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Merten v. National Manufacturers Bank of Neenah
Citations: 26 Wis. 2d 181; 131 N.W.2d 868; 1965 Wisc. LEXIS 970
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court; January 5, 1965; Wisconsin; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined that a judgment of divorce is reviewable even if one party has died. The respondent argued that sec. 247.37 (2) Stats. restricts the court's ability to set aside a divorce when one party is deceased. This statute allows for vacation or modification of a divorce judgment affecting marital status only if both parties are alive within one year of the judgment. However, the court referenced Hirchert v. Hirchert, which clarifies that a party can appeal a divorce judgment despite the other party's death. The court reasoned that it would be unjust to bind a party to an invalid judgment due to the other party's death. While the court acknowledged the appeal's legitimacy, it found no grounds to reverse the trial court's decision. The statute sec. 247.07 (4) allows for divorce based on cruel and inhuman treatment, but the evidence presented was minimal. The trial court's findings indicated the husband had treated the wife cruelly, but testimony was scant and uncorroborated. The court affirmed the trial judge's finding, as it aligned with the available evidence. Thus, while the divorce judgment was appealable, the court upheld it based on the evidence presented. The family court commissioner's recommendation for granting a divorce was deemed insufficient as it lacked compliance with statutory requirements to present evidence on the merits. While the commissioner's assertion of the parties being "irreconcilable" is relevant to marriage preservation efforts, it lacks probative value and does not fulfill the legal standard that requires demonstrating a violation of marital obligations. The trial court holds a significant advantage in assessing the evidence and the effects of the parties' actions, and a single act of cruelty can suffice for divorce. The appellate court affirms that a trial judge's decision carries substantial weight due to their direct engagement with the parties and context. Although there are concerns regarding the adequacy of evidence presented, the trial court's findings are not found to be against the weight of the evidence. The appellant's argument about the lack of corroboration for the testimony is dismissed, as the defendant was present and did not contest the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff's appeal regarding a modification of the judgment is also deemed appealable. The division of property was deemed fair and lawful, having been agreed upon by the parties with legal counsel. The stipulation and judgment explicitly stated that they were independent of any ongoing support obligations, identifying the arrangement as a "property settlement in lieu of alimony." The judgment confirmed the amount due was established at the time of judgment, with the husband given thirty days to secure the funds. His obligation was fixed, and the wife's right to payment vested immediately. While the husband expressed ethical concerns about transferring funds to his mother-in-law, the judgment clarified that the $8,500 was the wife's property, passing to her heirs as per law. The husband had no grounds for complaint regarding the settlement, which would have bound the wife similarly had she survived. According to Sec. 247.32, Stats., no further provisions for the wife were permitted after the final property division. The court affirmed the judgment and order, denying the motion for rehearing with costs on March 2, 1965.