Baroid v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

Citations: 121 Cal. App. 3d 558; 175 Cal. Rptr. 633; 46 Cal. Comp. Cases 790; 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 1961Docket: Civ. 60951

Court: California Court of Appeal; July 14, 1981; California; State Appellate Court

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Respondent Thomas G. Hancock sustained severe injuries, including paraplegia, in an automobile accident while commuting to work for petitioner N.L. Baroid on July 5, 1979. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) determined that Hancock's injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, despite the petitioner arguing against this under the 'going and coming' rule, which typically excludes recovery for injuries occurring during a commute to a fixed workplace unless exceptional circumstances exist.

The 'going and coming' rule states that an employee's employment relationship begins upon entering the employer's premises, and injuries incurred prior are generally not compensable. However, there are exceptions to this rule. One notable exception is the 'special mission' exception, where an injury during a regular commute may be compensable if the employee is performing a special task for the employer that is extraordinary compared to their routine duties. 

Another exception is the 'special risk' exception, which allows for compensation if an employee suffers injury from a risk closely related to their employment before entering the employer's premises. This exception applies even if the accident occurs in a public space, provided the risk is one that the employee is exposed to in a unique or heightened manner due to their employment.

The employer supplies equipment for oil well drilling and operates continuously, necessitating that employees, including the applicant, be available beyond their regular shifts from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. The applicant was provided with an 'airpage beeper' for on-call notifications, which he acknowledged understanding upon hiring. He typically received about ten calls per month to work outside scheduled hours, with tasks ranging from brief duties to extended 12-hour shifts. While he was not compensated for travel time when notified in advance, he was paid for travel when called in unexpectedly. 

The injury occurred on July 5, 1979, around 4:45 a.m., as the applicant was en route to work at the employer's request for a 5 a.m. start. It remains unclear how the request was communicated, as the applicant does not recall being informed prior to that morning. He remembers receiving a call awakening him, but cannot recall details of the conversation. A coworker, Jeweral Washington, testified that his supervisor had instructed him on July 3 to expect assistance from either the applicant or another employee on July 5, which aligns with the applicant's belief that he would be working that day. Washington did not receive any calls on the morning of July 5.

The workers' compensation judge, affirmed by the WCAB, determined that the applicant's injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act due to the 'special mission' exception to the going and coming rule. This conclusion references the landmark case of Schreifer v. I.A.C. County of Los Angeles, where 'special mission' is defined as an extraordinary duty related to employment. In this case, the applicant, Hancock, was required to report to work at 5:00 a.m., ahead of his regular shift, indicating a special need for his services similar to the circumstances in the L.A. Jewish Council case, where an employee was killed while performing extraordinary duties outside normal hours. The judge noted that it is irrelevant whether Hancock was paid from the moment he left home or upon arrival at the job site, emphasizing his reporting time was significant due to the special need for his presence. The employer has since sought annulment of the WCAB's decision, arguing that Hancock's injury does not qualify under the special mission exception.

Judicial review of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) decisions on factual matters is restricted to assessing whether substantial evidence supports the decision based on the entire record, as per Labor Code § 5952(d). The courts are not bound by the WCAB's legal conclusions, and when facts are undisputed, the issue is purely legal. The mere fact that an applicant is on 24-hour call does not exempt them from the going and coming rule, nor do irregular hours automatically justify a departure from it. An injury would be compensable under the 'wage payment or travel time' exception if the applicant had been paged to work at the time of the injury. Testimony revealed that the applicant was compensated for travel time only when called in unexpectedly, not for pre-arranged work outside regular hours. The WCAB failed to determine whether the employer had made prior arrangements for the applicant's shift or if the applicant was responding to an immediate call on the day of the injury. Consequently, the court could not uphold the WCAB's compensability ruling under the wage payment exception. The WCAB's decision relied on the 'special mission' exception, positing that the applicant was reporting early due to a special need for their services, which were part of their regular duties but extraordinary for the early hour.

The application of the special mission exception hinges on several key facts regarding the applicant's employment. Firstly, the applicant was on call 24/7 and understood this requirement upon accepting the job. He frequently received calls to work outside his standard hours. On the day of the injury, he was traveling to his usual workplace, and there was no evidence that the work he was going to perform differed from his regular duties; no emergency or special circumstance existed. If the employer had requested him to work that morning, the injury would be compensable under the 'wage payment or travel time' exception, negating the need to consider the special mission exception. The core issue is whether the applicant's trip was extraordinary relative to his routine duties. The document cites various cases where injuries during travel were deemed compensable under the special mission exception, particularly when the employee was performing duties outside their usual hours or at the employer's request. Examples include salesmen making special trips, workers coming in at unusual times, and employees directed to travel to different work locations.

The discussed cases share a commonality in that the circumstances surrounding the work—such as location, nature, or timing—deviated from the standard norms. The workers' compensation judge's decision, adopted by the WCAB, relies on precedent from L.A. Jewish etc. Council v. Ind. Acc. Com. and Schreifer v. Industrial Acc. Com. In L.A. Jewish etc. Council, Rabbi Cohn was required to perform his duties at an unusual hour, which the court noted constituted an extraordinary event necessary for fulfilling a special service beyond his typical job scope. In Schreifer, a deputy sheriff was called in early for a shift, which was irregular but deemed a special mission due to the early request from his superior. The court ruled that the injury sustained during this early trip was compensable under the special mission exception, emphasizing that the unusual nature of the call justified it as a special service. The ruling clarified that the mere irregularity of duty hours or being on 24-hour call doesn't automatically qualify for the special mission exception; it hinges on the extraordinary need for the employee's services at a specific time.

The applicant’s employment involved frequent assignments outside of regular work shifts, but the circumstances of the July 5th assignment do not meet the criteria for the special mission exception. Although the applicant was instructed to come in at 5 a.m. on July 3rd, the nature of the work performed on July 5th was not unusual or extraordinary, lacking any emergency or special circumstances. This situation is likened to the case of Schreifer, where a deputy sheriff’s injury while traveling to work did not qualify under the special mission exception. 

The case of Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. is cited as a comparison, where an employee injured after working a significant overtime shift was deemed to fall under the special mission exception because the extended hours and specific task (semiannual inventory) were atypical. The ruling emphasized that simply starting or ending work at different times does not suffice for the exception. In contrast, the applicant’s situation showed no evidence of working at an unusual hour or performing atypical duties. 

The text also refers to Labor Code section 3202, emphasizing the need for liberal interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act to protect injured workers, while highlighting the necessity of distinguishing certain injuries that are ineligible for compensation under the going and coming rule. This serves to prevent the misuse of exceptions that could undermine the protections intended for workers injured during their commutes.

Applicant asserts that his injury qualifies under the special mission exception due to the lack of public transportation to the employer's premises at 5 a.m., claiming that using his own vehicle was an implied condition of employment. The applicant references prior case law, indicating that this principle typically applies when an employee is required to have a vehicle for work duties. However, the applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated that utilizing his private vehicle was a necessity, as he failed to explore other transportation options available at that time, such as taxis or ride-sharing. The absence of public transportation alone does not justify the application of the special mission exception, which could lead to an overly broad interpretation if accepted. Additionally, the applicant did not establish that his travel at that hour posed a greater risk of injury or that the employer contributed to any potential risk, thereby failing to meet the criteria for the 'special risk' exception. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) decision is annulled, and the matter is remanded for a specific finding on whether the applicant was paged to work on the day of his injury, which would determine compensability under the 'wage payment or travel time' exception. If the employer arranged for the applicant to work at 5 a.m. on July 5th, then the injury would not be compensable under the going and coming rule. A dissenting opinion emphasizes the importance of interpreting workers' compensation law liberally to protect injured workers.

The appellate standard of review for decisions made by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) is based on whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, as outlined in relevant case law and the Labor Code. The 'going and coming' rule, established in 1916, generally excludes injuries occurring during routine commutes to and from work from workers' compensation coverage, unless exceptional circumstances apply. A key exception to this rule is the 'special mission' doctrine, which allows for compensation if an employee is performing a special task for the employer during their commute. This special task must be extraordinary compared to routine duties, not merely an extension of regular work hours. 

In evaluating whether the applicant, Hancock, was engaged in a special mission when he sustained injuries, the evidence indicated he was employed in a role requiring flexibility in hours, often called to work at irregular times using a beeper. Hancock's tasks varied significantly in duration and complexity, suggesting his work demands did not conform to a standard commute. Thus, the determination of whether Hancock's injuries were compensable hinges on whether his trip could be classified as 'special' due to the nature of his employment and the circumstances surrounding his commute.

On July 5, 1979, Hancock was injured while traveling to work at 5 a.m. in response to a request from his employer, which is unclear whether it was made via 'beeper' or prearrangement. The compensation judge determined that Hancock's transit fell under a special category due to several factors: he was on call 24/7, his usual hours were 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., and the early reporting time was not typical. The judge referenced two precedential cases—Schreifer v. Industrial Acc. Com. and Los Angeles Jewish etc. Council v. Industrial Acc. Com.—both of which established the compensability of injuries occurring during unusual hours in response to employer requests. The Schreifer case emphasized that an employee's on-call status does not solely determine compensability; rather, the nature of the request and the extraordinary nature of the mission are significant. The judge indicated that Hancock's situation demonstrated a substantial deviation from his normal work hours and that the urgency and specific employer request made his journey integral to his employment duties. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the decision awarding Hancock compensation, classifying his injuries as part of a special mission exception to the 'going and coming' rule.

The record suggests that 24-hour call may require employees to use personal vehicles during times when public transportation is unavailable, which would qualify for workers' compensation benefits. The judicial focus should be on including employees under workers' compensation protections when reasonable, leading to the affirmation of the board's decision to award benefits to applicant Hancock. The Supreme Court denied Hancock's petition for a hearing, though Chief Justice Bird believed it should have been granted. 

Additionally, it is noted that Hancock's supervisor did not testify and is no longer employed by the company. An exception to the 'going and coming' rule applies when employees are compensated for travel time, which can render injuries sustained while traveling to work within the scope of employment. However, there was no evidence regarding the duration of Hancock's work upon his early morning arrival on July 5, 1979, and the employer did not dispute the claim about transportation availability. A bus schedule introduced as evidence was dated nearly a year after the incident, and it was not demonstrated that this schedule was applicable at the time of the injury. The situation where an employer requires an employee to come to work urgently, necessitating the use of a personal vehicle, is distinguished. Finally, credit is given to the applicant's counsel for her compelling argument, although accepting her analysis could undermine the 'going and coming' rule.