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Jorden v. Ball
Citations: 258 N.E.2d 736; 357 Mass. 468; 1970 Mass. LEXIS 846
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; May 7, 1970; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court
In the case of Louise M. Jorden vs. Mildred Ball and others, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed a dispute arising from a husband's transfer of property to a third party, the defendant Ball, after a court decree favored the wife but before she filed for divorce. The plaintiff sought to invalidate this conveyance and gain title to the property, which the court eventually granted, leading to an appeal from the defendants. The critical legal issue was whether the plaintiff qualified as a "creditor" under the fraudulent conveyance act, G.L.c. 109A. Key facts include the marriage of the parties in 1933, the husband's purchase of the property in 1946, and his subsequent abandonment of the plaintiff in 1959. The plaintiff had been living in the house rent-free until 1966. After filing for separate support in 1967 and receiving a decree in her favor, the husband appointed his attorney, Richard L. Hull, to manage his property transactions. Hull then conveyed the property to Ball, acting as a straw for Hull, with no actual consideration exchanged. Hull's claim that the conveyance compensated him for legal services was deemed false by the judge. The court ruled that the plaintiff could be considered a "creditor" under the act because she had a legitimate claim that the conveyance was designed to frustrate her rights, thereby establishing jurisdiction to set aside the transfer. The court emphasized that the fraudulent conveyance act is remedial, allowing for the nullification of transfers intended to defraud creditors, and that the plaintiff's claim, whether established or not, was sufficient to warrant the court's intervention. The plaintiff failed to prove any personal interest in the property or a contractual claim against her husband, which is necessary for a wife's legal action against a husband under Massachusetts law (G.L.c. 209). Although equity provides some exceptions to this legal disability, none applied in this case. The plaintiff was entitled to support and maintenance from her husband, a duty that remains despite the wife's inability to sue him, as recognized in case law (French v. McAnarney). A claim for divorce due to cruel and abusive treatment existed, resulting in an unperfected entitlement to her husband's support and a potential claim to his assets following a divorce decree. The critical issue was whether these contingent claims disqualified her as a creditor under c. 109A. The statute defines a creditor to include "unmatured" or "contingent" claims, which encompasses the plaintiff's situation, as her claim was likely to develop into a legal obligation. Despite historical cases requiring a support or alimony decree before a wife could be considered a creditor, the broader definition in c. 109A is applicable here. The plaintiff's situation is distinguished from past rulings, affirming her status as a creditor under the current statute. The decree was upheld with costs of appeal awarded.