Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

Citations: 104 Cal. App. 3d 528; 163 Cal. Rptr. 750; 45 Cal. Comp. Cases 410; 1980 Cal. App. LEXIS 1702Docket: Civ. 46807

Court: California Court of Appeal; April 14, 1980; California; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Richard E. Pointer, employed as a data processing clerk by Safeway Stores, Inc., was injured after work hours when attacked by an unknown assailant as he returned home following a prolonged shift to assist with a semiannual grocery inventory. Safeway, self-insured under the Workers' Compensation Act, denied benefits, arguing the injury did not arise "out of and in the course of employment" as per Labor Code section 3600. Pointer applied to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board), where a judge initially ruled against him. However, upon reconsideration, the Board concluded that Pointer's injury did indeed arise from his employment and remanded the case for further hearings on other issues. Safeway sought judicial review of the Board's decision. The court questioned the reviewability of the Board's order under Labor Code section 5950, referencing precedent that denies review of orders made prior to final adjudication. The court noted that similar petitions had been deemed premature in past cases where the Board had remanded for further proceedings.

The court previously denied the petition based on existing legal precedents, yet noted that appellate courts have granted petitions for review even after remand in certain cases. Despite the frequency of these issues, no published appellate opinion has addressed the matter since the Gumilla case, resulting in ambiguity. This ambiguity raises concerns that failing to seek review of a Board order on a threshold issue during remand could preclude later petitions. The court invited parties to present their views, with all but the Board arguing that the petition is timely. The Board expressed internal disagreement and refrained from taking a position, urging the court to resolve the issue.

Legal arguments on both sides include references to the California Constitution, which emphasizes expeditious and inexpensive administration of workers' compensation laws. Allowing piecemeal appellate review could undermine this goal, potentially enabling employers to delay proceedings. Conversely, permitting review of threshold issues may better align with the statutory objectives of the workers' compensation system, which operates on a self-executing basis. Most claims are resolved without Board hearings, and prompt judicial review of threshold determinations may reduce the need for further litigation.

The court clarified that while an order may be subject to review, this does not guarantee that the appellate court will grant the petition. Employers filing unjustified petitions may incur attorney fees. Ultimately, an employer affected by a Board's adverse threshold determination can be considered "affected" under section 5950, justifying the need for appellate review.

The order in question can be considered "final" as defined in Gumilla, distinguishing it from cases where only reconsideration is granted. This interpretation aligns with Section 5900, which allows any aggrieved person to file a petition for reconsideration of any final order by the appeals board or referee. A "final" order is one that resolves significant rights or liabilities, excluding intermediate orders that do not conclusively address the issues. The court in Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. found a referee's ruling on a statute of limitations defense to be a final order. If the Board’s reconsideration decision is deemed "final" under Gumilla, it facilitates appellate review. The court advocates for the Board to determine the implications of severance and threshold issues, suggesting that aligning Sections 5900 and 5950 will respect the Board's authority.

On the merits, the case involves the "going and coming rule," which denies compensation for injuries during regular commutes unless extraordinary circumstances exist. The court references Hinojosa, which details the rule and its exceptions, focusing on the "special mission" exception. A special mission is defined as a work-related trip requested by the employer. Examples illustrate the distinction between a special mission and a personal errand, clarifying that a trip for a specific business purpose at the employer's request qualifies, while routine actions do not.

In Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979), the definition of "special" employee conduct is clarified, indicating it must be extraordinary relative to routine duties, yet still within the scope of employment. The special mission rule generally does not apply when an employee's only deviation from routine is starting or ending work outside normal hours. For instance, in General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., the court ruled that an employee arriving early to make coffee was not on a special mission, as this task was part of normal duties and not requested by the employer.

Conversely, in Schreifer v. Industrial Acc. Com., a deputy sheriff who was called to duty early was considered to be on a special mission since he was responding to an urgent request from his employer. The court emphasized that being called in at an unusual time constituted a special service due to the extraordinary nature of the request, despite the irregular hours compared to typical jobs.

The case at hand parallels Schreifer more closely than General Ins. Co., as the employee's additional duty was at the employer's request and addressed an important, atypical business need, effectively doubling his shift duration. The court noted that Pointer's situation was stronger than Schreifer’s due to more regular assignments and clear evidence of the unusual nature of the work. It concluded that the journey home was just as essential to the special service as the journey to work, asserting that the special mission extended until the employee was safely home. The Board determined that Pointer's special mission did not conclude until he reached his house, despite the petitioner arguing otherwise.

Charak v. Leddy (1965) established that the special mission exception does not apply to an employee injured in the secured area of her home, as she was within her private space. In contrast, Pointer was assaulted in a public area, and the reasoning in Charak supports his claim for recovery. California's policy favors liberal construction for employees, implying that any doubts regarding the going and coming doctrine should be resolved in their favor. The Board correctly found Pointer's injury arose during his employment.

A dissenting opinion argues that the review of the Board's tentative ruling is premature since final action has not been taken, referencing Gumilla v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1921). Labor Code section 5950 allows review only of final orders, and the dissent highlights that a writ of certiorari cannot review non-final orders. The appellate review standard requires substantial evidence to support the Board's decision, aligning with the "one judgment rule" that prevents piecemeal appeals and ensures all issues are resolved before review. This principle is upheld in various cases and is fundamental to appellate practice in the U.S.

The excerpt emphasizes the importance of expeditious and consolidated legal proceedings in the context of appeals and writs of error, as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. It highlights that the intention behind these legal frameworks is to prevent unnecessary expenses and delays from multiple appeals in the same case, particularly relevant to workers' compensation proceedings governed by the state's Constitution. The text argues for the necessity of procedural certainty for both workers and employers, cautioning against the complications that could arise from requiring parties to seek immediate review of every preliminary decision. It references state law, which does not permit reviews of decisions that could have been appealed previously, underscoring the potential procedural chaos and rights deprivation that could ensue from such a system. The author suggests that the application for review should be dismissed as premature, citing a previous case (Gumilla) as illustrative of the issues at hand. Additionally, the excerpt mentions the denial of a petition for a Supreme Court hearing and discusses the implications of statutory interpretation regarding the timing of appeals, particularly in relation to rehearings. Overall, the passage advocates for a streamlined process in workers' compensation cases to uphold justice effectively and prevent procedural inefficiencies.

Overtime work, while considered voluntary for individual employees, was necessary for the completion of inventory, highlighting the employer's need for additional labor. Pointer and two other clerks shared the responsibility of working overtime, with Pointer indicating he stayed late out of necessity. Over the past six months, Pointer had worked overtime on 15 occasions, though none matched the duration of his injury night. Under California’s interpretation of the special mission doctrine, the employee's journey does not necessarily require added risk to qualify for coverage. Respondents claimed Pointer's late-night travel posed extra risk, supported by his wife's testimony about her vigilance and the sheriff's assertion that lights deter crime. Conversely, the petitioner cited the sheriff’s statement that the crime rate was lowest during Pointer's travel window. There was no evidence indicating that the potential victim pool was lower at that time, making it unclear if the per capita risk differed. The court found it unnecessary to resolve this dispute.