People v. Navarette

Citations: 54 Cal. App. 3d 1064; 127 Cal. Rptr. 55; 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1203Docket: Docket Nos. 13827, 35767

Court: California Court of Appeal; January 30, 1976; California; State Appellate Court

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An indictment was filed against Beatrice Navarette and Joe Peraza in the Santa Clara County Superior Court for selling heroin and offering to sell marijuana, violating sections 11352 and 11360 of the Health and Safety Code. Both defendants moved to quash the indictment, claiming discriminatory grand jury selection. Evidence presented at hearings revealed that from 1969 to 1973, 10.8% of grand jury nominees were women, despite women constituting 51.7% of the county's population according to the 1970 Census. An expert testified that this underrepresentation was statistically significant, prompting the trial court to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden to the prosecution to justify the disparity.

In response, seven superior court judges testified about their nomination practices. Judge McInerny nominated three women and two men, adhering to guidelines recommending a representative selection of jurors. Judge Gallagher nominated only men, viewing this outcome as coincidental, while Judge Allen nominated two women and three men, noting a conscious effort in 1974 to improve representation of women and minorities due to previous concerns over an all-male grand jury in 1973.

Judge Evans nominated eight individuals, including one woman, to the grand jury from 1969 to 1973, noting a perceived need for more female nominees and his efforts to identify women candidates. He observed that women were often reluctant to serve due to concerns about late hours and safety, and that fewer women had the desired experience for grand jury roles. Judge Rhodes nominated only men, relying on personal acquaintances and showing no initiative to seek qualified women. Judge Longinotti nominated five men, similarly failing to actively pursue female candidates despite discussions with some who declined due to childcare and safety concerns. Judge Hall’s ten nominations included no recalled women, and he acknowledged difficulties in finding women willing to serve due to time commitments and safety issues, recalling the need for police escorts for female jurors. The trial court noted that in 1974, there were 19 women and 11 men nominated. The defendants argued women and 'blue collar' workers were systematically excluded from the grand jury, supported by an affidavit from sociologist Robert Blauner about the distinct social class of 'blue collar' workers. The court ruled that 'blue collar' workers were not an identifiable class entitled to proportional representation. Ultimately, the court found no deliberate exclusion of women but acknowledged a significant underrepresentation, emphasizing that the absence of intentional discrimination did not negate the impact of sustained underrepresentation of a cognizable class over time.

Defendant Navarette's motion to quash the indictment was granted by the court due to her status as a woman and a member of an underrepresented class on the grand jury. In contrast, defendant Peraza's motion was denied because he could not demonstrate any bias stemming from the grand jury's underrepresentation of women. The People appealed the quashing of Navarette's indictment, while Peraza filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to halt further action on his charges, except for quashing his indictment. This writ has been consolidated with the People’s appeal. 

The Attorney General contends that evidence showed the underrepresentation of women on the Santa Clara County Grand Jury was not due to intentional exclusion, arguing that the court should not quash the indictment absent purposeful discrimination. He maintains that the legal standard remains one of purposeful discrimination, despite suggestions from a previous case (People v. Superior Court (Dean, 1974)) that there may be an affirmative duty to ensure a fair cross-section of the community in jury selection. The People assert that, at the time of the grand jury nominations in 1973, the law's ambiguity regarding women's proportional representation meant that judges were not required to avoid excluding women intentionally.

Navarette counters that once statistical evidence of women's underrepresentation was presented, the burden shifted to the prosecution to prove no purposeful discrimination occurred. She argues that the prosecution's limited witness testimony from only 7 of the 24 judges was insufficient to meet this burden and suggests that the non-testifying judges might have systematically excluded women. Additionally, she disputes the Attorney General's claim about the legal clarity regarding women's status as an identifiable group entitled to representation, asserting that judges had an affirmative duty to ensure women's proportional representation. The claim regarding the prosecution's burden of proof was dismissed, as the court found that calling additional judges would have been redundant after the initial testimony.

Counsel for defendant Navarette is barred from claiming that the testimony of the seven judges was unrepresentative of the 24 judges involved in grand jury nominations. The testimony supports the court’s conclusion that there was no intentional exclusion of women from the grand jury between 1969 and 1973. None of the judges viewed women as unqualified or deliberately chose not to nominate them, with three judges having nominated women. The limited nominations of women were attributed to their lower numbers willing to serve and their qualifications. Although the trial judges faced challenges in encouraging women to serve, the court upheld the finding of no deliberate exclusion.

The document raises two additional issues: whether the judges had an affirmative duty to ensure proportional representation of women and whether they failed in this duty. It concludes that the judges could have achieved greater representation by actively seeking qualified women candidates, noting that only 10.8% of nominees were women during 1969-1973, despite women being the majority in Santa Clara County. In contrast, in 1974, after making a concerted effort, the judges nominated 19 women and 11 men.

The Attorney General acknowledges that the judges recognized the need for representation of women in 1974. The final question is whether the lack of affirmative action in 1973 necessitates quashing the indictment against Navarette. Citing the case of People v. Superior Court (Dean), the document highlights that while systematic, purposeful discrimination must be proven, negligence or inertia can also lead to discrimination. Officials have a duty to implement procedures to ensure a fair cross-section of the community when forming a grand jury.

A constitutional challenge to the composition of the grand jury can be supported by statistical evidence showing discriminatory outcomes, even in the absence of intentional discrimination. In this case, the defense presented data indicating a consistent underrepresentation of women on the Santa Clara County Grand Jury over several years. The prosecution's argument that judges did not intend to discriminate was rejected by the trial court, which stated that the lack of discriminatory intent was not the key factor. This aligns with the precedent set in *Taylor v. Louisiana*, which established that systematic exclusion of women violates the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement. The trial court concluded that the indictment should be invalidated due to gross underrepresentation of women in prior grand jury panels.

However, a significant issue remains regarding whether the rulings in *Dean* and *Taylor* should apply retroactively or only prospectively. Arguments for restricting these principles to future cases include the prevailing legal standard at the time of the grand jury selection, which required proof of purposeful discrimination for a constitutional challenge. The current record does not demonstrate that the exclusion of women was intentional. Historical cases on discrimination primarily involved race, and thus do not directly apply to this situation involving gender. Additionally, the Supreme Court had not previously established that excluding women from jury pools violated the Sixth Amendment until the ruling in *Taylor*.

In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a Florida law that allowed women to serve on juries only voluntarily, leading to significant underrepresentation of women in grand juries. This ruling overturned the precedent set by Hoyt v. Florida. The court determined that the new standards established in Taylor should not be applied retroactively to convictions from juries impaneled before the decision, as affirmed in Daniel v. Louisiana. The factors considered included the purpose of the new standards, reliance by law enforcement on former standards, and the impact on justice administration. The judges were justified in relying on prior law that did not recognize unintentional discrimination in grand jury selection as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

In the case involving defendant Peraza, the court reaffirmed that a male defendant has standing to contest the underrepresentation of women on juries, as established in Taylor. The court emphasized that defendants, regardless of their gender, could challenge the constitutionality of jury composition based on the exclusion of women, reinforcing the principle that all defendants are entitled to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community. Previous cases, such as Peters v. Kiff, supported this position, demonstrating that claims regarding jury selection are not limited to those belonging to the excluded group.

The trial court incorrectly concluded that Peraza, as a male, could not challenge the grand jury's composition due to the underrepresentation of women. However, the principles established in Taylor and Daniel prevent retroactive application of this rule to Peraza's case. Peraza also argued that 'blue collar' workers constitute an identifiable class entitled to proportional representation on the grand jury. He attempted to distinguish ‘blue collar’ workers, who work with tools, from ‘white collar’ workers, who engage in office work. The Judicial Conference Committee Report and the 1942 Knox Report indicate that deliberate exclusion from jury lists based on race, color, or economic status is improper. Citing Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., which recognized daily wage earners as an identifiable class, Peraza sought to define a class of economically disadvantaged individuals. However, the term 'blue collar workers' is deemed too vague and overinclusive, as many ‘blue collar’ jobs can yield high incomes, complicating the distinction. The characteristics of a unique social status based on employment are ambiguous, as demonstrated by the inclusion of various occupations. Consequently, 'blue collar workers' do not form a distinctly identifiable group. The order quashing Navarette's indictment is vacated, and criminal proceedings are to be reinstated. Peraza's petition for a writ of prohibition is denied, and the previously granted alternative writ is discharged. Efforts by the Attorney General to differentiate this case from federal precedents regarding grand jury representation are deemed ineffective, as the U.S. Supreme Court does not recognize such distinctions.