United States v. Boyd

Citations: 640 F.3d 657; 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7046; 2011 WL 1304466Docket: 08-6402

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; April 7, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

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Eric Boyd appeals his conviction for being an accessory after the fact to a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and death, and for misprision of a felony, both under federal law (18 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4). The case stems from the brutal carjacking, rape, and murder of Christopher Newsom and Channon Christian on January 6, 2007. Their bodies were discovered shortly after, leading police to Lemaricus Davidson, whose fingerprint was found in Christian's abandoned vehicle. Following a manhunt, Boyd, who had communicated with Davidson, initially denied knowing him but eventually provided information on Davidson's location, admitting he helped him evade capture. Boyd's trial included allegations of evidentiary errors, a duplicitous indictment, and prosecutorial misconduct. The court affirmed Boyd's conviction, detailing the legal definitions of accessory after the fact and misprision.

Boyd sought to exclude parts of his videotaped interview that contained statements made by Davidson regarding a carjacking, rapes, and murders, claiming they constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clause. The district court denied this motion, ruling that Davidson's statements were not hearsay as they were used to demonstrate Boyd's knowledge rather than to assert the truth of the statements. The court also found no issue with the Confrontation Clause.

During the trial, the Government presented over 30 witnesses, revealing that on January 9, 2007, Boyd took Davidson to Danielle Lightfoot’s apartment. Boyd's cousin, Kevin Armstrong, visited and, aware of Davidson's wanted status, advised him to speak with police. Boyd remained silent as Davidson made multiple calls to Armstrong seeking a ride, which was refused. The following day, Boyd and Davidson watched news coverage where Davidson attempted to deflect blame onto his brother after seeing his own picture. Lightfoot later asked them to leave her apartment, leading Boyd and Davidson to hide from police behind the apartment complex.

They subsequently broke into a vacant house, where Boyd provided Davidson with his cell phone and established a communication code. Boyd was later stopped by police and disclosed Davidson's location. Dr. Darinka Mileusnic-Polchan, the Chief Medical Examiner, testified about the autopsies of victims Christian and Newsom, detailing severe trauma to both, including burns, binding, and sexual assault. Boyd did not object to this testimony but later offered to stipulate that both victims suffered serious bodily injury and death, arguing further testimony would be unnecessary and prejudicial. The Government countered that proving these elements was essential, and the district court denied Boyd’s motion, affirming that stipulations require mutual agreement and that the medical examiner's testimony was relevant and admissible.

The court indicated that jury instructions would clarify the decision-making parameters at the close of the case. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan testified about the severe sexual assault and blunt force trauma that led to Christian's death, attributing it to mechanical and positional asphyxia, likely occurring on January 7, 2007. During jury instructions, the district court emphasized that the Defendant was on trial solely for the crimes outlined in the second superseding indictment, specifically for aiding another in avoiding arrest related to a carjacking, not for committing the carjacking itself. The court clarified that Davidson’s statements could only be used to assess Boyd’s knowledge of Davidson’s involvement in the carjacking, not to establish Davidson’s guilt regarding that crime. The jury convicted Boyd on both counts, resulting in a sentence of 180 months for being an accessory after the fact and 36 months for misprision of a felony, which were the maximum allowable terms.

Regarding the admissibility of Davidson's statements, the court addressed hearsay issues, stating that hearsay is an out-of-court statement used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Since Davidson's statements were offered to demonstrate Boyd's knowledge of the crimes rather than to prove the truth of the carjacking itself, they were deemed non-hearsay. Boyd’s claim that the statements were hearsay was rejected, as the evidence was relevant to establishing Boyd's state of mind, a necessary element of the offenses charged. The district court’s instructions to the jury ensured that the statements were used appropriately, and there was sufficient other evidence to support Davidson's commission of the carjacking. Boyd's argument that the statements contained implicit factual assertions was also dismissed, as it was not previously raised in the district court and did not affect the admissibility of the statements.

The court's analysis in United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983), indicates that the significance of a defendant's statement depends on the truth of an implied fact, which contrasts with Davidson's statements in the current case. Davidson's statements are relevant to proving Boyd's knowledge regardless of their truthfulness, as independent evidence confirms a carjacking occurred.

Regarding the Confrontation Clause, which guarantees a defendant the right to confront witnesses, testimonial out-of-court statements are only admissible if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. Davidson's statements, made to a companion rather than in an official context, are deemed non-testimonial. Boyd's claim that these statements violated his rights is unfounded, as they were not presented for their truth but to establish his awareness.

On the issue of duplicity in the indictment, it is established that separate offenses should be charged in different counts to ensure a unanimous jury verdict. Boyd contends that Count I is duplicitous because it charges him as an accessory to a carjacking resulting in both death and serious bodily injury, which are separate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2119. He argues that the conjunctive use of "and" in the indictment creates duplicity, which extends to Count II’s misprision charge. Boyd also claims that this alleged duplicity led to prejudicial evidentiary rulings, particularly concerning the admissibility of evidence related to sexual assault, which he argues should not be relevant to proving carjacking resulting in death.

Boyd's argument regarding duplicity was not raised before the trial and thus is waived concerning technical errors in the indictment. However, he can appeal based on alleged harm to his substantive rights arising from a duplicitous indictment. Since Boyd raised this argument post-trial, it is reviewed only for plain error. 

Examining the indictment, neither Count I nor Count II is duplicitous. Citing *Braverman v. United States* and *Campbell*, the reasoning clarifies that a single count of conspiracy to commit multiple crimes is valid since conspiracy itself constitutes one crime, regardless of its diverse objectives. This reasoning applies to the charges against Boyd, such as accessory after the fact to carjacking, which does not constitute a violation of the carjacking statute. 

Boyd's reliance on Third Circuit cases does not alter this conclusion. In *United States v. Starks* and *United States v. Pungitore*, the courts found duplicity where multiple distinct offenses were charged in one count. In contrast, Boyd's indictment charged singular crimes in each count based on violations of 18 U.S.C. 3 and 4, making it non-duplicative.

Regarding the medical examiner's testimony, Boyd contends that it was prejudicial and worsened by the alleged duplicity of the indictment. However, since the indictment is not duplicitous, the claim of exacerbation lacks merit. Alternatively, Boyd argues for exclusion of the testimony based on its prejudicial nature versus probative value, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Courts grant broad discretion in determining the balance of prejudice and probative value under FRE 403.

Evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, although evidence that is gruesome or disturbing is not automatically deemed unfairly prejudicial. In this case, testimony and photographs of the victims, while shocking, were admitted due to their significant probative value. To secure a conviction for misprision of felony, the Government must prove the principal committed the alleged felony. Similarly, to convict a defendant of being an accessory after the fact, the underlying offense must be proven. The district court correctly admitted the medical examiner’s testimony, which was critical to demonstrating that Davidson committed a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and death, despite the horrific nature of the evidence. The Government wisely chose not to present overly graphic autopsy photos.

The district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Government is not required to accept a defendant’s stipulation regarding evidence and cannot be compelled to selectively stipulate to specific elements. The precedent set in Old Chief applies only narrowly, where refusing a stipulation to felon status was deemed erroneous. However, a defendant cannot force the prosecution to replace evidence that forms a coherent narrative with a mere admission.

Boyd's argument against the admission of the medical examiner's testimony, claiming it was unduly prejudicial, was tied to the broader evidentiary rulings. The court has broad discretion under FRE 403 to determine if the prejudicial risk outweighs probative value, and in this instance, did not abuse that discretion.

Regarding prosecutorial misconduct, claims involving statements made during closing arguments are reviewed de novo if objected to, or for plain error if not. Reversal under plain error is reserved for exceptional circumstances where the misconduct is egregious. A two-step analysis is employed to assess whether misconduct occurred: first, determining if the statements were improper, and second, evaluating their severity based on four factors: potential jury misdirection, the extent of the remarks, intent behind them, and the overall strength of the evidence against the defendant.

Prosecutors are granted considerable leeway during closing arguments, and inappropriate comments alone do not warrant a trial reversal if the overall proceedings were fair. Boyd argues that the prosecutors' statements were designed to provoke the jury’s emotions, citing Prosecutor Stone’s description of the crime as "unspeakable" and claims that "some humans are just not human." Prosecutor Jennings referred to the victims' tragic fate and urged the jury to seek justice on their behalf, prompting Boyd's objection to his comments. While Jennings’s appeal to the jury's sense of justice aligns with precedent, his remarks about the victims' graves were deemed unnecessary and emotionally charged. However, in light of the entire trial and strong evidence against Boyd, these remarks were not sufficiently egregious to justify a reversal.

Boyd also contends that the prosecutors improperly vouched for witness credibility. Since he did not object during the trial, this claim is reviewed for plain error. Vouching occurs when prosecutors assert personal belief in a witness's credibility, which can mislead the jury. However, the prosecutors’ comments merely highlighted inconsistencies in Boyd’s statements and did not express personal beliefs or imply undisclosed knowledge regarding witness credibility. Given that Boyd himself challenged the witnesses' credibility, the prosecutors were justified in responding. Overall, the court affirmed the conviction.