Los Angeles County Department of Children's Services v. Richard H.

Citations: 234 Cal. App. 3d 1351; 285 Cal. Rptr. 917; 91 Daily Journal DAR 12231; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8014; 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 1152Docket: B051004

Court: California Court of Appeal; October 2, 1991; California; State Appellate Court

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A father appeals a juvenile court order declaring his minor sons, Richard H. and Christopher H., dependents under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The appeal follows the Los Angeles Police Department's detention of the children after Christopher was found comatose and hospitalized. The Department of Children's Services (DCS) filed a dependency petition alleging parental neglect and exposure to violence. 

Subsequent hearings revealed that both parents failed to appear for the initial adjudication, leading to multiple continuances. The prerelease investigation (PRI) report recommended against placing the children with the father due to his inconsistent presence at home, lack of employment, and alcohol use. Testimony from the maternal aunt and uncle highlighted the father's neglect, including failure to seek medical care for Christopher despite worsening symptoms and exposure to domestic violence. The court ultimately affirmed the dependency order, citing evidence of the father's inadequate care and the children's need for stability and protection.

The mother of the Minors resided with their maternal grandmother in April 1989 but occasionally stayed with the appellant. Mr. B. testified that prior to April 15, 1989, only the parents had custody of Christopher, and he observed both parents with the children during the week leading up to that date. Dr. Ellis Beasley, the physician who treated Christopher upon his hospital admission, detailed two separate head injuries: a severe parietal skull fracture and a subdural hematoma, both indicative of blunt force trauma rather than accidental causes. Dr. Beasley explained that subdural hematomas result from trauma or violent shaking, and if a child is subjected to continued shaking after a blood vessel bursts, it can lead to a comatose state, initially marked by irritability and later seizures.

At the hearing's conclusion, the court found the Minors to fit the criteria outlined in section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (j). The court sustained counts I and IV against the appellant, which alleged that Christopher was hospitalized due to severe injuries that could only have resulted from neglectful actions by the parents, endangering both Christopher's and Richard's health. Additionally, it was noted that the Minors were exposed to violent confrontations between their parents.

During the disposition hearing on February 8, 1990, the parents contested the social worker's recommendations, leading to a further hearing scheduled for April 3, 1990. The Department of Children’s Services (DCS) submitted reports indicating the parents' refusal to acknowledge their role in Christopher's injuries and raised concerns about the mother's developmental delays. The reports also highlighted severe neglect, as the parents reportedly misused aid funds intended for the Minors to support a partying lifestyle, necessitating assistance from relatives for basic needs. The DCS social worker, Byford Singleton, explained that the parents' denials made it unsafe for the Minors to return home.

Andy Boczan, a DCS social worker, assessed the Minors' situation, noting significant health issues for Christopher, including brain damage necessitating eye surgery. During a phone call, Boczan observed that appellant exhibited irrational behavior, suggesting possible substance use. Appellant and the Minors' mother agreed to participate in parenting and drug programs, for which Boczan provided transportation funds, specifying their intended use. Appellant claimed he completed the drug program but failed to provide verification and did not attend, a behavior Boczan viewed as irresponsible. The Minors' mother, described as passive due to a developmental disability, was dominated by appellant.

Appellant admitted to misusing the transportation funds, claiming to have attended a parenting class, which he delayed enrolling in and which was unauthorized. He had not secured employment. The Minors' mother testified that appellant used part of the transportation funds to buy food. Following a hearing, the court declared the Minors dependent and ordered their removal from parental custody, prompting appellant to appeal.

Appellant raised several contentions, including the court's failure to determine jurisdiction within six months and lack of evidence supporting the petition's allegations. He also argued against the court's decision not to place the Minors in his home, the finding of reasonable efforts without meaningful services provided to him, and the failure to appoint separate counsel for the Minors. The discussion clarified that procedural delays do not automatically warrant petition dismissal, emphasizing the protection of child welfare as the priority in dependency proceedings.

A court ruled that dismissing a case solely due to the late filing of a progress report, without considering the minors' best interests, undermines the objectives of dependency proceedings. The court emphasized that section 366.2 was not intended to impose mandatory jurisdictional penalties for noncompliance, nor did it suggest that the court would lose jurisdiction due to delays by the probation officer. Section 352 allows the court to extend hearings if not counter to the minors' interests, indicating that its time limits are also not strictly mandatory. The appellant's failure to object to multiple continuances resulted in a waiver of any claim of harm from these delays. Although the appellant argued for dismissal due to perceived delays by the county, he did not object to the various continuations set by the court, which included agreeing to a later date for the disposition hearing. 

The court found substantial evidence supporting the sustained petition, which is evaluated based on whether any substantial evidence supports the trier of fact's conclusion. Conflicts in evidence must favor the respondent, and the appellate court cannot substitute its own deductions. The appellant contended there was insufficient evidence regarding how his son Christopher was injured and whether his other son Richard was in danger. He argued that alternative explanations for Christopher’s injuries existed and highlighted his non-violent behavior towards his sons. However, this position overlooked evidence suggesting severe neglect by the parents, including claims that they misused welfare funds intended for the minors’ care. Such reports constituted substantial evidence supporting the dependency petition.

Evidence presented included Dr. Beasley's testimony regarding Christopher's two independent nonaccidental head injuries, establishing prima facie evidence that he fell under the protection of section 300, which was not successfully rebutted by the appellant. Testimony from the Minors' aunt and uncle indicated that Christopher was likely injured by one of his parents and that the appellant failed to seek timely medical attention. Inferences were also made regarding the potential for similar neglect affecting Richard. The court supported findings of violent confrontations between the parents, highlighted by Mr. B.'s testimony concerning the appellant's aggressive behavior and intoxication.

The appellant argued that the court wrongly denied placement of the Minors with him, asserting that such a decision violated section 361, subdivision (a) by imposing unnecessary limitations on parental rights. However, as a noncustodial parent, placement was governed by section 361.2, which mandates placement with the noncustodial parent unless it poses a detriment to the child. The court declared the minors dependents under section 300, citing clear and convincing evidence of substantial danger to their physical health, stemming from the father's violent confrontations and a lack of demonstrated ability to provide for the children.

The court acknowledged that while the County made reasonable efforts to prevent the Minors' removal, such efforts were technically legal but fell short of moral adequacy. These efforts included referrals for parenting and drug classes, alongside financial assistance, which was misused by the parents. Although the parents eventually began parenting classes, there was a significant delay in their enrollment, undermining their progress.

Appellant attended only five classes of a six-month parenting course, indicating significant progress still needed. His prior neglect, including delaying medical attention for one son and misusing welfare funds, supports the court's decision to deny custody. Testimony revealed appellant's irrational behavior, and despite receiving funds for a drug abuse program, he misallocated the money for personal needs instead. Although he cites a precedent (In re Danielle M.) arguing that lack of resources alone shouldn't deny custody, the current case shows evidence of neglect and potential danger to the children. Appellant acknowledged that his alcohol use could impair his caregiving abilities, raising concerns about his compliance with court orders. The court found substantial evidence that reasonable services were provided to appellant, despite his claims of insufficient assistance and his expectations of a home evaluation. The statute governing services for noncustodial parents is discretionary, and reasonable services were deemed minimally provided. Additionally, the representation of both DCS and the Minors by county counsel did not necessitate a reversal of the court's decision, as appellant argued potential conflicts of interest without sufficient basis for separate counsel appointment.

An actual conflict of interest must be present for a juvenile court to appoint separate counsel for a minor. County counsel can represent a minor without a conflict. The interpretation of former section 318 requires a certification that joint representation does not pose actual conflicts. Legislative history of section 317 confirms that an actual conflict must exist for separate counsel to be necessary. In this case, no actual conflict was found; the appellant failed to substantiate that a dependency petition against family reunification inherently creates a conflict of interest. The court noted that section 319 does not imply that family reunification must always be favored or that its absence creates an automatic conflict. Additionally, the claim of a conflict due to delayed prosecution was rejected, as the court believed the minors' best interests were served by their placement with relatives. Even if the court had erred in not appointing separate counsel, such an error would be deemed harmless, aligning with precedent that allows for dual representation under certain conditions if no actual conflict is present.

Appointment of counsel for minors in dependency proceedings is governed by section 317, requiring certification of no conflicts of interest before county counsel can represent both the Department of Child Services (DCS) and the minor at a detention hearing. The court referenced *In re Patricia E.*, which highlighted the potential for ineffective assistance due to joint representation, finding error due to the absence of counsel communication with the minor. *In re Elizabeth M.* rejected this evaluation standard, emphasizing that the right to counsel in dependency cases is statutory, not constitutional, and applied a standard that reversal requires a miscarriage of justice. The *Richard E.* case distinguished between the lack of counsel in dependency proceedings and criminal cases. The current case found no miscarriage of justice despite the lack of certification regarding conflicts of interest. The county counsel adequately represented the minors' best interests, as no independent counsel could have presented additional facts to benefit the minors. Consequently, the court affirmed the order from April 3, 1990.

Statutory references pertain to the Welfare and Institutions Code. An amended petition was filed on August 16, 1989. Relevant subdivisions address minors facing severe nonaccidental physical harm, serious harm due to parental negligence, risk of serious emotional damage, or having a sibling who has been abused. Section 352(b) mandates that if a minor is removed from parental custody, the dispositional hearing under Section 361 must occur within 60 days of the removal order unless exceptional circumstances are documented. Continuances cannot extend the hearing beyond six months after the Section 319 hearing. Section 358(a)(1) stipulates that the disposition hearing must occur within 10 judicial days post-adjudication. The county must demonstrate that the minors fit the criteria of section 300 by a preponderance of the evidence and that removal is justified by clear and convincing evidence. Section 317(c) demands the appointment of counsel for a minor if it benefits the minor, with stipulations against conflicts of interest. A letter dated August 2, 1991, acknowledged judicial notice of a memorandum and legislative changes to section 317 from Senate Bill No. 243. Former section 318, which required counsel appointment at detention hearings for certain minors, was repealed on January 1, 1989, with its provisions now included in section 317.