United States v. Curtis Rhine

Citation: Not availableDocket: 10-10037

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; April 1, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

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Curtis Oneal Rhine pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Initially sentenced to 360 months based on a higher offense level linked to his prior involvement in a drug-trafficking organization known as the 'Fish Bowl,' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for re-sentencing after determining the offenses were not part of a common scheme. Upon remand, the probation officer calculated a new sentencing range of 30 to 37 months. However, the district court sentenced Rhine to 180 months, explaining that the sentence needed to reflect his past drug conduct and adequately address the seriousness of his offenses, promote respect for the law, deter future criminal conduct, and protect the public. The court justified the length of the sentence as a variance from the advisory guidelines, emphasizing the need to account for Rhine's criminal history and conduct. The appellate court affirmed the district court's sentence, finding it procedurally correct and substantively reasonable.

The district court classified the sentence as a non-Guidelines sentence while also addressing potential departures under the Guidelines in the Statement of Reasons (SOR). Although the court indicated the sentence was outside the advisory sentencing guidelines, it completed a section of the SOR related to Guidelines-authorized departures. Rhine is appealing the sentence, which is subject to "reasonable" review as established by United States v. Booker. This review assesses both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Procedural reasonableness requires calculating the Guidelines range, considering 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and providing an explanation for the sentencing decision. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 30-37 months and noted the necessity of a 180-month sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and protect the public. The district court's explanation met the requirements for a non-Guidelines sentence, providing sufficient rationale for its decision. Additionally, the court referenced Rhine's participation in prison programs as relevant to his history and characteristics under § 3553(a)(1). Overall, the district court clearly intended to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines framework while supporting its decision with adequate justification.

Appellant's claim that Rhine I precludes consideration of his involvement with the Fish Bowl drug ring is incorrect. The ruling in Rhine I specifically addressed whether Rhine’s offense was limited to the 1.89 grams of crack cocaine in his possession on October 24, 2007, or encompassed all drugs he helped distribute. It was determined that the Fish Bowl drug trafficking did not constitute relevant conduct for the offense of conviction. However, the district court was permitted to consider Rhine's involvement with the Fish Bowl as part of his criminal history under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), which allows for a broad interpretation of a defendant's history.

The dissent's criticism regarding the procedural and substantive adequacy of the trial court’s sentence is unfounded. Procedural reasonableness follows the precedents set in United States v. Mares and United States v. Bonilla, which emphasize that the district court's reasoning must be assessed within the context of the entire proceedings, including the presentence report (PSR). The PSR indicated that Rhine was a significant supplier of crack cocaine, with involvement in over 4.5 kilograms, paralleling an aggravating factor in Bonilla's case. Thus, the district court's acknowledgment of Rhine's substantial drug trade participation was appropriate.

In terms of substantive reasonableness, the court evaluated the totality of circumstances, including the degree of variance from the guidelines. A deviation from the guidelines does not inherently render a sentence unreasonable. The 180-month sentence was justified based on Rhine's prior drug-related conduct, as detailed in the PSR, and the district court's discussion of the statutory purposes outlined in § 3553(a)(2). The decision to impose an upward variance was not arbitrary but was grounded in Rhine’s extensive drug trafficking history.

A district court can adopt facts from a presentence report (PSR) if those facts are reliable and the defendant does not provide evidence to contest them. In Curtis Oneal Rhine's case, his sentence of 180 months was half the statutory maximum for his guilty pleas. Rhine's argument against his sentence is linked to a procedural issue: if the court couldn't consider his alleged involvement in a separate drug trafficking scheme, the sentence would be unreasonable. Since the procedural argument is deemed invalid, the substantive challenge is also dismissed. The court found no abuse of discretion in the 180-month sentence for Rhine's drug and firearm offenses, affirming the decision.

In dissent, Circuit Judge Dennis notes that the court had previously vacated Rhine’s sentence due to procedural errors related to considering unrelated conduct. On remand, the district court set the proper Sentencing Guidelines range at 30 to 37 months but imposed a 180-month sentence, significantly above this range, citing it could be justified as a variance or departure. However, the dissent argues that the district court failed to adequately explain this deviation or provide fact-specific justification, rendering the sentence both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The dissent emphasizes that major departures require stronger justification than minor ones, and the district court's lack of explanation for the 180-month sentence was arbitrary.

The district court's sentencing departure was based on Rhine's alleged involvement in the Fish Bowl drug trafficking scheme, which the court claimed justified the application of certain Guidelines provisions. However, these provisions require that the conduct must be part of or similar to the offense of conviction. In the previous case, Rhine I, it was determined that the Fish Bowl conduct was not related to the offenses for which Rhine was convicted. Consequently, the dissenting opinion recommends vacating Rhine's sentence and remanding the case for re-sentencing.

Key facts include that during a routine traffic stop in October 2007, Rhine, a convicted felon, was found in a vehicle with marijuana and firearms. He was later discovered to have cocaine concealed in his anal cavity, leading to a two-count indictment for possession with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm by a felon. The pre-sentence report highlighted Rhine's alleged involvement in the Fish Bowl drug operation, detailing a prior FBI investigation that implicated him despite him not being charged. The probation officer suggested considering Rhine's alleged drug trafficking when calculating his Guidelines sentencing range, resulting in a Total Offense Level of 37 and a recommended imprisonment range of 292 to 365 months.

The district court initially upheld the findings of the pre-sentence report, rejecting Rhine's objections, and concluded that the transactions reviewed were interconnected, classifying them as part of a single episode. Consequently, Rhine received the maximum sentence of 240 months for Count 1 and 120 months for Count 2, to run consecutively. This sentence was later vacated and remanded for re-sentencing, as the appellate court determined that under Guidelines 1B1.3, related offenses must be part of a common scheme or course of conduct for proper consideration. The court found that Rhine's involvement in the Fish Bowl drug-trafficking ring was not sufficiently connected to his current offenses; there was no evidence linking his sole accomplice to the Fish Bowl activities, nor was there any overlap in the nature or execution of the offenses. The only shared aspect was the motivation for profit from crack cocaine distribution, which was deemed inadequate for establishing a common scheme. The analysis noted the significant differences in the nature of the offenses, including the scale of drugs involved and the contexts of transactions. Additionally, there was a notable temporal gap of at least 17 months between Rhine's participation in the Fish Bowl activities and his offense, with no evidence of intervening criminal conduct. On remand, the probation officer updated the pre-sentence report with two addenda.

Rhine was assessed with a criminal history category of IV and an offense level of 15, resulting in a recommended sentencing range of 30 to 37 months of imprisonment, which the parties did not contest. It was noted that had Rhine been convicted for his alleged involvement in the Fish Bowl drug trafficking, he would have received three additional points in his criminal history, changing his guideline range to 37 to 46 months. The probation officer suggested that the district court might consider a variance outside the advisory guidelines due to procedural history and Rhine's alleged Fish Bowl involvement, although the revised reports did not clarify the rationale or extent of the potential variance. The original probation report stated that no facts warranted a sentence outside the guidelines. The Government indicated that the court could impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court could also increase the sentence using Guidelines departure provisions if Rhine’s criminal history was deemed to under-represent the seriousness of his conduct or based on other aggravating circumstances. Although a specific departure recommendation was initially made, it was later withdrawn. At sentencing, the district court accepted the findings from the addenda and confirmed the offense level and category. The court indicated the need for a sentence that considered Rhine's prior drug conduct, suggesting that a sentence above the advisory guideline range was appropriate.

The Court determined that a total sentence of 180 months was necessary to address the defendant's criminal history and conduct, reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment, deterring future crimes, and protecting the public. The defendant was noted to be benefiting from prison programs, which the Court believed would continue. The sentence imposed was deemed a reasonable variance, though the district court did not provide detailed justifications for this variance during sentencing. The defense objected to the sentence as unreasonable. The district court later issued a written statement of reasons that adopted facts from pre-sentence reports, indicating the sentence could be viewed as either a variance or a departure under guidelines. The Court justified the variance based on factors such as the nature of the offense and the defendant's history, referencing specific sections of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It also stated that the sentence was reasonable in light of the advisory guidelines range. However, the Court inconsistently applied Guidelines provisions, specifically citing 5K2.21, which a prior report deemed inapplicable to the defendant. Ultimately, the sentence represented a 147-month increase above the top end of the correctly calculated guidelines range, raising the imprisonment term from three to fifteen years, with minimal explanation beyond a general reference to the pre-sentence report and 3553(a) factors.

The district court did not clarify how specific provisions influenced the defendant's criminal history category, offense level, or recommended sentencing range. The Supreme Court's decision in Gall v. United States established a two-step review for federal sentences. Initially, the appellate court must verify that no significant procedural errors occurred, such as improper calculations of the Guidelines range, failure to treat the Guidelines as advisory, neglecting the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, basing the sentence on erroneous facts, or inadequately explaining the rationale behind the chosen sentence. If the procedural aspects are sound, the appellate court then evaluates the sentence's substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard, factoring in the overall circumstances and any variance from the Guidelines range.

When assessing reasonableness, appellate courts consider the degree of variance and any incorrect application of Guidelines provisions. The review process is bifurcated: first, identifying procedural errors with de novo review of the Guidelines and clear error review of factual findings; second, evaluating substantive reasonableness under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The author contends that the district court made errors during re-sentencing, necessitating vacating and remanding for another re-sentencing. Specifically, the court failed to sufficiently explain its sentence, rendering it arbitrary and substantively unreasonable. Additionally, the court improperly applied Guidelines provisions, highlighting the necessity for district courts to adequately articulate their sentencing decisions to satisfy appellate review standards.

When a judge imposes a sentence outside the Sentencing Guidelines, they are required to provide a clear explanation for their decision, as established in United States v. Taylor. This circuit emphasizes that for non-Guideline sentences, the judge must articulate specific reasons that justify the chosen sentence, including any aggravating or mitigating circumstances related to the defendant's personal characteristics, offense conduct, and criminal history. Courts have found it to be plain error for a district court not to provide fact-specific reasons for an upward departure, as seen in United States v. Jimenez. Further, the district court's comments during sentencing must demonstrate consideration of the parties' arguments and a reasoned basis for the legal decision-making process, as noted in United States v. Cavera.

The adequacy of the judge's explanation is context-dependent; a brief rationale may suffice for straightforward arguments, but significant departures from the Guidelines necessitate a more substantial justification. The Eleventh Circuit has similarly mandated that when a sentence deviates from the recommended Guidelines range, the district court must explain why the imposed variance is justified based on the case's unique facts, as illustrated in United States v. Livesay, where a sentence of probation was vacated for lacking sufficient justification compared to the recommended imprisonment range.

The district court failed to provide adequate reasoning for imposing a sentence significantly below the advisory Guidelines range, which raised concerns about meaningful appellate review and fairness in sentencing. Specifically, the court did not explain how a 60-month probation sentence, with 6 months of home detention, was appropriate for a defendant involved in a $1.4 billion fraud, undermining the seriousness of the offense. The court's only justification—a conclusory statement about satisfying Congress's concerns for deterrence—was deemed insufficient. This lack of explanation mirrors issues in United States v. Carter, where the Fourth Circuit vacated a below-Guidelines sentence due to the district court's failure to articulate why a Guidelines sentence would be excessive. The Fourth Circuit emphasized the necessity for individualized assessments in sentencing, which must be clearly articulated to allow for meaningful appellate review. The absence of such an assessment in the present case led to a conclusion that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable. In contrast, in United States v. Bonilla, the Fifth Circuit found a variance sentence to be "minimally sufficient" as the district court provided some rationale based on the record, highlighting that adequate reasoning is essential for the legitimacy of variance sentences.

Reports indicated that the Government deemed a 41-month sentence appropriate due to the defendant's inconsistent employment history, issues with alcohol, and experiences of homelessness. Several case precedents illustrate procedural errors in sentencing where courts failed to provide adequate explanations for their decisions, particularly in relation to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Notable cases, such as United States v. Figueroa and United States v. Lynn, emphasize that a lack of individualized rationale for significant deviations from sentencing guidelines constitutes reversible error. The district court in the present case similarly failed to articulate how specific § 3553(a) factors applied, merely making generic statements without a tailored assessment of the defendant's conduct. References to the defendant's alleged drug trafficking involvement did not substantiate the court's reasoning. The court's explanations were limited to basic acknowledgments of guideline calculations without addressing the defendant's arguments or providing any meaningful insight into its decision-making process. Consequently, the district court did not meet the necessary standards for adequately explaining the imposed sentence.

The district court's imposition of a significant variance in sentencing lacks adequate justification and explanation, failing to meet the standards set by precedent cases such as Livesay and Carter. In those cases, appellate courts found that district courts did not sufficiently articulate how they arrived at the imposed sentences, despite referencing specific facts and consulting probation officers. The current district court's mere mention of the defendant's "drug activities" in the "Fish Bowl" area from the presentence report does not clarify how those facts justified the significant variance from the recommended sentence. The court also stated that a prison environment would benefit the defendant but did not explain why this warranted a fifteen-year sentence instead of the three years suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines. Without providing specific reasons or a detailed connection between the facts and the sentence, the district court's rationale is deemed insufficient. Unlike the case of Bonilla, where reports explained the rationale behind the selected sentence, the probation officer's report in this instance lacks detail. Consequently, the court's failure to adequately explain the sentence constitutes a procedural error, as it leaves unclear how the sentence was determined. This case is further distinguished from Bonilla by the fact that the same judge had previously indicated that the conduct leading to the current sentence could justify a significantly longer sentence of thirty years.

The district court's sentencing decision is criticized for lacking adequate explanation and for being substantively unreasonable. The court's new sentence appeared to be a compromise between a prior sentence and the Guidelines' recommendation, but it failed to provide sufficient reasoning for this change. The distinction from the case of Bonilla indicates that the court's justification was inadequate. Procedural error is identified due to the absence of a detailed explanation, which is vital for assessing the reasonableness of the sentence. According to precedent, a sentence's substantive reasonableness depends on whether the reasoning supports the imposed term. A major departure from Guidelines requires compelling justification, and the principle that punishment should fit the individual rather than just the crime is emphasized. The court's prior decisions (Gall and Kimbrough) illustrate the necessity of considering unique case circumstances. Ultimately, a sentence is deemed substantively unreasonable if determined arbitrarily, as established by various circuit court rulings.

Defendant's sentence is deemed procedurally unreasonable as he was not given an explanation regarding the specific basis of his sentence, which should consider his personal background, characteristics, and the nature of his offense. The district court abused its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence, appearing to select the sentence arbitrarily. Citing relevant case law, it is emphasized that a substantial exercise of discretion must have limits and that a sentence lacking rationale is inherently unreasonable. The district court varied the sentence to account for the defendant's alleged involvement in a drug trafficking scheme but did not provide adequate justification for the significant increase in the sentence compared to the recommended Guidelines. The court's previous view on the reasonableness of a longer sentence for the same conduct further underscores the arbitrary nature of the current sentence. The defense highlighted that, had the defendant been charged with the conduct, he would have received a much lower sentencing range. The majority's rationale for the sentence being substantively reasonable only reinforces the conclusion of arbitrariness. Ultimately, it is asserted that the lack of connection between the imposed sentence and the reasons provided indicates a substantively unreasonable decision that cannot be justified as a departure.

In light of the court's previous decision in Rhine I, 583 F.3d 878, and the law of the case doctrine, the departure provisions cited by the district court are deemed inapplicable. The law of the case doctrine maintains that decisions on a rule of law should govern subsequent stages of the same case. The district court justified its sentence based on Guidelines 4A1.3 and 5K2.0, referencing Rhine’s alleged involvement in a drug trafficking scheme. However, the court previously determined that this alleged conduct was not similar to the current offenses, highlighting substantial differences in quantities, distribution methods, participants, and the nature of transactions.

For Guidelines 4A1.3 to apply, prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction is required, which the court found lacking in this case. Additionally, for 5K2.0 to apply, it must relate to the circumstances of the current offense, and again, the court had established that Rhine’s purported involvement was not part of the same course of conduct or a common scheme related to the current offenses.

The district court also referenced Guidelines 5K2.21 in its written statement of reasons; however, this provision was acknowledged as inapplicable since the uncharged conduct did not connect to the current offenses. The only commonality noted was the profit motive from crack cocaine distribution, which was insufficient due to significant differences in the nature of the sales and participants involved.

Consequently, none of the departure provisions cited can justify the sentence. Although generally a sentence may be upheld despite errors if it can be shown the same sentence would have been imposed, in this case, three errors were identified: 1) a procedural error in failing to adequately explain the sentence, hindering meaningful appellate review; 2) an arbitrary imposition rendering the sentence substantively unreasonable; and 3) reliance on inapplicable departure provisions, which does not support the sentence. Therefore, the recommendation is to vacate the sentence and remand for re-sentencing.