State v. Knoche

Citations: 515 N.W.2d 834; 1994 S.D. LEXIS 61; 1994 WL 170214Docket: 18424

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court; May 4, 1994; South Dakota; State Supreme Court

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Robert G. Knoche was extradited from Indiana and arraigned on forgery charges and as a habitual offender in South Dakota. After being found guilty of forgery by a jury on May 27, 1993, he was sentenced to 13 years in prison and ordered to pay restitution of $321.31. Knoche's appeal raised multiple issues, including the admissibility of prior bad acts, the denial of proposed jury instructions, the requirement to display a tattoo, sufficiency of evidence, and procedural concerns regarding the habitual offender charge. 

The facts revealed that Knoche forged checks from the Dakota Inn, which were identified by several witnesses who recognized him due to his tattoo and other identifying information. The trial court allowed testimony related to other forgeries for identification purposes, accompanied by limiting instructions to the jury. Knoche did not present any witnesses during his trial. The habitual offender jury was informed of Knoche's prior conviction, which was contested by him. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decisions.

Knoche was determined to be the same individual convicted of eight prior felonies, resulting in a 13-year sentence in the state penitentiary. The court allowed the admission of evidence regarding Knoche's prior acts of passing forged checks to establish his identity and a common plan, despite his objection that it unfairly portrayed him as a "bad person." Under SDCL 19-12-5, while evidence of prior crimes is generally inadmissible to prove character, it may be permissible for other purposes. The trial court ruled the evidence relevant, concluding its probative value outweighed any potential prejudicial effect, and provided limiting instructions to the jury.

Regarding jury instructions, Knoche contested the completeness of the instruction concerning the elements of forgery as outlined in the indictment. The trial court rejected his proposed additions, deeming them redundant, since the instruction already required the jury to find that Knoche knew the signature was forged. The court affirmed that jury instructions are adequate if they accurately convey the law and inform the jury, which was satisfied in this case.

Knoche must demonstrate both an error in the jury instructions and that such error likely influenced the verdict. He failed to do so, as no evidence indicated he knew the check's signature was forged. Reimers testified under oath that she never issued a check to Knoche, a claim he did not contest. A jury verdict can only be overturned if the evidence does not support a rational theory of guilt, and in this case, the evidence was sufficient to uphold the finding that Knoche passed a forged check. Additionally, Knoche argued the trial court erred by not including a falsus in uno instruction, asserting that the credibility of witness Dolecheck was questionable. While Dolecheck's testimony included an error regarding the location of Knoche's tattoo, there was no indication he was intentionally misleading. Knoche did not clarify how this affected his case theory. The court noted that the requested instruction’s essence was already covered by other instructions provided to the jury. Knoche's constitutional rights were not violated when he was compelled to show his tattoo to Dolecheck, as this action constituted a demonstration of physical evidence rather than compelled testimony. The court found no error in the trial proceedings.

Evidence was deemed sufficient to support the conviction. The trial court appropriately informed the jury about Knoche's forgery conviction as part of the habitual offender proceedings. Despite Knoche's argument that this disclosure prejudiced the jury, the court retained discretion to choose jurors, as established in State v. Moves Camp, which indicates no constitutional right to a new jury in this context. 

Knoche's attempt to dismiss a juror for cause was unsuccessful; although the juror expressed doubts about presuming innocence, she affirmed her ability to be fair and impartial when questioned by the court. Knoche did not further pursue the dismissal on the record, and the juror was later removed through a peremptory challenge. Previous rulings confirm that a juror's sworn declaration of impartiality outweighs preliminary opinions.

The trial court correctly deferred ruling on motions regarding the constitutionality of Knoche's prior convictions until after the trial, as he did not provide sufficient legal authority to necessitate an immediate ruling. His lack of evidence against the constitutionality of his prior convictions meant the court found no error in this approach.

Finally, Knoche's arraignment on the habitual offender charge prior to the underlying conviction was not reversible error. Although he claimed this violated SDCL 23A-7-7, precedent from Moves Camp affirmed that such premature arraignment did not adversely affect the outcome of the trial or infringe upon his rights.

Knoche was informed of his constitutional rights at his initial appearance and was provided with a court-appointed attorney, present during his arraignment for the forgery charge and both trials. After being initially arraigned on a habitual offender charge prior to his forgery conviction, he was arraigned again on this charge post-conviction. The trial court was aware of the details in the Part II Information, and these circumstances did not constitute reversible error; they were imperfections that did not hinder a fair trial.

Following Knoche's habitual offender conviction, the trial court sentenced him under SDCL 22-7-8.1, which enhances punishment for non-violent prior convictions, with a life imprisonment upgrade for violent crimes. Although there was an error in the habitual criminal information alleging a violent crime in Oregon, this was rectified before sentencing. Ultimately, Knoche received a 13-year sentence, less time served, and was not prejudiced by the initial error. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the court. 

Additional notes indicate that Knoche's citations regarding the admission of prior bad acts were deemed irrelevant, as judicial notice had not been taken. Furthermore, forgery does not require actual falsification of a signature, and Knoche did not dispute the forgery itself, focusing instead on the identity of the person passing the forged checks. Lastly, it was noted that a jury may dismiss the testimony of any witness found to have knowingly provided false testimony on material facts.