10-6070

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; April 11, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

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Robert Langford appeals his conviction for being a spectator at a cockfight under federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. 13, which incorporates the Oklahoma state offense defined in Okla. Stat. tit. 21. 1692.6. The Tenth Circuit Court concludes that federal jurisdiction is lacking for victimless crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country. The case stems from a 2006 raid on a cockfighting facility located on property held in trust for a Kiowa allottee, categorizing it as Indian country. During the raid, most of the individuals cited were non-Indians, including Langford, who was charged under the Assimilative Crimes Act.

The court emphasizes that the Indian or non-Indian status of the defendant and victim is crucial under 18 U.S.C. 1152. The prosecution did not allege Langford's Indian status in the information, nor was any evidence presented at trial to support such a claim, with the trial testimony indicating he is non-Indian. The magistrate judge convicted Langford, which was upheld by the district court. 

On appeal, the court determined that the absence of any evidence or allegation regarding Langford's Indian status constitutes a plain error, significantly prejudicing his defense and undermining the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit vacated Langford's conviction and remanded the case for dismissal with prejudice.

The Assimilative Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. 13(a)) allows for the assimilation of state criminal laws into federal law for acts committed in federal jurisdiction areas, including Indian country, thereby making those acts punishable as if they occurred within the relevant state jurisdiction. The Indian Country Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. 1152) extends U.S. criminal laws to Indian country, except for the District of Columbia. In the specific case discussed, the assimilated crime involves being knowingly present at a cockfight. 

The situation involves a non-Indian, Langford, who participated in watching a cockfight in Indian country. The primary legal issue is whether federal jurisdiction exists for a “victimless crime” committed by a non-Indian in Indian country. The conclusion drawn is that there is no federal jurisdiction, following established Supreme Court precedent that requires either an Indian victim or perpetrator for federal jurisdiction to apply. This principle was notably established in United States v. McBratney, where the Supreme Court determined that the state held exclusive jurisdiction over a homicide involving two non-Indians on a Ute reservation, despite statutory provisions suggesting otherwise. The discussion emphasizes that jurisdiction refers to sovereign authority rather than subject matter jurisdiction, reinforcing the notion that states have exclusive criminal jurisdiction in Indian country for crimes involving non-Indians without Indian victims.

The Court established an exception to certain statutes based on the principle of sovereign equality among states, asserting that Colorado, upon joining the United States, gained criminal jurisdiction over its citizens and white individuals throughout its territory. Without a treaty provision between the Utes and the United States addressing crimes committed by white individuals against one another, federal courts were deemed to lack jurisdiction over such offenses within the reservation. The Supreme Court has upheld the "equal footing" doctrine from McBratney in subsequent rulings, including in United States v. Draper, where it affirmed Montana's exclusive jurisdiction over a murder case involving non-Indians on the Crow reservation, despite language in Montana’s enabling act asserting federal jurisdiction over Indian lands. In People v. Martin, a non-Indian's challenge to his conviction for murder on the Allegheny Reservation was rejected; the Court found that Colorado's "equal footing" status did not afford it more power than New York, an original state. The Court clarified that states possess jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians even in light of federal statutes like Section 2145, which has been held applicable in territories. The McBratney line of cases limits federal jurisdiction under Section 2145 and its successor, the Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA), reinforcing that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians against other non-Indians in Indian country, as noted in cases such as Duro v. Reina and United States v. Antelope.

The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed federal jurisdiction over victimless crimes by non-Indians on Indian land, but has suggested that the McBratney rule applies to such crimes. In *Solem v. Bartlett*, the Court clarified that state jurisdiction in Indian country is limited to crimes by non-Indians against non-Indians and includes victimless crimes by non-Indians. Federal jurisdiction over non-Indian perpetrated victimless crimes is lacking, as indicated in both *Solem* and *McBratney*. The Oklahoma Constitution states that the state disclaims jurisdiction over unappropriated public lands and Indian-held lands until federal title is extinguished. However, Oklahoma courts have interpreted this to limit jurisdiction only to the extent that the federal government claims it, allowing Oklahoma to assert jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians in Indian country.

The government’s failure to present evidence regarding Langford’s status as a non-Indian constitutes plain error, as this status is essential under the Indian Country Criminal Act (ICCA). Despite the government's claims that this is a mere technicality, the absence of proof affects the integrity of judicial proceedings. The ruling clarifies that Oklahoma can prosecute victimless crimes like cockfighting by non-Indians in Indian country. Consequently, the court vacates Langford’s conviction and remands the case for dismissal with prejudice, denying the appellant's motion to supplement the record.