Bach v. County of Butte

Citations: 215 Cal. App. 3d 294; 263 Cal. Rptr. 565; 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1109Docket: C000788

Court: California Court of Appeal; November 6, 1989; California; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

John N. Bach and Janet L. Bach (Bachs) appeal a trial court judgment stemming from a previous case involving zoning regulations in Butte County. The Bachs own a residence in the Lindo Manor subdivision, zoned for single-family use, where Mr. Bach was prohibited from operating a law practice. The county's enforcement action led the Bachs to cross-complain for damages, claiming violations of their federal civil rights and naming various county officials and neighbors as defendants. Following a trial, the jury awarded the Bachs $650,962, but the trial court overturned this verdict, granting motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict from the neighbors and the county counsel. 

The trial court did not grant the neighbors' request for an injunction against the Bachs, citing inequity due to changes in property use in the area, but upheld the zoning regulation. It allowed Mr. Bach to continue practicing law from his home under 'home occupation' provisions, with restrictions on non-resident employees. The neighbors received costs and attorney's fees, while the Bachs’ request for fees was denied due to their pro se status. The Bachs and other parties appealed; the appellate court reversed the damage award, granted injunctive relief to the neighbors, modified the injunction against the Bachs to prohibit their law practice, and affirmed the neighbors' awards while denying fees to the Bachs.

On December 31, 1985, a remittitur was issued and filed with the trial court on January 3, 1986. Subsequently, the County of Butte, its board of supervisors, Supervisor Wheeler, and neighbors submitted a memorandum of costs on appeal. The Bachs filed motions to tax these costs, which the trial court denied in an April 9, 1986 opinion. A judgment was prepared by the county that included an award of costs on appeal, prohibited the Bachs from using the premises for business purposes, and granted attorney's fees to the neighbors as prevailing parties in the Bachs' federal civil rights cross-complaint. The Bachs opposed a noticed motion for entry of judgment, arguing that changed circumstances in the neighborhood rendered the prior decision, Bach I, no longer applicable and requested an evidentiary hearing to assess these changes. The trial court denied this request and granted the motion to enter judgment, which was finalized on September 5, 1986.

On appeal, the Bachs claimed the trial court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing and lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of an at-issue memorandum. They also argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in First Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles warranted reversal of Bach I; criticized the breadth of the injunction; contended their motion to tax costs was improperly denied; and challenged the attorney's fees awarded to the neighbors. The respondents contended that the Bachs were attempting to relitigate settled issues and sought sanctions for a frivolous appeal. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, found the Bachs' appeal to be frivolous, and imposed sanctions of $17,500 against John N. Bach, the attorney for the appellants. The court reiterated that it is the trial court's duty to comply with the appellate court's directions when entering judgment.

The lower court is prohibited from reopening the case, allowing amended pleadings, or retrying the case; any such actions would render the judgment void. In the case of County of Butte v. Bach, the appellate court reversed the damages awarded to the Bachs, directing a judgment in favor of all cross-defendants on the Bachs' federal civil rights cross-complaint. The appellate court also reversed the denial of injunctive relief to the County of Butte regarding the use of the property for law office purposes and ordered further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Additionally, the appellate court reversed the denial of injunctive relief to the neighbors concerning a violation of a restrictive covenant, affirming other judgment aspects.

The Bachs' claim for an evidentiary hearing was based on a misinterpretation of the remand language, which must be considered alongside the entire appellate opinion. In Bach I, it was clarified that the Bachs' property was in an R-1 residential zone where only single-family dwellings are permitted, with a 'home occupation' exception allowing professional offices under specific conditions. The court determined that John Bach's use of the property exceeded the residential use intended by the zoning ordinance, leading to the conclusion that he was not 'residing on the premises' as defined. Consequently, the appellate court found that the lower court erred by not enjoining Bach from conducting a law practice on the premises. The remand directed the lower court to vacate the previous injunction and issue a new one consistent with the appellate opinion, specifically prohibiting the Bachs from using the property as a law office.

The trial court was not directed or authorized to hold the evidentiary hearing requested by the Bachs. They cited several cases to argue for an evidentiary hearing based on changed circumstances, but these cases were deemed inapplicable. The citation of Curtin was incorrect; the rehearing resulted in a new opinion that did not support the Bachs' argument. In Curtin, the appellate court found that equity allowed modification of a license suspension due to a departmental error, but no such erroneous action occurred in the Bachs' case, which involved a valid zoning regulation. The Bachs also failed to demonstrate the relevance of Barber v. LeRoy and Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara to their appeal. Ultimately, the court reaffirmed that Bach I did not authorize the evidentiary hearing and explicitly prohibited reopening the case or amending pleadings.

The trial court correctly denied the Bachs' request for an evidentiary hearing and issued a judgment in line with the ruling in Bach I. The Bachs claimed the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment after the remittitur because no at-issue memorandum had been filed; however, this argument is unfounded. Bach I did not mandate a new trial, thus negating the need for an at-issue memorandum, which is only necessary for placing a case on the civil active list, not for invoking jurisdiction.

The trial court's injunction prohibits John N. Bach, Janet L. Bach, and their associates from using the property at 895 Lorinda Lane for law office or business purposes. The Bachs argue that this injunction violates the Butte County zoning ordinance's home occupation provision and restricts all property uses. However, they raised this argument for the first time on appeal and had previously only objected to the inclusion of costs in the judgment. As this objection was not made in the trial court, it cannot be considered now.

The Bachs also seek to reverse the judgment on the grounds that Bach I was incorrectly decided and demand an evidentiary hearing to address their due process and Fifth Amendment rights. They cite First Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, asserting that the prior decision did not resolve their constitutional issues. However, the First Lutheran case is not applicable here because the Bachs did not claim before this appeal that the Butte County zoning regulation constituted a Fifth Amendment taking of their property.

No claim for inverse condemnation was presented during the initial trial, the appeal in Bach I, or the subsequent trial court proceedings post-remittitur from Bach I. The Bachs raised this issue for the first time on appeal, acknowledging that they did not plead an inverse condemnation cause of action nor did they submit it for trial determination. They argued that their civil rights action implicitly included an inverse condemnation claim, a position deemed unpersuasive and without supporting authority. Their cross-complaint focused on alleged conspiracies regarding a discriminatory zoning ordinance and did not address inverse condemnation.

Furthermore, an inverse condemnation action requires state action and cannot be asserted against private parties, which undermines the Bachs' claim against the neighbors and county officials. The court viewed their argument as an attempt to reargue previously settled issues. 

Regarding costs, the remittitur awarding costs was filed on January 3, 1986. Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1033 and 1034, parties awarded costs must serve and file a verified memorandum of costs within 30 days. The County of Butte and associated parties complied with these requirements, submitting verified memoranda of costs that included the necessary oaths. The Bachs contested the trial court's cost award, claiming the lack of attached invoices or statements was improper. However, they misrepresented the verification process required, which only necessitates a verified memorandum without the need for additional documentation.

Copies of bills, invoices, or other documentation are not required to be attached to a memorandum of costs; a verified memorandum serves as prima facie evidence of incurred costs (Wilson v. Board of Retirement). Supporting documentation is only necessary if a party challenges the memorandum by filing a motion to tax costs. The Bachs incorrectly argued that the trial court erred by denying their motion to tax costs due to late-filed documentation, misrepresenting the procedural requirements. Sections 1033 and 1034 permit parties to submit a verified memorandum of costs within 30 days of the remittitur's filing, without necessitating supporting documents at that time. The trial court acted correctly in awarding costs since procedural requirements were met.

The Bachs also contested the trial court's award of $27,316 in attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to the neighbors as prevailing parties in a federal civil rights case, but this issue was previously rejected in Bach I. An appellate decision on trial court findings is binding in subsequent proceedings. Since Bach I affirmed the attorney's fees award, the trial court was obligated to include it in the judgment post-remand; the Bachs' contrary assertion is deemed frivolous.

The County of Butte and individuals associated have sought monetary sanctions against the Bachs for a frivolous appeal. Under Code of Civil Procedure § 907, the reviewing court can impose damages if an appeal is found frivolous or solely for delay. California Rules of Court, rule 26(a) also allows for penalties against offending parties. An order to show cause was issued regarding sanctions against the Bachs, who opposed on the grounds of procedural jurisdiction, claiming lack of personal service.

The claim lacks merit as the Bachs have submitted to the court's jurisdiction by filing an appeal, allowing service of an order to show cause via mail to their attorney. They acknowledged receiving this order, establishing the court's jurisdiction to impose sanctions for a frivolous appeal. The Bachs argued that sanctions were inappropriate due to a lack of proper notification regarding which aspects of their appeal were deemed frivolous, suggesting a need for a court declaration or affidavit. This argument is characterized as frivolous, as the order clearly notified them that all issues raised in the appeal were subject to scrutiny.

The standards for determining a frivolous appeal, outlined in *In re Marriage of Flaherty*, state that an appeal may be considered frivolous if pursued with improper motives or if it indisputably lacks merit. Importantly, the court acknowledges that while an appeal without merit is not necessarily frivolous, in this case, the Bachs' arguments are entirely devoid of merit. Their claim for an evidentiary hearing contradicts established law, and they provided no legal authority to support their position. The Bachs' contention regarding the trial court's jurisdiction based on procedural rules is deemed absurd, and their attempts to challenge the injunction wording and relitigate issues from a prior case are dismissed as meritless. Additionally, their arguments regarding the award of costs are misrepresentative of established procedures.

The court found the Bachs' appeal regarding attorney's fees to be meritless, reiterating a rejection from a previous case, Bach I. John N. Bach, representing himself and his wife, was deemed to have pursued the appeal for the improper purpose of delaying payment of a prior judgment totaling $50,940.33 plus interest, which they had avoided for nearly three years. This delay allowed the Bachs to retain the use of the funds while the respondents incurred additional legal costs. The court emphasized the need for a stronger judicial response to such abuses of the legal system, which unfairly affects both opposing litigants and the judicial process. The court issued sanctions against Mr. Bach, finding his actions particularly egregious as a licensed attorney. Sanctions of $15,000 were imposed, intended to compensate the respondents for their expenses in defending against the frivolous appeal. This amount is to be paid into a trust account, from which the respondents will receive payments proportional to their incurred costs related to the appeal.

Sanctions of $17,500 are imposed against John N. Bach, attorney for the appellants, for pursuing a frivolous appeal, with the amount payable to the court clerk to cover processing costs. This decision is supported by precedent cases, including Finnie v. Town of Tiburon and Maple Properties v. Harris, and constitutes a written statement of reasons for the sanctions as required by In re Marriage of Flaherty. A copy of the opinion will be sent to the State Bar of California in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6089(b). The trial court's judgment is affirmed, and respondents are awarded their costs on appeal. Notably, there was a misunderstanding during oral arguments regarding the request for sanctions by the County of Butte and its board of supervisors, which had indeed been included in their brief. The Bachs' opposition to the motion for entry of judgment relied on John Bach's declaration, which detailed increased commercial development and traffic in the area surrounding their property.