Fare v. Willie T.

Citations: 71 Cal. App. 3d 345; 139 Cal. Rptr. 439; 71 Cal. App. 2d 345; 1977 Cal. App. LEXIS 1618Docket: Crim. 29409

Court: California Court of Appeal; June 29, 1977; California; State Appellate Court

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A juvenile court referee found Willie T. to be a person under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for receiving stolen property, violating Penal Code section 496. Following a continuance of the disposition hearing, the referee ordered his removal from his mother's custody for suitable placement. This decision was upheld by a juvenile court judge, and a rehearing request was denied. The case arose after Robert Quinonez observed his stolen bicycle being ridden by Willie T., who was arrested by Officer McCarroll shortly thereafter. Although Willie was read his rights, the officer did not confirm if he wished to waive them until later at the station, where Willie indicated he did. He claimed to have received the bicycle frame from another boy but did not initially know it was stolen until informed by Quinonez.

Willie T. raised several contentions on appeal: (1) he did not intelligently waive his Miranda rights due to his age and lack of prior police experience, (2) trial counsel's failure to object to the admissibility of his statement constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) his right to apply for rehearing was compromised because the application was submitted by his mother rather than by legal counsel, and (4) the continuance of the disposition was effectively a probation period, making the suitable placement order invalid without compliance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 777. The appeal highlights concerns regarding the admissibility of statements made by a minor without proper waiver of rights and the procedural integrity of the juvenile court process.

In the absence of an objection during trial, issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as established in multiple California cases. The appellant's claim that the lack of objection from trial counsel constituted ineffective assistance is unfounded. The record indicates that counsel's decision not to object was a tactical choice, believing the appellant's statements were exculpatory. The key issue was whether the appellant knew the bike was stolen, and his statements were consistent with his defense.

Additionally, the appellant's capability to waive his rights was not compromised. California law holds that a minor's age does not automatically render them incapable of waiving rights; this determination depends on the circumstances. Officer McCarroll explained the appellant's rights clearly, and the appellant indicated understanding. Although it was noted that the appellant had an IQ of 85 and was academically behind, this does not preclude the validity of his waiver, as similar cases have upheld that minors with lower intelligence can still make informed decisions.

The application for rehearing filed by the appellant's mother was deemed ineffective as it lacked substantive legal argument, and there was no indication why counsel did not prepare the application. The judge reviewed the transcripts from the hearings, which included trial counsel's arguments, before denying the rehearing. The absence of a formal application by counsel did not negate the judge's ability to consider the case comprehensively, as per established case law.

At the disposition hearing on April 21, 1976, the referee imposed conditions for the appellant, emphasizing the importance of attending school and obeying his mother to remain at home. Failure to comply would result in removal from the home. The appellant was allowed to stay with his mother under conditions, including full-time school attendance at an approved institution, timely notification of absences to the probation officer, a curfew of 9 p.m., regular reporting to the probation officer, and adherence to all laws, prohibiting possession of weapons, alcohol, drugs, or theft.

During a subsequent hearing on July 21, 1976, a new public defender objected to the conditions imposed, suggesting they were akin to probation and required a formal hearing to modify the disposition. The referee rejected this argument, noting that no objections were raised at the previous hearing regarding the three-month continuance and reaffirmed that the minor was given a chance to meet the imposed conditions to avoid more severe consequences.

Concerns arose from the probation officer's report indicating the appellant had been frequently truant and beyond his mother's control. Consequently, the referee extended the disposition for three weeks to obtain a psychiatric report. At the third hearing on August 11, 1976, the referee declared the appellant a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, determining that home probation was ineffective for rehabilitation. The court ordered suitable placement that included weekly psychiatric counseling and remedial education, recognizing the need for more structured support.

Appellant argues that the court's order on April 21, which included certain conditions, effectively placed him on probation rather than simply continuing the case. He claims that the court improperly modified this order by removing him from his mother's custody without adhering to the modification procedures outlined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 777. The court agrees that the order violated the 45-day limit set by section 702, which governs continuances. Although intended for appellant's benefit, the continuance essentially constituted a probation order, leading to prejudicial treatment in subsequent proceedings as they were treated as an original disposition rather than a modification. The court emphasizes that different statutory standards apply to modifications compared to original dispositions. Respondent suggests that appellant waived this issue by not objecting to the continuance, but the court disagrees, asserting that acceptance of probation does not waive procedural requirements for its revocation. The appellate court ultimately reverses the disposition order and remands for further proceedings, while affirming all other aspects of the order. A petition for rehearing and a petition for a Supreme Court hearing were both denied.

Miranda v. Arizona establishes the requirement for law enforcement to inform individuals of their rights during custodial interrogation. Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 mandates that any order altering a previous custody arrangement for a minor, such as removing them from a parent or guardian and placing them in foster care or a correctional facility, must follow a noticed hearing based on a supplemental petition filed by a probation officer. This petition must provide sufficient facts to demonstrate that prior efforts at rehabilitation or protection of the minor were ineffective. Following the filing, the juvenile court clerk is required to schedule a hearing within 30 days, and the probation officer must serve notice as outlined in specified sections. Additionally, any order to detain the minor before the hearing must be preceded by a separate hearing as detailed in Article 15 of the chapter.