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Chief of Police of Dracut v. Town of Dracut
Citations: 258 N.E.2d 531; 357 Mass. 492; 1970 Mass. LEXIS 852
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; May 11, 1970; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court
A legal dispute arose involving Wilfred Paquette, the chief of police for the Town of Dracut, who filed a suit in equity against the town, its board of selectmen, and the Dracut Police Relief Association to clarify the respective rights in managing the police department. The conflict stemmed from a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the selectmen and the association, which the chief argued exceeded the selectmen's authority under Massachusetts General Laws (G.L.) c. 149, sections 178G-178N, and infringed upon his exclusive powers under G.L. c. 41, section 97A. The case was appealed after the Superior Court ruled in favor of the chief, prohibiting the defendants from enforcing certain provisions of the agreement. The facts established that the town had previously operated under G.L. c. 41, section 97A since 1955, and in 1967, the association claimed exclusive bargaining rights, which the selectmen recognized. The chief refused to negotiate on behalf of the selectmen, who then finalized a collective bargaining agreement on October 26, 1967, incorporating disputed terms. Notably, a town meeting on October 16, 1967, voted to rescind section 97A and adopt section 97, altering the legal framework for the police department's establishment. Under Section 97, selectmen can establish regulations for the police department, whereas Section 97A designates the chief of police to create such regulations, subject to selectmen's approval or, in certain cases, without it. The chief has control over town property used by the police and directs the officers' assignments. A critical issue is whether the town meeting's action on October 16, 1967, rescinded its prior acceptance of G.L.c. 41, 97A, which was accepted on March 7, 1955. Section 97A requires acceptance by a town meeting vote but lacks provisions for rescission. Established legal precedent holds that once a statute is accepted, it remains in effect until repealed or amended by the Legislature, as no language indicates that acceptance can be revoked. The town concedes this point but argues that changes from the Home Rule Amendment, ratified on November 8, 1966, make this rule obsolete. However, the record does not reference the Home Rule Amendment, and its implications are considered unclear. Section 8 of the Amendment allows the General Court to enact general laws applicable to all towns but does not permit towns to exercise powers inconsistent with such laws. The Home Rule Procedures Act reiterates these limitations, confirming that G.L. c. 41, 97A remains a general law that towns can opt to adopt but cannot rescind under the current legal framework. The Home Rule Procedures Act (G.L.c. 43B) does not authorize municipalities to unilaterally rescind their prior acceptance of General Laws, indicating a legislative intent to maintain stability in municipal affairs and prevent chaos. Consequently, a town meeting vote on October 16, 1967, to rescind the town's acceptance of G.L.c. 41, 97A is deemed invalid. The police department continues to operate under 97A. Authority within the police department is shared between the selectmen and the chief of police. The selectmen are responsible for establishing the department, appointing the chief and other officers, and determining their compensation. The chief has the authority to create regulations for the department, which take effect automatically if the selectmen do not act on them within thirty days. In contrast, G.L.c. 149, sections 178G-178N grants the selectmen sole authority to engage in collective bargaining for the police department regarding wages and working conditions, and to execute contracts resulting from those negotiations. This statute emphasizes that if any agreement conflicts with existing laws or bylaws, those laws or bylaws will take precedence. The legislature's enactment of later statutes must be interpreted harmoniously with existing laws, recognizing that both the chief and selectmen have distinct but overlapping authorities. The collective bargaining statute acknowledges that selectmen's negotiation powers may sometimes conflict with the chief's regulatory authority under 97A, but does not assign total control over the police department to either party. 178I stipulates that if a negotiated agreement conflicts with any law, the law prevails. The chief argues that several articles in the collective bargaining agreement are void because they conflict with G.L.c. 41, 97A, and exceed the selectmen's authority, which is limited to negotiating wages, hours, and conditions of employment. The trial judge ruled in favor of the chief regarding all disputed articles. Many of these articles require the chief to prioritize individual requests, personal preferences, seniority, and rank when assigning duties, shifts, vacations, and leaves. While it may be customary for police chiefs to consider these factors, there is a distinction between discretionary consideration and a contractual obligation to comply with them. Unlike private employers, police chiefs are subject to statutory limitations on authority regarding personnel assignments. The chief's primary concern must be public safety and the efficient operation of the police department, not the personal preferences of officers. Thus, the articles that limit the chief's authority in duty assignments are deemed null and void for police department members. Other provisions are void due to conflict with specific laws, as stated in G.L.c. 149, 178I. For instance, Article 17, par. 2, which addresses rule-making authority, is invalid because the chief can establish rules without selectmen's approval under G.L.c. 41, 97A. Selectmen cannot alter this authority through the agreement. Additionally, Article 17, par. 4, mandates uniform requirements, including weapons. The provision regarding weapons conflicts with Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 41, Section 98, which grants police chiefs the authority to determine the weapons carried by officers. Since the chief in Dracut holds this control, the statutory provision takes precedence. Several disputed provisions of the collective bargaining agreement are within the selectmen's bargaining authority, with specific limitations. Article 5 mandates the police chief to keep complete records of overtime and sick leave and to make them accessible to the association, which is a reasonable expectation for departmental operations. Article 7 allows police officers one leave of absence without pay every five years, extendable up to 90 days, with the employer determining the number of concurrent leaves and the definition of "reasonable purpose." The selectmen can negotiate terms but cannot interfere with the chief's authority over duty assignments and leave approvals. Article 16 outlines a grievance procedure for contract violations, but this cannot extend to grievances related to actions authorized by the chief under Chapter 41, Section 97A. A Superior Court decree declared certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement null and void; however, several provisions were found valid, necessitating a modification of the decree. Paragraphs 5 and 7 of the final decree will be revised by removing specified language regarding the Collective Bargaining Agreement and replacing it with a new list of articles and sections. The modifications include retaining Article 4, a portion of Article 7, specific sections of Article 11 concerning seniority and other provisions, the second and third paragraphs of Article 12, Article 17, relevant sections of Article 18, and Article 19. The amended final decree is affirmed as modified. Additionally, notes clarify that in towns adopting the referenced section, a police department will be established under the selectmen's supervision, with a chief of police appointed to manage the department and its officers. The chief is responsible for making regulations, which take effect unless the selectmen act within thirty days. It also notes that cities with certain charters can adopt new ones without special legislative acts. Furthermore, an amendment to a statute states that agreements may override regulations made by a chief of police, but this does not impact the current case due to a lack of existing relevant regulations. Article 4 outlines provisions for employee leave, stipulating that special leave with pay is permitted if an employee arranges a substitute without incurring costs to the town, and requires notification to the Chief of Police in advance, with exceptions for emergencies. The department is not responsible for employee agreements, and shift changes need approval from the Officer in Charge. Article 7 describes leave of absence without pay, allowing one month initially, which can be extended up to 90 days, with restrictions on frequency and the number of concurrent leaves. The purpose of leave must be agreed upon by the Association and the Employer. Article 11 addresses seniority for part-time employees and outside details, mandating rotations based on seniority and allowing waivers for those who wish to opt out. Other provisions state that shift assignments should reflect written preferences regarding rank and seniority, and no employee is to be assigned more than one shift unless in emergencies or for overtime, with all assignments posted at the Police Station. Article 12 mandates vacation be granted based on seniority, with employees able to request vacations during the year. Denials must be communicated in writing, and grievances can be filed if necessary. Vacation selections must occur by April 1st. Article 17 establishes a Personnel and Training Officer responsible for managing personnel files and training, alongside regulations set by the Chief and approved by the Board of Selectmen. It also outlines the requirement for officers to attend specialized training annually. Article 18 details the process for extra paid detail assignments, which are made by the Chief or representative based on seniority, and stipulates a minimum payment requirement for engagements. Article 19 specifies responsibilities for maintaining police property, including a designated officer for overseeing property and equipment management. Additionally, there is potential conflict between Article 12 and Massachusetts General Laws c. 41, 111A, and 111D regarding vacation scheduling, as these laws grant department heads discretion in scheduling vacations to minimize disruption to municipal operations.