In Re Edge

Citations: 33 Cal. App. 3d 149; 108 Cal. Rptr. 757; 1973 Cal. App. LEXIS 882Docket: Crim. 1484

Court: California Court of Appeal; June 28, 1973; California; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of California, Fifth District, reviewed an appeal from the People of the State of California challenging a superior court order that vacated the Adult Authority's revocation of Leslie Wayne Edge's parole. The court ordered a new revocation hearing in compliance with the due process standards established in Morrissey v. Brewer, which outlines minimum procedural safeguards required in parole revocation cases. 

Key issues included whether the Morrissey requirements apply to a parole revocation hearing that occurred after the Morrissey decision, despite earlier steps in the revocation process taking place before that date, and whether those requirements could be satisfied by separate criminal proceedings resulting in the parolee's conviction. 

Edge was released on parole on June 3, 1971, and subsequently arrested multiple times for various offenses, leading to a parole violation charge. The institutional revocation hearing took place on July 13, 1972, after the Morrissey ruling, during which Edge pleaded nolo contendere and had his parole revoked. He later filed a habeas corpus petition, resulting in the superior court's order that the People appealed.

The chronology indicated that although the revocation hearing was held post-Morrissey, all preceding actions occurred before the ruling. The court acknowledged that Morrissey was intended to apply prospectively and dismissed several arguments presented by the appellant aimed at avoiding the application of Morrissey, finding them unmeritorious.

Under Supreme Court Rule 59, mandates cannot be issued until 25 days post-judgment, which aligns with the period for filing a petition for rehearing under Rule 58. The Attorney General argues that the decision's operative date is only after this 25-day window. However, the Supreme Court typically considers its decisions effective from the date they are rendered, as established in multiple cases, including Desist v. United States and Johnson v. New Jersey. The California Supreme Court similarly views the decision in Morrissey as effective from its decision date, June 29, 1972. Given this established precedent, the intermediate appellate court recognizes that the Morrissey decision is effective immediately, not after 25 days. 

The court further notes that Morrissey explicitly applies to future parole revocations without indicating a delay for implementation, implying that the effective date aligns with the decision date. While the implementation burden on the parole system is acknowledged, it is deemed minor compared to the due process rights of parolees. The court references Goldberg v. Kelly, where a similar situation allowed for a transition period for implementing new procedures. Ultimately, the court holds that the decision’s compliance is necessary and due process considerations outweigh the state's burden of implementation.

Applying the principle of timely implementation of new parole procedures, the case emphasizes that parolees should not remain at liberty under unconstitutional procedures while awaiting new protocols. The analysis rejects the appellant's reliance on Goldberg to support their claims, asserting that no reasonable time frame for compliance with Morrissey can be inferred from its language, precedents, or context. The appellant contends that the parole revocation proceedings commenced on May 26, 1972, with the filing of the revocation report, thereby arguing that Morrissey is not relevant despite a subsequent hearing on July 13, 1972. This argument analogizes the filing to the beginning of a criminal trial, but the Attorney General counters that the revocation hearing signifies the end of the process initiated by the parolee's arrest. The appellant references several Supreme Court cases establishing that new constitutional doctrines apply prospectively to cases where trials begin after their announcement. However, the document clarifies that various stages precede a criminal trial, asserting that the revocation hearing is comparable to a trial phase. Consequently, the filing of the revocation report cannot be equated with trial commencement; the revocation hearing itself is essential for determining the validity of the parole revocation, aligning it with the trial framework in criminal proceedings. The conclusion emphasizes that new doctrines apply to any events occurring prior to the actual revocation hearing.

In Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, the Supreme Court determined that the constitutional principles established in Katz v. United States, regarding wiretap evidence, apply only to searches conducted after the decision's date. Similarly, Stovall v. Denno ruled that the right to counsel in lineups is limited to those occurring after June 12, 1967, the date of United States v. Wade. No precedent links the effective date of these decisions to the filing date of complaints or indictments. In the present case, there is no logical connection between the effective date of the decision and the filing of the parole revocation report on May 26, 1972. Consequently, all Morrissey requirements, including the necessity of a preliminary hearing, must be met for any in-custody parole revocation hearings not concluded by June 29, 1972.

Morrissey outlines minimum due process requirements for revocation hearings: written notice of violations, disclosure of evidence against the parolee, the opportunity to present evidence and witnesses, the right to confront adverse witnesses (unless justified otherwise), a neutral hearing body, and a written statement explaining the evidence and reasoning for revocation. The revocation process is not equivalent to a criminal trial but should allow for a flexible consideration of evidence, including materials typically inadmissible in criminal court. At the hearing, the parolee must have the opportunity to contest the violation or present mitigating circumstances.

A parolee cannot relitigate issues decided in other forums, particularly if the revocation is based on a conviction of another crime, which does not require reproving guilt. However, the parolee may present evidence to dispute the conviction's relevance to the parole violation or to challenge inaccuracies in the violation report. Edge's claim for an informal preliminary hearing on all charged violations, including those linked to criminal convictions, is denied, as such hearings are not required for violations supported by independent criminal convictions. Preliminary proceedings serve to determine whether grounds exist for revocation, justifying temporary detention pending formal proceedings.

The court compared the initial proceedings for parole violations to a preliminary hearing aimed at establishing 'probable cause' for such violations. Due process mandates a minimal inquiry conducted promptly and near the site of the alleged violation, with the understanding that this inquiry does not require a judicial officer but can involve qualified personnel like a parole officer. The parolee must receive notice of the hearing, where they have the right to speak on their behalf and present evidence and witnesses, except if the identity of an informant poses a risk. A summary of the proceedings must be created, and the hearing officer must assess whether probable cause exists for revocation.

The court referenced the Morrissey case, emphasizing that it does not intend to create rigid procedures for parole revocations, particularly when charges stem from criminal prosecutions, which provide adequate protections under established criminal law. In cases where the parolee is convicted, this conviction serves as probable cause for parole revocation. The Adult Authority is instructed to conduct further hearings adhering to Morrissey guidelines within 30 days of the decision being finalized. The order appealed is affirmed with modifications, and a petition for rehearing was denied. Justice Douglas’ partial dissent clarified that the entire court agreed on certain conclusions regarding the non-relitigation of issues settled in other forums.