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People v. Aris
Citations: 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178; 264 Cal. Rptr. 167; 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1187Docket: E005418
Court: California Court of Appeal; November 17, 1989; California; State Appellate Court
A jury convicted Brenda Denise Aris of second-degree murder for killing her husband, finding that she used a firearm in the act. Aris received a sentence of 15 years to life, with the firearm enhancement stayed. She raised multiple claims of trial court error, including the exclusion of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome, denial of self-defense jury instructions, improper jury instructions regarding unreasonable self-defense, and exclusion of evidence related to the victim's violent character. Aris testified that her husband had physically abused her throughout their ten-year marriage, often forcing her to return after she left. On the night of the incident, after suffering a severe beating and threats from her husband, she retrieved a handgun for protection, fearing further violence. She shot him five times while he was asleep, believing she needed to act preemptively to prevent severe harm or death. The court addressed the application of self-defense laws in the context of a battered woman killing her abuser. It reaffirmed that an honest belief in imminent danger is required for both perfect and imperfect self-defense. While the court recognized the error in excluding expert testimony regarding the psychological impact of being a battered woman, it ultimately deemed this error harmless given the specific circumstances of the case. Self-defense encompasses statutory and case law, particularly outlined in sections 197 and 198. Homicide is deemed justifiable under section 197 when a person acts in lawful defense against imminent threats of great bodily injury, provided there are reasonable grounds for such apprehension. Section 198 clarifies that mere fear of an offense is insufficient; rather, circumstances must genuinely provoke a reasonable person's fears, and the individual must act solely under these influences. Self-defense is analyzed through two key requirements: (1) the defendant must genuinely believe they are in imminent danger of death or serious injury from an unlawful attack and that their actions are necessary to prevent this harm; and (2) a reasonable person in the same situation would share that perception and take similar actions. In California, "perfect" self-defense necessitates both subjective honesty and objective reasonableness, fully exonerating the accused, while "imperfect" self-defense requires only subjective honesty, reducing homicide to voluntary manslaughter. The defendant argued that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the concept of imminence regarding imperfect self-defense and declined to provide requested instructions on this matter. However, the court's instruction—aligned with CALJIC No. 5.17—was deemed appropriate, stating that a person who kills under an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity of self-defense acts unlawfully but without malice, thus not committing murder. The instructions were consistent with established case law, emphasizing that an honest but unreasonable belief in imminent danger is necessary for self-defense claims. The trial court properly instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter, emphasizing that lack of malice aforethought applies when the defendant honestly but unreasonably believes self-defense is necessary against imminent peril. The jury sought clarification on "imminent," leading the court to define it as a peril that must appear immediate and present at the moment the fatal shot is fired, not prospective. The court reiterated this definition after consulting CALJIC No. 5.17 and CALJIC No. 1.01, which the jurors had. Defense counsel objected to the definitions of "imminent" and "immediate," arguing they should be distinguished, but the court held its definition after scholarly review of case law. These cases, while related to perfect self-defense, were deemed applicable to imperfect self-defense due to the similarity in the belief elements. California law asserts that a threat alone does not justify a deadly response unless accompanied by a demonstration of intent to carry out the threat at that moment. A previous threat must be coupled with immediate action threatening the victim's life or serious injury to justify self-defense. The law maintains that mere prior threats do not warrant an assault if there's no immediate demonstration of force, as the threat may not be intended to be executed. The court's definition aligns with established California precedent regarding the immediacy requirement for self-defense claims. The legal framework values human life and permits its taking only in cases of absolute necessity. Homicide is justified only under imminent danger, not merely based on fear of future threats. The defendant must perceive an actual, immediate threat at the moment of the act, considering prior assaults and relevant circumstances. A history of threats alone does not justify killing; there must be a clear indication of an attempt to fulfill such threats at the time of the incident. The law applies equally to all individuals, including those who have committed acts of violence, ensuring that even batterers are afforded legal protections against unjustified killings. In this context, the defendant cannot evade murder charges simply because retreating from a dangerous situation is inconvenient. Alternatives to self-defense, such as seeking help from family or legal protections, must be pursued rather than resorting to lethal force. While recognizing the challenges faced by victims of domestic violence, the legal system upholds strict standards to protect against the unjustified taking of life, advocating for improvements in support systems rather than compromising legal principles. The trial court's definition of "imminence" was upheld as correct, supported by rulings from other state courts regarding self-defense claims involving sleeping husband-victims. Cases like *State v. Norman* and *State v. Stewart* emphasize that an imminent threat or overt act must be present for self-defense to apply, particularly when the victim is asleep. In contrast, *State v. Hennum* did not dismiss self-defense outright in similar circumstances. The defendant argued that the court's definition restricted the jury's consideration to the moment of the shooting, but this claim was rejected. The trial court had previously instructed the jury about considering the defendant's state of mind based on past threats or assaults, which the jury had in writing. The defendant's request for additional jury instructions related to uncontrollable fear and reasonable apprehension of danger was also denied, as these concepts were sufficiently covered by existing jury instructions. Overall, the trial court's decisions were deemed appropriate and adequately informative for the jury's considerations. The court addressed the refusal to give specific jury instructions regarding "prior threats," concluding that these were already covered in the instructions provided. Consequently, the trial court did not err in declining to provide the requested instructions. Additionally, the defendant argued that the court should have instructed the jury on perfect self-defense. However, the court found no substantial evidence to support the claim of reasonable self-defense, emphasizing that a sleeping victim does not present an imminent danger. The expert testimony regarding the defendant's perception was deemed irrelevant to the reasonable person standard. The court noted that no reasonable jury could conclude that a sleeping individual posed an imminent threat, especially since the defendant had the opportunity to leave the room before returning to shoot. Furthermore, the court reviewed the defendant's request for instructions on imperfect self-defense, finding that the instructions refused were based on a "reasonable person" standard, which could be detrimental to the defendant's case. Even if the instructions had been appropriately tailored, they were either unsupported by substantial evidence or redundant due to existing instructions. The relevant aspects of the refused instructions had been adequately covered by the "prior threats" instruction, which directed the jury to consider how past threats influenced the defendant's perception of danger. CALJIC No. 5.50 and the defendant's requested instruction No. 4 regarding retreat were properly denied by the trial court, as there was no evidence of an assault by the victim that would negate the requirement to retreat. The trial court also did not err in excluding expert testimony from Dr. Lenore E. Walker on the specifics of the defendant's experience as a battered woman and its impact on her perception of danger, as this testimony was deemed unnecessary for understanding self-defense instructions. While the court allowed general testimony on "battered woman syndrome" (BWS) to inform the jury about common misconceptions, it excluded the assertion that the defendant acted in self-defense during the shooting of her husband. This exclusion aligns with section 29, which prohibits expert testimony regarding a defendant’s mental state concerning the charged crime. Dr. Walker described BWS as a pattern of psychological symptoms resulting from repeated abuse, highlighting a heightened sensitivity to danger among battered women. She clarified that BWS is not classified as a mental illness but can be viewed as a type of posttraumatic stress disorder. The cyclical nature of abuse typically involves stages of "tension-building," "acute explosion," and "loving contrition," with women often responding violently during the tension-building phase due to their inability to defend themselves during acute episodes. Battered women often remain in abusive relationships due to intermittent positive reinforcement from their partners, particularly during phases characterized by "loving contrition." Societal norms instill in women a role as peacekeepers, fostering optimism and hope in relationships. The economic repercussions of leaving an abusive partner can be severe, and the threat of violence from the batterer, including potential harm to themselves or their children, heightens the danger of separation. Many have unsuccessfully attempted to leave, leading to a state of "learned helplessness," where the woman feels psychologically paralyzed and lacks self-esteem. In the context of legal proceedings, Dr. Walker's testimony regarding the defendant as a battered woman was excluded. She intended to explain how Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) affects a woman's psychological state during a homicide, particularly in relation to self-defense claims. The admissibility of BWS in justifying self-defense hinges on whether expert opinions about the reasonableness of the defendant's actions are pertinent to the legal standard of perfect self-defense. Under California law, justifiable homicide is distinguished from excusable homicide: justifiable acts are deemed legal, whereas excusable acts acknowledge criminality but mitigate blame. Justification requires an objective assessment of the actions taken, contrasting with the subjective evaluation necessary for an excuse. The application of an objective standard, rather than a subjective one, governs the evaluation of fear in self-defense claims. This approach emphasizes that justification pertains solely to the act committed, not to the actor's mindset. Consequently, assessing the reasonableness of a defendant's belief in the necessity of self-defense and the actions taken does not involve the defendant's subjective state of mind but rather an objective standard based on what a reasonable person would believe and do in similar circumstances. California law articulates this evaluation in objective terms. Expert testimony regarding a defendant's state of mind, such as Dr. Walker's opinion about the defendant's perceptions of danger, is deemed irrelevant to the reasonableness of the self-defense claim, as it centers on the defendant's mental processes. Although Dr. Walker’s insights into the defendant's subjective perception of danger are pertinent to establishing the first element of self-defense (actual perception), her testimony regarding whether the defendant acted with malice aforethought is inadmissible. The court maintains that while Dr. Walker's expertise on the experiences of battered women is relevant to understanding the defendant's perceptions, it was an error to exclude her testimony that specifically addressed how these experiences influenced the defendant's perceptions of danger and necessary actions for self-defense. An expert's opinion on a defendant's mental state is permissible if it does not address whether the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for the charged offense, as established in People v. McCowan. Section 29 allows psychiatric testimony concerning the defendant's mental condition relevant to a diminished actuality defense and does not preclude evidence linking the defendant’s actions to a mental disease. Dr. Walker's proposed testimony regarding the defendant's status as a battered woman and its impact on her perceptions falls within acceptable bounds, as it does not address the ultimate issue of her actual perception. While Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) testimony is admissible, trial courts must caution that such evidence should not mislead the jury regarding the reasonableness requirement for perfect self-defense. Instead, it should be limited to proving the defendant's honest belief in the need for self-defense. The respondent's argument to exclude Dr. Walker's testimony by analogy to prior cases (People v. Bledsoe and People v. Bowker) is rejected, as those cases involved evidence of past abuse rather than the defendant's mental state at the time of the incident. The trial court's error in excluding Dr. Walker's testimony about the defendant being a battered woman was deemed harmless. Given the circumstances—especially the defendant's own testimony suggesting a lack of imminent danger from the victim, who was asleep at the time—the court concluded that it was unlikely the jury would have reached a different verdict even if the BWS testimony had been included. An assault victim, after hitting the defendant with an arrow, descended from a loft, at which point the victim no longer posed a threat. The danger was not present during the assault, although future threats were anticipated. Expert testimony indicated that it was unlikely a jury would conclude the defendant genuinely believed she was in imminent danger. Despite hearing general testimony on battered women's syndrome (BWS) about feelings of entrapment and hypervigilance, which included instances of battered women killing their abuser while they slept, the jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder based on inadequate provocation, rejecting the claim of imperfect self-defense. The court determined that even with the exclusion of certain testimony, a different jury verdict was improbable. The defendant argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the absence of a cooling-off period when fear accumulates over time and that the jury instruction CALJIC No. 8.44, which suggests that fear alone cannot constitute heat of passion, should have been modified. Both claims were dismissed as incorrect. The trial court had instructed the jury on malice aforethought and defined the conditions under which a killing could be considered manslaughter due to sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Specifically, provocation must be significant enough to trigger strong emotional responses, and the defendant's response must align with how an ordinarily reasonable person would react under similar circumstances. The court clarified that emotions like fear and revenge alone do not constitute the heat of passion necessary to reduce murder to manslaughter, emphasizing that such emotions could coexist with deliberate decision-making rather than impulsive action. The law establishes a standard for determining if the defendant acted under "heat of passion," as outlined in CALJIC No. 8.44 (4th ed.). The trial court provided instructions indicating that "passion" encompasses any intense emotion and that the defendant's heat of passion must result from sufficient provocation, which can include verbal provocation. It clarifies that heat of passion may arise from a series of events over time. The court found no error in the instructions regarding the "cooling off" period, noting that the defendant's fear, developed over years due to the victim's past assaults and threats, was relevant to the case. The court emphasized that the peak of fear experienced during the victim's last assault must have subsided before the defendant returned with a gun, necessitating the jury's consideration of whether this fear had diminished. The court rejected the defendant's claim that fear alone justified the killing, asserting that this interpretation would incorrectly imply that every case of voluntary manslaughter requires multiple emotions. Instead, the instruction correctly stated that fear alone can constitute heat of passion without being exclusive. The judgment was affirmed, with concurrence from Justices McDaniel and Dabney, and a petition for rehearing and review by the Supreme Court was denied. Notes clarify that parts IV-VI of the opinion are not published, citations follow the Penal Code, and a relevant legal principle is illustrated through a quote from "A Man For All Seasons." Cutting down laws to confront wrongdoing raises concerns about the resulting absence of legal protection. The dialogue emphasizes that laws are essential for maintaining order and safety, even when defending against evil. In the context of criminal actions, Section 29 prohibits expert testimony regarding a defendant's mental states, such as intent or malice, which must be determined by the trier of fact. However, Dr. Walker's opinion on the reasonableness of the defendant's belief and actions in self-defense is not excluded under this section, as it pertains to actions rather than mental states, though it was deemed irrelevant. Various state courts differ in their treatment of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) testimony, influenced by whether they adopt a subjective or objective standard of reasonableness. Some cases illustrate that BWS can be relevant in assessing the reasonableness of a defendant's perception of danger, highlighting the complexities surrounding the admissibility and interpretation of such testimony in legal proceedings. Defendant's argument hinges on the notion that juror Biddle's statement can be used to assess whether an error was harmless. Biddle expressed doubt that the defendant had battered woman syndrome because Dr. Walker did not provide that testimony. The court clarifies that this statement reflects the juror's subjective thought processes and is not admissible regarding juror misconduct or harmless error related to the exclusion of evidence. While juror misconduct statements may be admissible if they relate to the law not included in jury instructions, Biddle's comment does not qualify as misconduct. The defendant's reliance on Biddle's statement to argue the exclusion of Dr. Walker's testimony was not harmless error instead illustrates the subjective nature of juror deliberations. Allowing such statements in appellate reviews would undermine the jury system, turning objective record assessments into subjective explorations of juror motivations, which would disrupt the integrity of the judicial process.