O'HARA v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc.

Citations: 917 F. Supp. 1523; 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20395; 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 44,169; 1995 WL 815229Docket: 4:94-cv-00664

Court: District Court, N.D. Oklahoma; November 13, 1995; Federal District Court

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Eleesa M. O'Hara filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Saint Francis Hospital, asserting pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The hospital moved for summary judgment, claiming O'Hara was discharged for incompetence and unsafe patient care rather than her pregnancy. The court outlined the criteria for granting summary judgment, stating it is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, as established by precedent. The burden is on the nonmoving party, O'Hara, to provide admissible evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact. Mere allegations or minimal evidence are insufficient to defeat the motion; rather, substantial evidence must indicate that a jury could find in her favor. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to O'Hara. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on gender, including discrimination based on pregnancy, as defined by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.

O'Hara must establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination by proving four elements: (1) she was pregnant, (2) she was qualified for the registered nurse position in the PACU at Saint Francis, (3) she was discharged, and (4) the position remained open or was filled by another person. If successful, this creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination, shifting the burden to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge. The defendant only needs to produce evidence, not to persuade the court of the motivation behind its actions. If the defendant meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination is eliminated. Ultimately, O'Hara must prove that the asserted reason for her discharge was not the true reason and that her pregnancy was a factor. The burden of persuasion regarding intentional discrimination remains with her. 

In reviewing the facts, O'Hara worked for Saint Francis for about ten years and began as a novice registered nurse in the PACU on May 18, 1992. She underwent a three-month orientation program, during which she was assigned a preceptor. Barbara Hannah, the clinical manager of the PACU, hired O'Hara along with three other novice nurses. Despite having no prior experience, O'Hara required orientation, similar to other newly hired nurses. A preceptorship conference record from August 15, 1992, contains both positive feedback on O'Hara's attitude and test performance and identifies areas for improvement, such as her difficulty transitioning from a student role to a registered nurse and her lack of engagement in patient care.

O'Hara acknowledged her inadequate skill level at the conclusion of her initial orientation in August 1992, attributing it to inconsistent training caused by multiple preceptors. To address this, her preceptor was changed to Maria Cox, with additional support from E. Fleetwood or J. Krajicek on other days. She was given four weeks to meet orientation criteria for caring for PACU patients, with weekly evaluations. By September 18, 1992, a conference revealed significant improvements in O'Hara's confidence and competence; she was deemed ready to start shifts independently. 

The record included suggestions for her continued development, emphasizing assertiveness in patient interactions, the need for support with ICU patients, proactive questioning, and ongoing study of surgeries and anatomy. O'Hara was assigned to a shift with more available assistance and the opportunity to manage sicker patients for experience. In November 1992, she received a written performance evaluation alongside several peers, scoring 30 points, placing her in the "meets and may exceed" expectations category. While her evaluation highlighted her dependability, motivation, and enthusiasm, her supervisor noted that O'Hara struggled to transition from asking questions to working independently and applying her training effectively.

In December 1992, she announced her pregnancy, and by early 1993, she faced five disciplinary write-ups related to patient care, culminating in her termination.

Five incidents involving nurse O'Hara are summarized based on affidavits and deposition testimonies. 

1. On January 20, 1993, O'Hara contravened a doctor's order by slowing the irrigation rate on a patient's prostate/bladder post-surgery, leading to a blockage that another nurse had to resolve.
2. On February 1, 1993, O'Hara's patient faced respiratory distress, requiring intervention from multiple medical personnel to avert cardiac arrest.
3. On March 17, 1993, O'Hara was stopped from rapidly injecting Lanoxin, which could have caused the patient's heart to stop and posed a risk of crystallizing with Ancef in the same IV line.
4. On March 24, 1993, another nurse intervened as O'Hara attempted to administer morphine to a patient with rapidly dropping blood pressure, which would have exacerbated the condition. O'Hara then left the unit in distress.
5. On April 8, 1993, O'Hara discharged a patient post-surgery who presented with a significant abdominal hematoma, raising concerns about her competency.

Following the March 17 incident, O'Hara was put on probation, and on March 23, she was unexpectedly required to take a PACU certification test, unlike other nurses. On March 28, O'Hara filed a discrimination complaint related to her employment. After the April 8 incident, Geuder recommended O'Hara's termination for incompetence, a decision supported by Ligouri, who was unaware of O'Hara's pregnancy. O'Hara was suspended and given until April 16 to find another position before her termination.

O'Hara established a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating her pregnancy, initial qualifications, and termination. However, she failed to show that her position was filled afterward. The defendant countered her claims by asserting incompetence as the reason for termination, which is a valid nondiscriminatory justification for firing a nurse. O'Hara acknowledged the hospital's concerns regarding her patient care practices, leading the court to conclude that the defendant met its burden of production.

To oppose Defendant's motion, Plaintiff must provide evidence that suggests the employer's non-discriminatory explanation is a pretext. Establishing a prima facie case alone is insufficient for overcoming a summary judgment motion; simply demonstrating that the employer's reason is incorrect does not meet the burden. The non-movant must present evidence that allows a rational factfinder to conclude that the employer's stated reasons for dismissal are false. The Court's task is to determine if there are disputed facts regarding the pretextual nature of the employer's actions.

While Plaintiff acknowledges the accuracy of the events described in her write-ups, she disputes the hospital's characterization of those incidents. Defendant's account relies on deposition testimonies and affidavits from seven nurses, whereas Plaintiff counters with her own deposition testimony, a memo she wrote, and a letter requesting an investigation into her termination. However, Plaintiff has not provided corroborating testimony from other witnesses, rendering her self-serving statements lacking in probative value.

Plaintiff does not present direct evidence of discrimination but claims circumstantial evidence suggests discriminatory intent, including suspicious timing and ambiguous statements. However, she fails to provide evidence showing that similarly situated employees received better treatment or that she was qualified for her position compared to the person who replaced her. Consequently, she cannot establish an inference of pretext due to the write-ups against her. The only supportive fact she offers is a favorable evaluation from November 1992, which categorized her performance as "meets and may exceed" expectations.

O'Hara, a PACU nurse, completed her initial training and an additional session. After struggling with orientation, her supervisor deemed her ready for shift work with assistance available. This evaluation occurred five months before her termination and two months prior to the first patient care incident that led to disciplinary write-ups. The time lapse renders the November evaluation irrelevant to her job performance post-orientation, failing to indicate any discriminatory intent by the hospital. 

O'Hara also claims that the timing of her write-ups, which began a month after announcing her pregnancy, suggests discrimination. However, the court concludes that timing alone does not imply discriminatory intent, particularly since the documented circumstances surrounding the patient incidents are supported by multiple witnesses. 

Furthermore, O'Hara argues that a test she was required to take in March demonstrates discrimination, claiming other nurses were not subjected to similar testing without warning. The court finds the hospital’s explanation for the test credible, noting it was intended for diagnostic purposes and that O'Hara was terminated before the results were reviewed.

Overall, O'Hara did not present sufficient evidence to prove discriminatory intent, as no rational trier of fact could infer that her termination was due to her pregnancy. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Saint Francis Hospital.