ESTATE OF VERDI BY VERDI v. Toland

Citations: 733 N.E.2d 25; 2000 Ind. App. LEXIS 1147; 2000 WL 1048581Docket: 74A01-9908-CV-277

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; July 31, 2000; Indiana; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case involves the Estate of Helen Verdi, represented by Frank J. Verdi, appealing a trial court's summary judgment favoring Peggy Toland, both individually and as Executrix of Cecil Toon’s Last Will. The key issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Toland. 

The facts indicate that Cecil Toon, the testator, lived with Helen Verdi and her husband for most of his life. After the deaths of both Verdi's husband and Toon's wife, they continued to live together. Toon executed a will in 1996 bequeathing all assets to Verdi and naming her executrix. In 1997, after moving Toon to a rehabilitation center, Toland and her brother sought guardianship due to Toon's diminished mental capacity, which was confirmed by medical evaluations stating he was incapacitated and unable to manage his affairs. 

Despite this, Toon executed a second will in September 1997, which split his estate between Toland and Verdi. The same attorney who represented Toland in the guardianship proceeding drafted this new will. Toon died in December 1997. The appellate court ultimately reversed the trial court's decision, indicating potential issues regarding the validity of the second will given the circumstances of Toon's mental capacity at the time of its execution.

On December 29, 1997, the Second Will was filed for probate, followed by the Verdi Estate's "Will Contest" on May 19, 1998. The Executrix sought summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Verdi Estate appealed, arguing that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the Testator's mental soundness and potential undue influence. 

The standard for summary judgment requires no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, shifting the burden to the non-movant to present facts disputing this. The presumption of soundness of mind can be rebutted by evidence showing a lack of mental capacity at the time of will execution. The Verdi Estate presented evidence, including a report indicating the Testator suffered from dementia, a court order appointing a guardian due to incapacity, and a psychiatrist’s conclusion of incompetence prior to the will's execution. This evidence raised genuine issues about the Testator's mental capacity.

Regarding undue influence, a presumption arises when a relationship of trust existed between the Testator and the defendant, and the defendant benefited from the will. Niece, having been appointed guardian and benefitting from the will change, was in such a position. Coupled with evidence that the Testator was easily led due to dementia, this raised a presumption of undue influence that needed to be addressed at trial.

Consequently, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Niece was deemed erroneous, leading to a reversal of that decision.

The Verdi Estate raised an appeal issue regarding the trial court's failure to grant a Motion to Strike hearsay statements and those violating the Dead Man's Statute from the defendants' affidavits prior to ruling on their Motion for Summary Judgment. However, the court found that the facts presented by the Verdi Estate made it unnecessary to address this issue to resolve the appeal. Nonetheless, guidance was provided concerning the Dead Man's Statute, as outlined in Indiana Code section 34-45-2-4, which applies to cases involving executors or administrators and matters from the decedent's lifetime, rendering adverse parties incompetent witnesses against the estate, unless related to the testator's soundness of mind. In this case, since Niece is involved and a devisee under the testator's second last will, she is considered incompetent to testify against the estate, except on matters regarding the testator's mental capacity. Additionally, the Verdi Estate's claim of fraud against the testator lacked supporting evidence, leading to the conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact existed on that point. The testator's First Will, dated October 20, 1996, named Verdi as the sole heir to the estate.