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Rubenstein v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Citations: 90 N.E.2d 289; 339 Ill. App. 404Docket: Gen. 44,750
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; February 21, 1950; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Sidney Rubenstein appealed a judgment from the Illinois Appellate Court, which ruled against him in a claim against Fireman's Fund Insurance Company for damages caused by the collapse of a portion of his dining room ceiling. The insurance policy, effective September 1, 1946, covered personal property at his residence and included various exclusions. Notably, the policy did not insure against breakage of fragile items unless caused by specific perils, including theft, vandalism, or collapse of a building. On August 7, 1947, a significant section of the ceiling fell without prior warning, damaging his personal property valued at $434. Rubenstein argued that the insurer needed to prove the applicability of the exclusion clause as an affirmative defense, which he claimed was not adequately pleaded by the defendant. He maintained that he provided sufficient detail regarding the loss and relevant policy provisions in his pleadings. The court's opinion, authored by Presiding Justice Burke, ultimately upheld the trial court's judgment against Rubenstein. The defendant acknowledged the issuance of an insurance policy, asserting that it only covered risks explicitly stated within the policy and did not specify which terms it was relying on for its defense. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's answer failed to inform him of the affirmative defense, thus denying him the opportunity to demonstrate that his loss fell within an exception to the exclusion clause. The plaintiff cited several cases to support his position, emphasizing that in insurance actions, he must prove that his loss resulted from a covered peril. However, the cited cases primarily addressed conditions subsequent rather than coverage issues. The defendant's amended answer reiterated that only specified risks were insured and denied the plaintiff's claimed loss. Consequently, the court found that the burden rested on the plaintiff to prove that his loss was due to a covered risk. Furthermore, any pleading defects not raised in the trial court are deemed waived under Supreme Court Rule 42. The plaintiff was aware of the trial issue, which was addressed during proceedings. Insurance policies are interpreted favorably toward the insured, and ambiguous terms are resolved in their favor. The policy in question excludes certain losses unless caused by specific events, including theft, vandalism, or other similar casualties. The plaintiff contended that "other similar casualty" is ambiguous and should be broadly construed in his favor. Conversely, the defendant maintained that the trial judge correctly determined the loss was not due to an insured peril. The term "similar" implies resemblance among different casualties, and the plaintiff argued that the exceptions indicate a focus on casualties without human intervention. In the case Thames Mersey Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, Fraser Co., 12 A.C. 484 (House of Lords, 1887), the court ruled that insurance policies covering "all other perils" only encompass similar perils of the sea, not any peril. The plaintiff argued that the term "all other perils" included damages from seaworthy ship transit, specifically citing a loss from a ceiling collapse. However, the court agreed with the defendant that the only relevant peril noted in the policy was the "collapse of building." Judicial interpretation of "collapse of building" requires that the entire structure loses its identity as a building. For instance, in Teutonia Ins. Co. v. Bonner, the court found that a building blown over did not constitute a "collapse." Similarly, in Security Ins. Co. v. Mette, the court determined the partial fall of an ice house did not meet the definition of collapse under fire insurance. In Skelly v. Fidelity, Casualty Co. of New York, a case involving damage from a runaway railroad car, the court ruled that a small portion of wall damage did not qualify as a collapse under the policy terms. The plaintiff's assertion that the ceiling's partial collapse constituted a similar casualty to those insured was rejected. The court concluded that the damage did not align with the policy's definitions and thus affirmed the municipal court's judgment, indicating that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the incident qualified as an "other similar casualty."