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Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.

Citations: 914 F. Supp. 97; 11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 585; 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 776; 1996 WL 32892Docket: Civil Action No. 95-5712

Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania; January 23, 1996; Federal District Court

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In the case of Michael A. Smyth v. The Pillsbury Company, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed a wrongful discharge claim by an at-will employee, Smyth, who alleged he was terminated for sending inappropriate emails based on assurances of confidentiality from his employer. The court assessed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal only if the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that could support a claim for relief. The court noted that Pennsylvania law does not grant a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of at-will employees, who can be terminated for any reason unless protected by contract.

Despite Smyth’s reliance on the employer’s assurances about email confidentiality, the court found that Pennsylvania's at-will employment doctrine grants employers broad discretion to terminate employees. Exceptions to this doctrine exist only under limited circumstances where the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. However, the court indicated that such public policy exceptions are narrowly construed and only a few have been recognized by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Ultimately, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that Smyth failed to establish a viable claim for wrongful termination.

An employee cannot be terminated for serving on jury duty, as established in Reuther v. Fowler, Williams, Inc., where the court highlighted the importance of citizen availability for jury service as a public policy concern. Similarly, an employer is prohibited from denying employment to individuals with prior convictions, as affirmed in Hunter v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, which emphasized the need to avoid stigmatization and unreasonable restrictions on former offenders per Pennsylvania law and public policy. Additionally, employees are protected from dismissal for reporting federal regulatory violations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as shown in Field v. Philadelphia Electric Company, which recognized the employee's obligation under federal law and expertise in the area. 

Public policy exceptions must be specifically defined, and without identifying a distinct violation of public policy, an employee's termination will not be deemed wrongful. Public policy sources include legislation, regulations, and judicial decisions, with the judiciary required to make case-by-case determinations in the absence of specific legislation. A clear public policy mandate arises from established prohibitions or privileges. The plaintiff alleges wrongful termination based on a violation of privacy rights under Pennsylvania common law, referencing Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., where the court discussed potential wrongful discharge claims related to drug screening policies and recognized the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as pertinent to privacy rights.

The Court of Appeals refers to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which defines the tort of invasion of privacy as an intentional intrusion into another's solitude or private affairs that is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Liability for such an intrusion requires it to be substantial and offensive. Although Pennsylvania courts have not ruled specifically on whether an employee's discharge related to privacy invasion violates public policy, the Court predicts that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would analyze the facts of such a case. If the discharge relates to a substantial and highly offensive invasion of privacy, it is likely to be deemed a violation of public policy. 

The Court of Appeals suggests that Pennsylvania would use a balancing test between the employee's privacy rights and the employer's need for a drug-free workplace. The court vacated a lower court's dismissal of a complaint, allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint regarding privacy violations related to the employer's drug and alcohol program.

Applying the tort definition to the current case, the court finds that the plaintiff has not stated a valid claim. It asserts that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails voluntarily sent by an employee using the company e-mail system, even with management assurances of non-interception. Once the employee communicated with a supervisor via company email, any expectation of privacy was forfeited. The court further concludes that even if a reasonable expectation existed, the interception of such communications would not be considered a substantial invasion of privacy, as the employer's interest in monitoring inappropriate conduct outweighs any privacy concerns. Consequently, the court grants the motion to dismiss, stating that the defendant's actions did not violate public policy. 

Additionally, while the plaintiff's complaint may imply an exception to at-will employment based on reliance on assurances regarding email privacy, Pennsylvania law holds that an employer cannot be estopped from terminating an employee based on such promises.