United States v. Chagra

Citations: 850 F. Supp. 354; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5254; 1994 WL 150598Docket: Crim. No. 94-36

Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania; April 11, 1994; Federal District Court

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The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the government's motion to revoke a prior release order for defendant Lee A. Chagra, Jr., charged with conspiracy to distribute significant quantities of cocaine and marijuana. Following Chagra's arrest on March 16, 1994, and an initial detention hearing where the magistrate judge ordered his release on bond, the government sought a review of that decision. The court confirmed its jurisdiction and held a hearing on April 7, 1994, to assess whether Chagra posed a risk of flight or a danger to the community, as outlined by the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The court emphasized the standards set by 18 U.S.C. 3142, which require a defendant to be released unless it is determined that no conditions can assure their appearance or the safety of others.

A judicial officer must evaluate several factors when determining pretrial release, including: 1) the nature of the offense, especially if it involves violence or narcotics; 2) the strength of the evidence against the defendant; 3) the defendant's personal history, which encompasses character traits, mental and physical condition, family and community ties, employment status, financial resources, past conduct, history of substance abuse, criminal history, and compliance with court appearances; and 4) the potential danger to individuals or the community posed by the defendant’s release. Under the Bail Reform Act (BRA), there is a rebuttable presumption against pretrial release if the defendant is charged with a Controlled Substances Act violation that carries a maximum penalty of ten years or more, indicating that no conditions will assure the defendant's appearance or community safety. This presumption arises upon probable cause that the defendant committed the charged offense. In this case, the defendant is indicted for conspiracy to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine and over 100 kilograms of marijuana, with penalties significantly increased due to a prior cocaine-related conviction. A presumption against release is established, but the defendant can rebut this by presenting credible evidence of their intent to appear in court and their non-threatening nature. If the presumption is rebutted, the government retains the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a danger to the community and by a preponderance of the evidence that they are a flight risk. Additionally, the court considered the transcript from prior hearings in its decision-making process.

Extensive witness testimony was presented, with the government relying on DEA Special Agent John Guseman, who provided information from about eight confidential informants and cooperating witnesses. Guseman testified to the shipment of 100 to 150 kilograms of cocaine and 1,000 pounds of marijuana from El Paso, Texas, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, during the alleged conspiracy. Although the DEA verified many details of the drug transactions, they did not link the defendant, Chagra, to the conspiracy.

The defendant countered with testimony from federal probation officer Raul Alvarado, his uncle Edward Abraham, and attorney Raymond Caballero, along with character references. The court, after reviewing the hearing transcript and considering all testimony and exhibits, concluded there were no conditions that would ensure the defendant's appearance or community safety.

To rebut the presumption of being a danger to the community, the defendant needed to present credible evidence against continued drug activity. Although the defendant's evidence, including character testimonies and letters of commendation, was sufficient to rebut the presumption, the government established by clear and convincing evidence that his release would still pose a threat to community safety. The presumption, once rebutted, remains as an evidentiary consideration.

Congress recognized in the Bail Reform Act (BRA) that individuals charged with major drug offenses often engage in ongoing criminal activity, leading to a significant risk of pretrial recidivism. The defendant's prior federal conviction in 1986 for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, which included a six-month sentence and nearly five years of probation, further supported the government's position regarding the likelihood of continued illegal activity.

The indictment indicates that the defendant poses a high risk of recidivism, given the evidence of his substantial involvement in a large-scale drug distribution scheme, coupled with a prior conviction. The court cites the significant quantities of drugs and the lengthy duration of the conspiracy as indicators that the defendant is likely to continue illegal activities if released. The court concludes that clear and convincing evidence shows no conditions can ensure the safety of others or the community.

Regarding the risk of flight, the defendant attempted to counter the presumption against him by providing testimony from his probation officer, who confirmed the defendant's compliance with probation requirements from a previous conviction, including regular reporting and negative drug tests. The defendant's uncle testified about his financial support for the defendant and willingness to act as a surety, asserting that he would suffer significant loss if the defendant failed to appear for trial. 

Despite this testimony, the court finds insufficient assurance that the defendant will appear as required. The potential penalties he faces in the current case are significantly more severe than those from his prior conviction, which weakens his claims of low flight risk. Additionally, the defendant lacks steady employment, dependents, and a permanent residence, and the evidence regarding his income is inconsistent. The court remains unconvinced by the character references from family and friends, who seem unaware of critical details about the defendant's life. Ultimately, the uncle's offer to act as custodian does not alleviate the court's concerns about the defendant’s appearance at trial.

Evidence indicates that the defendant has engaged in significant evasive actions to avoid prosecution, including using multiple fictitious names and possessing at least two driver's licenses. Testimony from Agent Guseman reveals that the defendant coordinated drug shipments to Pittsburgh, crossing the border into Mexico where he would await notifications of successful deliveries. Additionally, the defendant has established contacts in Mexico related to drug activities. The court emphasizes that individuals charged with major drug offenses often have the resources and foreign connections to evade prosecution, as noted by Congress in the enactment of the Bail Reform Act (BRA). 

The magistrate judge's initial decision to set a $100,000 bond and appoint a custodian was deemed inadequate by the court, which finds substantial likelihood of the defendant fleeing due to large sums of cash involved in the conspiracy. The court also dismisses electronic monitoring as a viable solution, stating it only alerts authorities after a flight has occurred. Ultimately, the court concludes that there is clear and convincing evidence of the defendant posing a danger to the community and a preponderance of the evidence suggests that no conditions can ensure his appearance at trial. As a result, the court orders the defendant to be detained pending trial, revoking the prior release order, and commits him to the custody of the Attorney General. The defendant will be allowed reasonable consultation with counsel and may be delivered to a U.S. marshal for court appearances as needed.

Defendant contends that the court should apply an intermediate review standard between abuse of discretion and de novo, which was rejected in Delker and supported by United States v. Koenig. He argues the evidence against him is weak, primarily relying on confidential informants (CIs) and cooperators (CWs) who can be easily discredited. However, consistent testimony from eight or more such witnesses can be compelling. Although Agent Guseman's hearsay testimony from CIs and CWs is inadmissible in criminal trials, it is considered valid for detention hearings according to 18 U.S.C. 3142(f). The court utilized a preponderance of the evidence standard to assess the defendant's likelihood of appearing at trial. While no Third Circuit precedent differentiates the burdens of proof for risk of flight and dangerousness, the adopted distinction aligns with the majority of circuits. Ultimately, even if a stricter standard were applicable, the court concludes that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that no conditions can ensure the defendant's appearance.