Poplawski v. Huron Clinton Metropolitan Authority

Citations: 260 N.W.2d 890; 78 Mich. App. 644; 1977 Mich. App. LEXIS 1233Docket: Docket 30470

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; September 21, 1977; Michigan; State Appellate Court

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Defendants appeal a judgment of $340,741.40 resulting from a jury verdict, as well as a denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The case stems from a 1973 pedestrian-motorcycle accident at Metropolitan Beach, operated by the Huron Clinton Metropolitan Authority, where Dale Coulston, a harbor master and defendant, was involved. The plaintiff, along with her fiancé, initially arrived to play golf but chose to leave due to overcrowding. As they walked toward the parking lot, the plaintiff looked both ways before crossing a road and was subsequently struck by Coulston’s three-wheeled vehicle.

Witness testimony indicated that the road was 24 feet wide, and both the plaintiff and her fiancé observed no oncoming traffic when they began to cross. Coulston, however, claimed he was responding to a radio call and was traveling at 25 to 30 miles per hour without applying brakes before the impact, admitting he did not see the plaintiff until it was too late. He also noted that his motorcycle's horn was inoperable at the time. The defense requested a jury instruction clarifying that being on the wrong side of the road does not automatically equate to negligence, asserting that the mere fact of being in the wrong lane at the time of the collision does not constitute negligence per se.

The statute mandating that vehicles drive on the right side of the roadway must be interpreted reasonably, considering the driver’s circumstances and intent for being on the wrong side. The trial court declined to provide a specific jury instruction related to this interpretation, reasoning it was redundant to the existing charge regarding proximate cause of negligence. The jury was instructed that if either party violated the statute, they were negligent per se, but they must determine if such negligence was a proximate cause of the incident. If the defendant faced a sudden, unavoidable emergency and exercised ordinary care, this could excuse the violation.

The court referenced Standard Jury Instructions (SJI 12.01 and 12.01(A)), which are mandated in civil cases if applicable and requested. The accuracy and applicability of these instructions were examined in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Zeni v Anderson, which established that a violation of a penal statute creates a prima facie case of negligence from which a jury may infer negligence. Although some cases have implied negligence per se aligns with strict liability, a closer review indicates that Michigan does not endorse such a strict interpretation.

The specific statute in question is MCLA 257.634; MSA 9.2334, which the Supreme Court has previously analyzed, noting a longstanding rebuttable presumption approach regarding the requirement for vehicles to stay to the right. The Supreme Court concluded that the focus should be on acceptable excuses for statutory violations rather than whether an excuse is permissible. Although a superficial reading of Zeni might suggest a need for reversal in this case, a deeper analysis reveals factors that support the trial court's decision. The court also referenced Hackley Union National Bank v Warren Radio Co, where the plaintiff argued that the defendant's own admission of driving on the wrong side constituted negligence as a matter of law.

Defendant asserted that the sudden emergency doctrine raised a factual question for the jury. The Court acknowledged that while the defendant was on the wrong side of the highway during the collision, this alone does not establish negligence as a matter of law, referencing Martiniano v. Booth. The manner in which the defendant ended up on the wrong side is a factual issue for the jury to resolve, especially considering whether an emergency situation caused the violation of the statute requiring vehicles to be driven on the right side. 

Additionally, the Court noted that a statutory violation can create a rebuttable presumption of negligence, citing MCLA 257.402, which presumes a motorist negligent if they rear-end another vehicle. Both parties agreed this statute applied, but the presumption can be rebutted, although the sudden emergency doctrine was not a factor in this case. The trial court found sufficient evidence regarding reasonable care to warrant a jury's consideration, thereby preventing a directed verdict for the plaintiff. 

The Court also referenced a case where the plaintiff alleged violations of additional statutes related to assured clear distance and following too closely. It emphasized that while the assured clear distance statute was once strictly construed, recent interpretations allow for a reasonable construction that considers circumstances and due care, as established in various cases.

The Court affirmed the jury's verdict, determining that the trial court's instructions adequately protected the defendants from being subjected to an outdated irrebuttable presumption of negligence. Despite the trial court's inclusion of the contentious "negligent as a matter of law" instruction, it also clarified that negligence must be established as a proximate cause of the injury, and properly defined "proximate cause." Additionally, the trial court provided a "sudden emergency" instruction, which, while arguably inapplicable, offered a broad potential excuse for the defendants if they exercised ordinary care but were unable to avoid the emergency. The combination of these instructions fulfilled the trial court's responsibility to instruct on the law without committing reversible error. The Court expressed concern regarding a literal interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Zeni v Anderson, suggesting that it could grant juries excessive discretion in excusing statutory violations. It advocated for a clearer framework where trial courts assess evidence for legal excuses before instructing juries. The Court limited Zeni v Anderson to its specific facts, noting that the trial court acted with the understanding that previous law was unsettled at the time the jury instructions were formulated.

Affirmed without costs. A circuit judge served on the Court of Appeals by assignment. The case references MCLA 257.634 and MSA 9.2334, as well as Manning v Cheboygan Area Schools, which outlines principles related to the "sudden emergency" doctrine. Key principles include assessing facts favorably for defendants and determining if the circumstances of the accident were "unusual" or "unsuspected," with examples such as a blizzard qualifying as unusual. The current case does not reveal either condition. The Michigan Standard Jury Instructions indicate five specific scenarios where the "sudden emergency" instruction, SJI 12.01(A), should be modified, none of which apply here. Various case precedents from California, Indiana, Iowa, West Virginia, and Vermont are cited to support these principles. Additionally, the Zeni case is noted for its context in last-clear chance situations, which involve specific duties for the trier of fact.