Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.

Citations: 593 F. Supp. 1066; 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23652Docket: 81-2295-Civ

Court: District Court, S.D. Florida; September 12, 1984; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Edwin Lees Shaw, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Scott Shaw, deceased, brought a case against Grumman Aerospace Corporation under the Death on the High Seas Act and Federal Admiralty Law. The non-jury trial, presided over by District Judge Aronovitz, involved testimonies from lay and expert witnesses, examination of exhibits, and oral arguments. 

Key findings include: 

1. Navy Lieutenant J.G. Gary S. Shaw died on December 12, 1979, when his Grumman A-6 aircraft crashed into the ocean shortly after being launched from the aircraft carrier Constellation.
2. Neither Shaw's body nor the aircraft wreckage was recovered.
3. Edwin Lees Shaw is the personal representative of Gary Scott Shaw's estate, which is being probated in Dade County, Florida.
4. Grumman Aerospace Corporation is based in New York but also authorized to operate in Florida.
5. At the time of the incident, Gary Shaw resided in Fort Lauderdale, and the aircraft was being utilized as intended.
6. Shaw's death resulted in significant financial losses for his widow and daughter, totaling $840,556.75, subject to potential adjustments for VA benefits and pre-judgment interest.
7. A detailed investigation was conducted by Lieutenant Commander John Schork, who was present during the incident. His findings were based on witness interviews, aircraft records, and simulations of potential mechanical failures.

The Court admitted parts of Schork's factual findings into evidence, allowing for further examination and cross-examination based on his investigatory conclusions and opinions.

Lieutenant Commander Schork ruled out several potential causes for the aircraft accident, including engine and catapult failure, pilot incapacitation, and disorientation, deeming them unlikely. He identified the most probable reason as an issue with the horizontal stabilizer's leading edge, focusing on six likely problem areas, such as loss of a locking bolt, tampering, foreign object damage, and failure of the control system. Schork deemed willful tampering and major structural failure unlikely, considering foreign object damage and Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) malfunction to be remote. He concluded that the crash resulted from a loss or failure of hardware in the stabilizer actuation system, supported by evidence of the aircraft's violent nose-down pitch and similar stabilizer behavior in simulations.

This conclusion was corroborated by expert opinions, including those of Plaintiff's experts Thomas Lombardo and Ira Rimson, which the Court accepted as credible in establishing liability. Joseph Novak, an A-6 engineering manager, testified that his opinion regarding a disconnect in the flight control system was formed independently of the Navy JAG report and was based on the aircraft's behavior during launch. Although he slightly modified his stance during live testimony, he reaffirmed his initial opinion. Additionally, eyewitness Lieutenant Commander Daniel Jorvig observed the stabilizer's position during the crash, which supported the conclusion of a failure in the longitudinal control system. The investigation indicated that the disconnect occurred near the walking beam, but the critical issue was identified as a lack of redundancy in the longitudinal flight control system.

The accident was caused by the uncontrolled rotation of the longitudinal stabilizer to a leading edge-up position, resulting from a design flaw that lacked failsafe mechanisms to prevent such uncontrollable movement. This defect rendered the aircraft dangerously uncontrollable, particularly if the primary control system was disrupted, leading to a certain crash. Grumman, the manufacturer, designed and sold the KA-6D aircraft to the Navy, which was expected to remain in its original condition, aside from modifications intended to address the design defect. The aircraft was deemed unreasonably dangerous due to the pilot's inability to control it upon disconnection of the primary system.

Grumman failed to exercise reasonable care in its design, leading to an inherent defect characterized by a total lack of redundancy in the control system. The absence of a warning device further exacerbated the risk to users like Gary Shaw. Historical data revealed that six prior incidents had also resulted from disruptions in the longitudinal control system, often occurring during takeoff, indicating a recognized defect that Grumman attributed to maintenance rather than design.

Grumman proposed several Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) to address this issue, including the installation of self-retaining bolts in the control system, which were initially rejected for budgetary reasons. Eventually, ECP 822 was approved, leading to the issuance of Air Frame Change (AFC) 416 in February 1978, mandating the retrofit of A-6 aircraft with these bolts. Records show that the subject aircraft had undergone part of this retrofit before the crash, but it indicates that the new bolts did not resolve the underlying design flaw, as evidenced by the accident involving NG523.

The Navy issued general performance and criteria specifications for the A-6 aircraft, leading to Grumman winning the contract in 1967. Grumman provided detailed specifications, which were approved by the Navy, allowing production to commence. Under MIL-D-8706, Grumman understood that the Navy did not assume responsibility for the accuracy of design data unless specifically approved. The Navy's testing of A-6 prototypes focused on quantitative measures of mission and performance criteria, while Grumman retained final control over the aircraft's design, including its longitudinal flight control system. 

The A-6 aircraft delivered to the Navy, including the subject aircraft, were deemed defective. Grumman impliedly warranted the aircraft to be airworthy and free from defects, which Navy pilot Gary Shaw relied upon. Grumman breached these warranties by delivering a defective aircraft with a critical flaw in the longitudinal control system, lacking redundancy, which could lead to catastrophic failures. If a disconnect occurred in a specific area, pilots could not detect loss of control, and the design lacked warning devices, preventing timely ejection in emergencies.

Despite knowing about the defect, Grumman suggested a flawed remedy, misleading the Navy into thinking the issue was resolved. Effective design necessitates redundancy and consideration of potential failures, which Grumman neglected. The design flaw and Grumman's negligence were proximate causes of Shaw's death in the accident. Redundancy has been a standard requirement in aviation for decades, and while other A-6 control systems had redundancies, Grumman attributed the issue to Navy maintenance rather than addressing the inherent design defect. Alternative redundancy solutions were available to Grumman but were not implemented.

Dual controls could have been implemented in the aircraft, but this would have increased weight and complexity. Despite the strong components of the longitudinal flight control system providing some redundancy, additional redundancy is essential to prevent system disruption. The Navy's broad "detail specifications" allowed Grumman significant leeway in design choices. MIL-F-18372 outlines general requirements for flight control systems in Navy aircraft and permits various designs. The A-6 aircraft did not meet several Navy specifications, and Grumman was required to conduct a failure effects analysis of its longitudinal flight control system. Grumman's analysis for the A2F-1 identified a lack of redundancy, categorizing failures of summing linkage components as Class I failures that could lead to catastrophic outcomes. Notably, Grumman did not perform a failure effects analysis for the A-6A, despite significant modifications to the control system, including changes to the stabilator and other components.

The A-6's flight control system failed to comply with the Navy's Detail Specification concerning simplicity, reliability, maintenance ease, and failure compensations, as well as MIL-F-18372, which mandates designs that avoid system discontinuity upon device failure. The system's shortcomings were evident in its failure effects analysis, which also highlighted redundancy and failsafe requirements outlined in SD-24K. Grumman neglected to incorporate a redundancy factor in the design, even though it was feasible to do so. Additionally, mechanisms to prevent random stabilator migration were technically possible, yet Grumman did not implement such safety features, despite their existence in other A-6 control systems.

The control system used by Grumman was not cutting-edge and has been prevalent in general aviation. There was a notable knowledge imbalance regarding design risks between Grumman and the Navy. Grumman was aware that the lack of redundancy posed a risk of single-point failures leading to stabilator migration, which could result in disaster. Although Grumman acknowledged the risk of random migration due to disconnection, it did not consider implementing a safety mechanism to mitigate this risk. Grumman focused on minor issues, such as bolt failures, rather than addressing the fundamental defects in the A-6's longitudinal flight control system.

The Navy, upon recognizing defects in the aircraft linked to a history of accidents, relied on Grumman's advice to resolve a critical issue with the longitudinal flight control system through the installation of self-retaining bolts. Despite having some awareness of potential redundancy issues, the Navy lacked the design expertise to fully understand the catastrophic risks associated with the disconnect problem. Grumman possessed superior knowledge regarding design defects and failed to adequately inform the Navy about the underlying flaw in the A-6's flight control system. At the time of approving Grumman's specifications, the Navy was unaware of these design defects. Grumman also neglected to warn the Navy and end users, such as Gary Shaw, about the inherent dangers of the aircraft's control system.

The court confirmed its jurisdiction under the Death on the High Seas Act and Federal Admiralty Law, establishing proper venue. It concluded that the A-6 aircraft did not meet the Navy's performance specifications and was unfit for intended use. Grumman, holding final control over the aircraft's design, was found negligent in its design, manufacture, and testing processes, directly contributing to Shaw's death. The negligence breached warranties related to merchantability and fitness, leading to Grumman being strictly liable for damages. 

Grumman attempted to assert the government contractor defense, which places the burden of proof on it to demonstrate eligibility. However, the court determined that Grumman failed to meet this burden of proof regarding the defense's applicability.

Evidence is deemed insufficient to demonstrate that the Navy, rather than Grumman, created the detailed specifications and drawings for the A-6 aircraft's longitudinal flight control system. It also fails to show that Grumman adhered to government specifications in a material manner or that it alerted the Navy to known patent errors or dangers associated with the aircraft. There was a knowledge imbalance regarding defects between Grumman and the military at the time of specification approval. Once aware of the design flaws, Grumman led the Navy to believe that installing self-retaining bolts would remedy the issues, justifying the Navy's reliance on Grumman's expertise.

Approval of Grumman's specifications by the Navy does not grant immunity under the government contractor defense, as this defense is not applicable when the contractor sets detailed specifications and the government merely approves them. The parties have agreed that potential damages are $840,556.75, subject to certain deductions for VA benefits and potential additions for pre-judgment interest. The court finds that pre-judgment interest is discretionary and should not be awarded due to the plaintiff's delay in filing, ongoing disputes about liability, and the complexity of the case. 

The widow and children of the deceased pilot receive Veterans Benefits, and the defendant argues these benefits should offset any damages awarded. However, cited cases do not support this argument as they pertain to actions against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, where Veterans Benefits can be offset against claims against the government but do not provide a basis for reducing damages in this context.

The Defendant is not required to compensate the Plaintiff multiple times for the same injuries, as the assessment pertains solely to the Defendant's wrongdoing. Payments from third parties, such as the United States, do not diminish the Defendant's liability, as supported by McKay v. Rockwell, which does not endorse a set-off for the Defendant. The Ninth Circuit's reversal of the District Court's liability finding did not address damages, reinforcing the Plaintiff's case against duplicity in compensation from different sources. The "collateral source" rule under Florida law prohibits any set-off, as noted in legal precedents. This situation differs from Federal Tort Claims Act cases where the liable party also provides benefits. Thus, it is deemed fair for Grumman to be held accountable. A final judgment will be entered in favor of the Plaintiff for $840,556.75, with costs to be determined by the Clerk upon submission of a Bill of Costs by the Plaintiff within thirty days.