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Harrington v. State
Citations: 659 N.W.2d 509; 2003 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 35; 2003 WL 470339Docket: 01-0653
Court: Supreme Court of Iowa; February 26, 2003; Iowa; State Supreme Court
Terry Harrington appeals the denial of his postconviction relief application by a district court, which held his claims were time-barred under Iowa Code § 822.3. Harrington challenges this ruling, asserting that newly discovered evidence, including a witness recantation, police reports implicating another suspect, and 'brain fingerprinting' results warranted vacation of his first-degree murder conviction and a new trial. He also argues a due process violation occurred due to the prosecution's failure to disclose police reports during his original trial, which is addressed under Iowa Code § 822.2(1). The State contests Harrington's claims and argues that his appeal is untimely. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Iowa finds that Harrington's appeal is timely, the action is not time-barred, and he is entitled to relief based on the due process violation. The court deems Harrington’s motion for conditional remand moot, reversing the district court's judgment and remanding the case for an order vacating Harrington's conviction and granting a new trial. The court also clarifies the timing of Harrington's notice of appeal, noting it was filed within thirty days of the ruling on a post-trial motion, despite being late relative to the initial decision. Harrington was required to file his post-trial motion by March 15, but he acknowledges that his motion was not date-stamped by the clerk until March 19 and 20. He claims to have faxed the motion to the clerk and presiding judge on March 15 and mailed a copy to opposing counsel the same day. The district court later confirmed that Harrington faxed the motion on March 15 and found it to be timely filed. Rule 1.442(5) allows for a pleading to be filed with a judge, who must note the filing date and send it to the clerk. The trial judge accepted Harrington's motion on March 15, despite not noting the filing date, and transmitted it to the clerk, which resulted in two copies being date-stamped on different days. The judge's acknowledgment of receipt on March 15 was deemed to satisfy the filing requirements, confirming that Harrington's motion and subsequent notice of appeal were timely. The background details include Harrington's conviction for first-degree murder in 1978, stemming from the shooting of security guard John Schweer, primarily based on the testimony of a juvenile accomplice. On July 22, 1977, Hughes, Harrington, and Curtis McGhee planned to steal a beige Toronado. While Hughes waited in Harrington's car, Harrington, armed with a shotgun, and McGhee went to locate the vehicle. After hearing a gunshot, Hughes observed Harrington and McGhee fleeing. Harrington claimed he shot a police officer. Throughout the investigation, Hughes's credibility was challenged as he initially implicated three other men before naming Harrington as the shooter, admitting to being a "confessed liar" and that he tailored his testimony to what police wanted to hear to secure the dismissal of his theft and burglary charges. Minimal physical evidence linked Harrington to the crime, although Hughes claimed Harrington concealed the shotgun in his jacket, which later had traces of gunpowder. Witnesses, including Hughes's girlfriend and friends, testified they saw Hughes with Harrington and McGhee on the night before the murder. Harrington's alibi was contradicted by these accounts. Both Harrington and McGhee were convicted of first-degree murder in separate trials. Harrington's appeals, including claims of perjury by Hughes, were denied, and he is serving a life sentence without parole. The second postconviction relief (PCR) action was initiated by Harrington in 2000, over twenty years after his conviction, prompting the State to invoke the statute of limitations as a defense. Harrington argued for an exception under Iowa Code § 822.3, citing grounds that could not have been raised earlier. The trial court acknowledged that the evidence Harrington relied on was newly discovered but still ruled that his petition was time-barred. Despite this ruling, the court examined the merits of Harrington's claims. Harrington sought to vacate his conviction under Iowa Code § 822.2, which allows individuals claiming constitutional violations or newly discovered evidence that demands a new trial to seek relief without a filing fee. His due process claim was predicated on the prosecution's failure to disclose eight police reports during the original trial, as established in Brady v. Maryland, which holds that non-disclosure of favorable evidence violates the Due Process Clause. Harrington also cited the same police reports, along with recantation testimony and new brain testing evidence, as newly discovered evidence. To prove a Brady violation, Harrington needed to demonstrate: (1) suppression of evidence by the prosecution; (2) that the evidence was favorable to him; and (3) that it was material to his guilt. For his newly discovered evidence claim, he had to establish: (1) the evidence was found post-verdict; (2) it could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence; (3) it was material and not merely cumulative; and (4) it likely would have altered the trial's outcome. The due process claim is determinative for the appeal, rendering the trial court's refusal of Harrington's new trial request on newly discovered evidence moot. The evidence presented at the post-conviction relief (PCR) hearing included recantations from three prosecution witnesses: Kevin Hughes, Candice Pride, and Clyde Jacobs. Hughes admitted to fabricating his testimony about Harrington's involvement in a car theft to secure a $5,000 reward and evade criminal charges. Pride stated she had no knowledge of Harrington’s guilt and merely repeated what Hughes instructed her to say during their relationship. Jacobs recanted his trial testimony, asserting he never saw Harrington on the night of the murder and claimed he was coerced by law enforcement to implicate Harrington to deflect attention from his own criminal activities. Joseph Hrvol, the prosecutor, denied any coercion or reward offers to Hughes, although a previously undisclosed police report suggested that law enforcement had communicated an incentive for information related to the case. The summary of witness recantations serves to provide context for evaluating the materiality of the police reports, while the scientific testing evidence is deemed unnecessary for this appeal's resolution. The PCR court found that the recantation evidence presented by Harrington could not have been discovered earlier despite exercising due diligence, but ultimately deemed the recantations not credible. The court characterized the new testimony as cumulative and merely impeaching, concluding it would not influence the outcome of a new trial. Harrington claimed that eight police reports relevant to his 1978 criminal trial were not disclosed to him. His original attorney had passed away, preventing access to the case file. However, James Cleary, who represented Harrington during his first PCR claim, testified that he requested all related investigative documents in 1987, but the eight reports were not included. These reports were only discovered in 1999 when an interested party requested the complete file from the Council Bluffs police department, leading to their eventual delivery to Harrington's current counsel. Harrington argued that this newly discovered evidence justified vacating his conviction and asserted a Brady violation occurred in 1978, as the reports contained potentially exculpatory information about an alternative suspect, Charles Gates, and had been withheld by the prosecution. Most reports detailed the investigation into Gates, including Schweer's prior requests for increased lighting at the car lot shortly before his murder. Notably, Schweer reported seeing a man attempting to enter a truck and requested floodlights after observing suspicious behavior. Witness John Burke corroborated seeing a man with a shotgun near the dealership shortly before the murder. Additionally, a police report documented Schweer's account of seeing a man with a possible rifle in the area shortly before the murder, further suggesting the presence of another suspect. Investigative reports indicated that police interviewed a witness from a nearby service station who identified Charles Gates as a man seen walking a dog near car dealerships during evenings. Gates was subsequently located and questioned, but no documentation of this interview exists. A polygraph test administered to Gates suggested he was not truthful in denying ownership of a shotgun or involvement in the shooting of John Schweer; however, the actual results of this test have not been produced, despite being typically included in case files. Gates was also identified as a suspect in a fourteen-year-old unsolved murder in Omaha, and former neighbors described him as a loner with peculiar habits and aggressive dogs. Several officers confirmed that witnesses had seen Gates in the area around the murder, and one officer stated that Gates was thought to be the individual chased off the car lot days prior to Schweer’s death. Although it was believed Gates was later excluded as a suspect, the reasoning behind this exclusion was unclear, and related documentation was missing. The district court determined that Gates' police reports were material evidence not available to Harrington's trial counsel, but concluded that their disclosure likely would not have altered the trial's outcome. The court acknowledged the existence of numerous potential suspects and noted defense counsel was aware of a witness who saw someone matching Gates' description. Ultimately, the court denied postconviction relief based on a Brady violation and newly discovered evidence. The review of the case will focus on errors of law, particularly regarding the constitutional violation asserted. Iowa Code section 822.3 establishes a three-year statute of limitations for postconviction relief (PCR) applications, starting from when a conviction becomes final or the writ of procedendo is issued in the case of an appeal. This statute, enacted in 1984, mandates that individuals whose convictions became final before July 1, 1984, must file by June 30, 1987, to avoid being barred from relief. Harrington's current action is subject to this time limitation unless an exception applies, specifically if the ground for relief could not have been raised earlier. The district court ruled that this exception did not apply, determining Harrington's PCR action was time barred. To utilize the exception, an applicant must demonstrate that the factual ground could not have been previously raised and establish a connection between this ground and the conviction in question. Courts have held that it would be unreasonable to extend the statute of limitations for trivial facts irrelevant to the conviction. For a ground of fact to toll the statute, it must be relevant and likely to change the case outcome. The State contends that the requirement for establishing a nexus parallels the criteria for a substantive claim based on newly discovered evidence, which necessitates showing that such evidence is material and likely to alter the trial outcome. Although past cases have used similar language for both doctrines, the current clarification distinguishes them. Specifically, an applicant invoking the ground-of-fact exception must show relevance to the conviction but is not required to prove that the ground would likely change the trial's outcome to avoid the statute of limitations defense. This clarification disavows any previous rulings inconsistent with the new standard. The trial court did not evaluate the applicability of the ground-of-fact exception asserted by Harrington, but it can be inferred that the court's rejection was not due to Harrington's inability to present the matters earlier. The court found that both the undisclosed police reports and recantation evidence were discovered post-verdict and could not have been uncovered sooner with due diligence. These findings are supported by substantial evidence and are binding concerning the statute-of-limitations issue. The trial court mistakenly believed that Harrington needed to demonstrate that the new evidence met the criteria for a claim of newly discovered evidence, a misconception that significantly affects the ruling. Since it was established that Harrington could not have raised these matters earlier, the trial court's sole remaining task was to determine the connection between the evidence and Harrington's conviction, which exists as both types of evidence could materially affect trial outcomes. Consequently, Harrington's claim is not time-barred, and the district court erred in ruling otherwise. Regarding Harrington's due process claim, the review is de novo, and to establish a due process violation, Harrington must prove three elements: (1) suppression of evidence by the prosecution, (2) the evidence being favorable to the defendant, and (3) the materiality of the evidence to the guilt issue. Evidence is considered suppressed if it is discovered post-trial and was known to the prosecution but not disclosed to the defense, regardless of whether the individual prosecutor was aware of it. The prosecutor has a duty to disclose favorable evidence known by others in the government’s employ, including law enforcement. The prosecution's responsibility for disclosure does not depend on their intention; rather, the emphasis is on nondisclosure itself, regardless of the prosecutor's good or bad faith. Furthermore, the duty to disclose exists even without a request from the accused, although if the defendant was aware of the facts enabling them to utilize the evidence, it is not deemed suppressed. The prosecution acknowledged that it possessed evidence relevant to the case during the trial, which was not disclosed to the defense. The trial court found that the defense was unaware of certain police reports until over twenty years post-conviction, when these documents were discovered by Harrington's family. The reports were deemed 'suppressed' under the Brady rule, which mandates disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Despite some information about a suspect observed near the crime scene being raised during trial, the defense did not know the suspect's identity or the details of prior contacts between the victim and this individual. Testimonies indicated that the police had no immediate suspects at the time of trial, supporting the notion that the defense lacked critical information to fully exploit the evidence. The Nevada Supreme Court established that mere verbal disclosures were insufficient to prevent a Brady violation without access to the actual documents. The undisclosed reports, which described a potentially incriminating individual with a shotgun, could have significantly bolstered Harrington's defense by suggesting an alternative suspect, thereby establishing reasonable doubt regarding Harrington's involvement. Consequently, Harrington demonstrated that the withheld evidence was favorable to his defense, satisfying the criteria for a Brady violation. The suppression of favorable evidence constitutes a violation of due process only if the evidence is deemed 'material to the issue of guilt.' Materiality is established when there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed had the evidence been disclosed. The defendant is not required to prove that the evidence would have led to acquittal but must show that it could alter the case's perception significantly. The inquiry involves assessing whether the undisclosed evidence could undermine confidence in the verdict, considering the totality of circumstances, including its impact on defense preparation. In this case, significant concerns regarding the credibility of Hughes, the main witness against Harrington, undermine confidence in the conviction. Hughes had a history of dishonesty and only identified Harrington as the perpetrator after other suspects provided alibis. The unreliability of Hughes suggests that the jury might have doubted his testimony had they known of an alternative suspect, Gates, who was considered a prime suspect by police. The withheld investigatory reports contained crucial information about Gates that could have shifted the defense's trial strategy. Specifically, these reports linked Gates to the crime scene and provided a previously unknown connection to the victim. Had Harrington's defense been aware of this information, they would likely have focused their trial efforts on Gates, altering the outcome of the proceedings. Harrington's attorney failed to effectively utilize evidence that could indicate Gates was the actual perpetrator of the crime, as independent witnesses placed Gates at the murder scene prior to the incident, where he was seen with a shotgun and a dog. Notably, the victim had encountered someone resembling Gates attempting to break into a truck shortly before the murder. In contrast, Harrington’s identification as the murderer came from a known liar, supported only by minimal evidence—a few gunpowder particles on his coat weeks later and recanted testimony from teenage witnesses. The murder weapon was never found, and there was no connection between Harrington and the dog prints at the scene, despite police initially focusing on "a man with a dog." Given this evidence, a jury might have reasonable doubt about Harrington’s guilt, establishing the materiality of the undisclosed evidence. The court cited previous cases affirming that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the failure to disclose evidence regarding an alternative suspect violated Harrington's due process rights. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court’s ruling, vacated Harrington's conviction, and ordered a new trial. Justice Cady dissented, arguing that Harrington's claim was not based on a lack of knowledge about the potential suspect or the dog prints but rather the failure to disclose police reports related to the investigation. Suppression of potentially exculpatory evidence by police does not warrant a new trial in this case, despite a clear Brady violation, as Harrington was sufficiently aware of the information to conduct his own investigation and formulate a defense. Although the suppression of police reports is concerning, due process requires that such reports must reasonably alter the trial's outcome to necessitate a new trial. Despite the passage of time and the death of Harrington's defense attorney, it is uncontested that Harrington and his counsel were informed about the key details in the suppressed reports, allowing them to question witnesses effectively. The sensational nature of the information would have prompted competent counsel to pursue it independently, regardless of the suppressed reports. The majority's reliance on precedents like Mazzan and Wilson is misplaced, as those cases involved essential reports that were crucial to the defense's understanding. In contrast, Harrington's team had sufficient information to grasp the significance of the allegations against the potential suspect. The majority's emphasis on the significance of the suppressed reports appears exaggerated and overlooks that Harrington's defense counsel had already dismissed similar claims decades ago. Therefore, the Brady violation does not warrant postconviction relief, and the district court's ruling should be affirmed. Additionally, Harrington's motion was deficient as it lacked a proof of service. The absence of a certificate of service does not affect the timeliness of the appeal, as the State did not challenge the sufficiency of the defendant's rule 1.904(2) motion. Evidence indicates that the shell used in the crime was manufactured before 1966, and Hughes' potential status as an accomplice was contested during Harrington’s murder trial, with the court expressing doubts regarding this claim. Later proceedings revealed that Hughes had been charged with conspiracy to steal a car related to the night of the murder. The murder weapon was never recovered, and although footprints were cast at the crime scene, they were not compared to Harrington's feet. Witness Lee testified seeing two individuals in a car waiting for Hughes, but she could not identify them. Cognitive psychophysiologist Dr. Lawrence Farwell provided testimony that Harrington's brain did not contain information about the murder but did support his alibi. Harrington's motion for limited remand proposes to present recanting testimonies from two prosecution witnesses who previously implicated him. Ann Danaher, a barber who worked at the Iowa State Penitentiary, actively researched Harrington’s case for five years to aid his family in proving his innocence. Furthermore, an officer acknowledged at a post-conviction relief hearing that Gates was a suspect shortly after the murder. At sentencing, Harrington expressed his belief in his innocence and his perception of being judged by his race rather than his character, vowing to continue fighting for a verdict that reflects his innocence.