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Continental Air Transport Co. v. Carpentier
Citations: 152 N.E.2d 488; 19 Ill. App. 2d 340Docket: Gen. 47,479
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; September 18, 1958; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Continental Air Transport Company sought licenses under Section 3-801(f) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle law, which applies to buses used as common carriers for more than seven passengers. The Secretary of State denied the licenses, classifying the plaintiff's buses, which operated exclusively between airports and the city, as serving a specialized purpose, thus not qualifying for the general transportation provisions. The company filed a $5,600 surety bond and sought judicial relief under the Administrative Review Act, naming state officials as defendants. The trial court issued a temporary injunction preventing the defendants from enforcing the law against the plaintiff pending judicial review of the license denial. The court's powers under the Administrative Review Act allow for a stay of the agency's decision, and the court determined it had the authority to issue the injunction to maintain the status quo until the case's resolution. Key issues included the appropriateness of the restraining order and the inclusion of non-party state officials in the proceedings. The court affirmed its authority to grant such relief as indicated in Section 12 of the Act. Defendants Bibb and Morris argue they were wrongfully included in the Administrative Review proceedings and injunction order because they were not parties in the initial proceedings before the Secretary of State, thus lacking an opportunity to be heard. According to Section 8 of the Administrative Review Act, only parties of record to the original proceedings should be made defendants. Although Bibb and Morris were not involved in those proceedings, their inclusion was deemed necessary to enforce a temporary restraining order, which aimed to protect the plaintiff's transportation service from potential penalties and irreparable harm during the review process. The Administrative Review Act, Section 14, states that the Civil Practice Act applies to all related proceedings, allowing for the joinder of necessary defendants for comprehensive resolution of the controversy, as per Section 24 of the Civil Practice Act. The court interpreted these statutes liberally to support efficient dispute resolution and determined that Bibb and Morris were appropriately included in the Review proceedings. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the plaintiff could adequately remedy the situation by paying license fees under protest, noting legislative changes effective January 1, 1958, which established that the Secretary of State's actions relating to licenses are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Review Act. The court also dismissed the defendants' claim that these proceedings violated the Illinois Constitution by asserting that including a state agency as a defendant does not infringe on sovereign immunity, referencing Moline Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue. Thus, the trial court's order was affirmed.