Carden v. Board of Registration for Professional Engineers

Citations: 174 Cal. App. 3d 736; 220 Cal. Rptr. 416; 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 2778Docket: B008832

Court: California Court of Appeal; October 28, 1985; California; State Appellate Court

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Michael J. Carden appeals a judgment that denied his petition for a peremptory writ of mandate against the Board of Registration for Professional Engineers. He raises several issues: 

1. The court allowed the Board to impose an extensive apprenticeship requirement in addition to the statutorily mandated nine years of engineering work experience.
2. The Board allegedly lacked the authority to expand the registration requirements for fire protection engineers beyond those specified in Business and Professions Code section 6767 and Bulletin 3-75.
3. The court incorrectly awarded only partial credit for Carden’s previous engagements due to disqualification for administrative work.
4. The Board did not issue a statement of findings regarding the denial of Carden's application for licensure as a fire protection engineer.

The Professional Engineers' Act requires applicants for registration to provide six years of satisfactory engineering experience and pass an examination. In 1974, the Act was amended to allow registration without examination for applicants with nine years of satisfactory experience. In 1975, the Board established regulations permitting registration as a fire protection engineer without examination if the applicant met the qualifications outlined, including the requirement for experience deemed satisfactory by the Board. The Board defined "fire protection engineering" as a branch of engineering focused on safeguarding life and property from fire hazards, necessitating specific education and experience.

Qualifying experience for professional engineer registration requires satisfactory full-time engineering work under a licensed engineer, as outlined in Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 16. 404, subd. n. Applicants must provide evidence of nine years of qualifying experience, excluding part-time work, short-term employment, and technician roles, as specified in Bulletin 3-75. A second bulletin detailed fire protection engineering. The appellant applied for registration as a fire protection engineer on December 21, 1976, holding a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration but lacking formal engineering education. His application included 15 years and 2 months of experience at J.M. Carden Sprinkler Co., where he worked under his father's supervision before becoming president in 1972. The board denied his application on June 8, 1977, citing that two of his engagements were considered apprenticeship periods and only partial credit was given for others. Despite submitting additional information in August 1977, the board reaffirmed its decision in April 1978. The administrative hearing initiated in June 1982 focused on whether his experience was nonqualifying due to being at a subprofessional level or primarily administrative. Testimonies indicated that individuals without formal engineering education require an apprenticeship to achieve professional capability, with most professionals achieving proficiency within two years. The board's expert, Daniel Jacobsen, assessed that appellant lacked sufficient credible professional performance time to qualify for registration without examination, emphasizing the improbability of attaining engineering expertise in two years without formal education. He concluded that by the end of the claimed engagements, the appellant had begun to perform professional engineering functions.

Appellant, as vice president of his company, claimed minimal engagement in administrative tasks—only one hour weekly and about 1% of his time on sales—attributed primary responsibilities to his father and a business manager. Even after becoming president, he asserted that his administrative duties remained largely delegated. Contrarily, witnesses testified that similar roles required 40% to 60% of their time for administrative responsibilities. Initially, an evaluator estimated appellant's professional engineering activity at 25% during two engagements but later adjusted this to 50% after considering witness testimonies. The administrative law judge and the board concluded that appellant failed to demonstrate nine years of competent experience in fire protection engineering, leading to the denial of his application on August 18, 1982. An unsuccessful petition for a writ of mandate to the superior court followed on January 17, 1984, prompting this appeal.

Appellant argued that the board exceeded its statutory authority by denying credit for apprenticeship experience. The court emphasized that judicial review focuses on the legality of the board's regulations rather than their wisdom, affirming that such regulations must fall within the authority granted and be necessary to fulfill statutory purposes. The court must uphold the presumption of regularity for administrative rules, deferring to the agency's expertise unless an arbitrary decision is evident. Appellant's claim that nine years of engineering experience qualifies an applicant under state standards overlooks the requirement that such experience must be satisfactory to the board, indicating that not all experience counts toward the minimum requirement. Lastly, the absence of an explicit mention of an apprenticeship period in the statutes does not restrict the board's authority but rather empowers it to define qualifying engineering experience.

In Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel, the court examined the authority of a licensing board, acknowledging that the California Legislature mandated registration for professional engineers to protect public welfare. The board's decision to limit qualifying experience to full-time professional engineering work was deemed reasonable to achieve these objectives. The appellant argued that guidelines used in evaluating applications were improperly admitted, claiming their unofficial status rendered them irrelevant. However, the court found that any admission of irrelevant material did not invalidate the board's actions, as long as there was sufficient competent evidence to support its determination. The board concluded that the appellant's experience at a subprofessional level did not meet the nine-year statutory requirement. An administrative law judge found that the appellant deserved 19 months of credit for his work, a decision later upheld by the board. The court emphasized its deference to the administrative expertise of licensing agencies, stating that it would uphold agency decisions unless they lacked substantial evidentiary support or violated statutory or constitutional rights. Ultimately, the evidence supported the board's finding that the appellant's work did not qualify as full-time engineering performed at a professional level.

The board's decision to grant appellant only partial credit for engagement 3 was supported by substantial evidence, including the finding that he spent half of his time on administrative duties during engagements 1 and 2. There were significant discrepancies between appellant's testimony and that of his colleagues regarding time allocation, and he failed to address these inconsistencies, despite being responsible for proving his qualifications under Business and Professions Code section 6767. The board was not required to fully accept appellant's claims given this context.

Appellant argued that full credit should be given if he could demonstrate his primary job function involved qualified engineering tasks. However, the Legislature stipulated that without passing an examination, a minimum of nine years of qualifying engineering experience is necessary to ensure public safety. The requirement for this experience to be gained through "full-time employment or activity" is deemed reasonable. Even if full credit were granted for engagements 1 and 2, appellant would still fall short of the nine-year requirement.

Appellant also claimed that the board's letters dated June 8, 1966, and April 12, 1978, lacked sufficient rationale for denying his application for licensing as a fire protection engineer. The standards from *Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles* dictate that the board's reasons must allow parties to understand the basis for the denial and guide potential review. The findings need not be overly specific; they should adequately connect the evidence to the board's decision, and should be interpreted liberally to support the board's order. The judgment affirming the board's decision was upheld, with concurrence from Roth, P.J., and Compton, J.

Section 6767 mandates that the board establish a final filing date for applications within three years following the adoption of relevant regulations. The board is authorized to implement necessary regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act. An appellant's work experience was detailed, listing various positions held from 1958 to 1976, with specific durations. However, Jacobsen determined that 28 months of the appellant's experience as a Fire Sprinkler-Fitter Apprentice was not "engineering-oriented," thus disregarding it for consideration. The court's ruling in Topanga emphasizes that variance boards are required to provide findings that support their decisions, and it is reasonable to limit this requirement to final administrative actions, as judicial review under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 pertains only to final administrative decisions resulting from mandated evidentiary hearings.