Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court

Citations: 234 Cal. App. 3d 1019; 286 Cal. Rptr. 323; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7913; 91 Daily Journal DAR 12031; 1992 A.M.C. 320; 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 1124Docket: Docket Nos. B050142, B050255

Court: California Court of Appeal; September 27, 1991; California; State Appellate Court

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Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. petitions for writs of mandate to vacate trial court orders that denied its motions to dismiss or stay two negligence actions (Williams and Secard) in the Los Angeles Superior Court, asserting that a forum-selection clause in the ticket contracts mandates litigation in Florida. The court consolidated the cases due to identical legal and factual questions and partially granted the petitions, remanding for further proceedings on the issue of notice regarding the forum-selection clause.

The plaintiffs allege injuries sustained during a cruise on the M/V Tropicale due to Carnival's negligence, citing multiple failures: not informing passengers of a severe storm, departing despite warnings, inadequate safety equipment, insufficient staffing and training, lack of safety instructions, failure to maintain the vessel's seaworthiness, and issues with tugboat services leading to a collision with the dock. The enforceability of the forum-selection clause hinges on whether the plaintiffs had sufficient notice of it before entering the contract. If a plaintiff is found to have been sufficiently notified, the clause is enforceable; if not, it is not enforceable.

On September 15, 1989, Carnival filed a special appearance and a motion to dismiss or stay the action under Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30, asserting that plaintiffs had agreed to litigate any disputes arising from their voyage in Florida. A similar motion was filed in a related case, Secard. Carnival cited ticket contract provisions indicating that acceptance of the ticket constituted agreement to all terms, including a forum-selection clause mandating litigation in Florida. Bruce A. Jordan, Carnival's assistant general counsel, confirmed that the company is based in Miami, Florida, and handles all passenger claims there.

In opposition, the Williams plaintiffs argued the forum-selection clause was unenforceable, claiming it was unreasonable, not clearly communicated, and not freely bargained for. They also contended that enforcement would violate federal statute 46 U.S.C. 183(c) and the principles established in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. The plaintiffs highlighted that of the 238 plaintiffs, nearly two-thirds were California residents, with no plaintiffs from Florida. Attorney Donna Silver stated many plaintiffs received tickets shortly before departure, with some not receiving tickets at all until boarding. Additionally, she noted that many plaintiffs faced physical and financial hardships that would impede their ability to travel to Florida for litigation.

The Secard plaintiffs similarly argued against the enforcement of the forum-selection clause, citing a lack of evidence that it was freely negotiated and asserting that its enforcement would effectively deny them access to the courts due to logistical challenges.

Miguel P. Inumerable, attorney for the Secard plaintiffs, asserted that key witnesses, including the treating physicians and employees of the United States Weather Service, would face inconvenience if the case were moved to Florida. The Secard plaintiffs—Antoinette, Ed, Fred, George, and Joan—identified Dr. Peter Yatar and Dr. Dale Kellon as their medical providers in California. Carnival, in a reply dated April 3, 1990, defended the enforceability of the forum-selection clause, claiming the plaintiffs had adequate notice and consented to the terms of the ticket contract. Carnival's General Counsel, Lawrence D. Winson, emphasized that the clause was intended to prevent litigation in multiple jurisdictions and that Florida was chosen for its operational convenience, housing its legal department and most vessels.

On April 12, 1990, the court denied motions to transfer the cases to Florida, citing the case of Full-Sight v. Soft-Lenses. The court noted that transferring the case to Florida would be unreasonable and unjust, considering the interests of the 238 plaintiffs from California, where the voyage began and medical treatment occurred. The court deemed California the appropriate venue. In a prior opinion (Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court), the court ruled the forum-selection clause unenforceable, referencing Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, indicating it reflected overreaching by Carnival and would severely impede the plaintiffs’ access to court.

On November 15, 1990, the Supreme Court denied a petition for review of a prior opinion. Subsequently, on April 17, 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's decision in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute and vacated the judgment, remanding the case for further consideration. The analysis of the original holding was deemed no longer valid due to the Shute decision, although the facts differ regarding whether plaintiffs had adequate notice of the forum-selection clause before contracting. In Shute, the Supreme Court did not address this notice issue, while respondents acknowledged their awareness of the clause. However, in contrast, plaintiffs in the current cases (Williams and Secard) have not conceded the sufficiency of notice. The trial court did not rule on this notice issue, which was raised via declarations from the plaintiffs' attorney and objections from Carnival. The court has remanded the matter for further proceedings on the notice issue, holding that the forum-selection clause is unenforceable if a plaintiff lacked sufficient notice prior to the contract. The petitions for writs of mandate were partially granted, directing the trial court to vacate its prior orders, while the matter is remanded for further proceedings. The alternative writs are discharged.

On April 3, 1990, Carnival objected to the Silver declaration, prompting Silver to submit a declaration on April 9, 1990, asserting that her facts were based on her review of communications with the plaintiffs, who would provide further substantiation during depositions or interrogatories. Carnival's motions to stay or dismiss did not cite lack of personal jurisdiction or forum non conveniens; however, they included arguments and statements from Winson and Jordon that related to enforcing a forum-selection clause, which primarily pertained to claims of forum non conveniens and minimum contacts with California. Carnival did not present any evidence regarding the negotiation process of the ticket contract terms, including the forum-selection clause, and its counsel acknowledged ignorance of such procedures during oral argument. The cited case supporting this discussion is Full-Sight Contact Lens v. Soft Lenses, Inc.