Daymon v. Hardin County General Hospital

Citations: 569 N.E.2d 316; 210 Ill. App. 3d 927; 155 Ill. Dec. 316; 1991 Ill. App. LEXIS 495Docket: 5-89-0839

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; March 26, 1991; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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June Daymon, the plaintiff, seeks damages for lost earnings and fringe benefits following her alleged wrongful discharge from Hardin County General Hospital. The crux of the case revolves around the hospital's Personnel Policies and Procedures handbook, which includes a disclaimer stating that the handbook does not constitute an employment contract. The defendant, Hardin County General Hospital, argues that this disclaimer establishes that Daymon was an at-will employee, meaning she could be terminated without cause.

On September 21, 1988, Daymon was discharged for leaving her work station on September 16, 1988, which was cited as a violation of the handbook's policy stating that employees must be present at their assigned jobs unless there is a bona fide emergency. Daymon contends that the discharge was unjust and contrary to the policies outlined in the handbook, claiming that both the hospital and its employees adhered to these policies as binding terms of employment.

The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, leading to Daymon's appeal. Under Illinois law, an employment contract that does not specify a term is considered at-will, allowing either party to terminate the relationship for any reason, as long as it does not violate independent contractual or statutory provisions. The precedent cases cited affirm that such relationships can end for good, bad, or no reason at all.

An employee hired for an unspecified duration is presumed to be an at-will employee, although this presumption can be challenged by demonstrating a different contractual agreement between the parties. In the case of Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, the Illinois Supreme Court established that an employee handbook can create enforceable contractual rights if certain criteria are met: (1) the handbook must contain a clear promise that an employee would reasonably interpret as an offer; (2) the handbook must be communicated to the employee in a way that ensures awareness of its content; and (3) the employee must accept the offer by starting or continuing employment post-awareness of the handbook. If these conditions are fulfilled, the employee's ongoing work is considered consideration for the promises within the handbook, thereby forming a valid contract.

In contrast, the presence of disclaimers in employee handbooks complicates contract claims. For instance, in Perman v. ArcVentures, Inc., the court found that a manual providing a grievance procedure could create enforceable rights despite disclaimers stating that the manual is not a contract. Conversely, in Bennett v. Evanston Hospital and Hogge, the courts ruled that handbooks with explicit disclaimers and no requirements for just cause for termination did not establish contracts, affirming the at-will employment status of the employees. Overall, the enforceability of contractual rights derived from employee handbooks hinges on the absence of disclaimers and the presence of specific contractual elements as outlined in the relevant case law.

In Hogge, the court determined that a statement could not imply that an employee could be terminated solely for conduct related to specific enumerated offenses. The existence of a contract is a legal question for the court, which also interprets contractual terms. A motion for judgment on the pleadings, per section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure, tests the sufficiency of pleadings, focusing solely on the allegations presented. The court examines whether any material factual issues exist; if none do, it determines which party is entitled to judgment based on the pleadings. The April 1, 1988, employee handbook, referenced in the complaint, outlines expectations for punctual attendance, notification for absences, and conditions for termination. It specifies that failure to notify a supervisor or excessive absenteeism may lead to dismissal and details the process for grievances, which includes discussing complaints with a supervisor. Specific reasons for discharge include missing scheduled workdays without notice and other serious offenses deemed by the Administrator. The handbook states that employees forfeit accrued personal days upon improper resignation or just cause termination, with no severance pay other than accrued days.

An employee must provide written notice to their supervisor within five working days if their grievance is not resolved, indicating an appeal to the Administrator. This appeal should be clearly stated, dated, and signed. The Administrator is required to meet with the employee within six days of receiving the appeal and must respond in writing to the grievance within ten days of the meeting, with the response also clearly stated, dated, and signed. If the grievance remains unresolved, the employee can notify the Administrator in writing within five days of receiving the Administrator's response to escalate the issue to the Board of Directors. 

The excerpt notes that the employee handbook does not contain explicit terms requiring just cause for dismissal. Although there is a grievance procedure for workplace issues, it does not clearly apply to terminations. The grievance procedure described contrasts with the one in the case of Perman, which allowed employees to appeal unfavorable employment decisions. The disciplinary actions listed in the handbook align with general expectations for at-will employment. 

The handbook’s provisions might imply that employees who resign properly or are terminated without just cause retain their accrued personal days. Despite the employer's claims of just cause for dismissal, the language in the handbook does not sufficiently assure employees that they cannot be discharged without just cause. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled that the handbook does not create enforceable contractual rights, leading to a judgment in favor of the defendant. 

Justice Goldenhersh dissents, arguing that the majority misapplied the law and disregarded ambiguities in the grievance procedures regarding terminations. He believes the case should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings, asserting that all requirements for contractual formation are present.