People v. Wesley

Citations: 198 Cal. App. 3d 519; 243 Cal. Rptr. 785; 1988 Cal. App. LEXIS 85Docket: D005080

Court: California Court of Appeal; February 10, 1988; California; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Jerry L. Wesley was convicted by a jury for failing to appear in court after being released on bail, in violation of Penal Code section 1320.5. Wesley appealed, arguing that the trial court did not instruct the jury that they needed to find he specifically intended to evade the court's process to secure a conviction. The case revolves around whether section 1320.5 constitutes a specific or general intent crime, referencing the Supreme Court's explanation of intent distinctions in People v. Hood. A general intent crime requires proof only of the intention to perform the act itself, while specific intent requires proving the intention to achieve a further consequence. The court emphasized the importance of legislative intent in statutory interpretation and noted that the language of section 1320.5 clearly states that a person is guilty if they willfully fail to appear “in order to evade the process of the court.” The statute also outlines potential penalties, including fines up to $10,000 or imprisonment. The analysis of legislative history and statutory context is critical to understanding the intent behind the law.

The phrase 'in order to' indicates a specific purpose, which in this context is 'to evade the process of the court.' This intention modifies the requirement of 'willfully fails to appear as required,' establishing section 1320.5 as a specific intent crime. An individual must not only intend to fail to appear but also intend for that failure to achieve the purpose of evading court processes. This interpretation is supported by the concluding sentence of section 1320.5, which clarifies that a willful failure to appear must have the specific intent to evade the court. The Attorney General's argument that this language merely limits unlawful conduct overlooks the significance of the phrases 'in order to' and 'for the purpose of,' which are essential to understanding legislative intent and should not be considered redundant. Additionally, the Attorney General's interpretation of section 1320.5 as a general intent crime conflicts with the overall statutory framework. Historically, the crime of failure to appear was established as a general intent crime in 1959; however, section 1320, enacted in 1979, explicitly includes language that necessitates specific intent, indicating that the Legislature intentionally required this element. The presumption in section 1320 that a defendant who willfully fails to appear within 14 days intends to evade the court further reinforces this specific intent requirement.

The Pacific Law Journal's analysis highlights that the new statute includes the intent to evade court processes as a crime element, establishing a rebuttable presumption that a felony defendant who willfully fails to appear within fourteen days intends to evade the court. This statute, enacted in 1983 as section 1320.5, parallels section 1320 but differs in its evidentiary approach. Both sections describe a defendant's mental state regarding willful failure to appear with the intent to evade the court process in similar terms, suggesting no legislative intent to differentiate between defendants based on their release status (recognizance vs. bail).

The trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the requisite specific intent, constituting a denial of due process. This omission is significant enough to require reversal unless the error is deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The review of the record indicated that the error was not harmless, particularly as the defense centered on the defendant Wesley's lack of intent to evade. Wesley's testimony, which included claims of returning to court while being disoriented from illness and medication, raised substantial issues that could not be dismissed as trivial. Therefore, the judgment was reversed, with concurrence from Justices Wiener and Todd. 

Notes clarify that all statutory references pertain to the Penal Code, provide definitions, and discuss relevant case law regarding the implications of intent instruction errors. The analysis emphasizes the necessity for courts to adhere to proper jury instructions regarding intent to ensure a fair trial process.