Armenta v. Superior Court

Citations: 61 Cal. App. 3d 584; 132 Cal. Rptr. 586; 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1837Docket: Civ. 48414

Court: California Court of Appeal; August 27, 1976; California; State Appellate Court

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Henry Armenta petitioned for a writ of mandate to suppress evidence obtained from what he argued was an unconstitutional search. The case arose from a heroin buy operation conducted by the Santa Barbara Sheriff's Department using informant Eugene Lancaster, who was also enrolled in a methadone program. On January 26, 1976, Lancaster, equipped with a hidden recording device, purchased heroin from Armenta at the methadone clinic. Armenta was subsequently arrested and charged with the sale of heroin.

Armenta claimed that Lancaster's actions violated his rights under state and federal law, warranting suppression of the evidence. The court acknowledged that while a federal regulation was violated by the sheriff's conduct, it did not rise to a level of constitutional infringement that would justify suppressing the evidence. The court evaluated the claim under California's constitutional right to privacy, determining that the use of an informant in this context did not constitute an unreasonable governmental intrusion, as it was connected to specific criminal activity. Furthermore, it asserted that any expectation of privacy Armenta might have had was derived from statutes that govern the use of informants in methadone clinics, and whether such regulations create a constitutional expectation of privacy depends on their reasonable application. Ultimately, the court found the search illegal but not unconstitutional, thus denying the writ.

Petitioner argues that Lancaster's actions breached California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5328, which mandates confidentiality for information and records from methadone maintenance programs. The court disagrees, stating that section 5328 applies only to information obtained during the operation of the program. The conversation between the two men, which led to the drug sale, was unrelated to program activities and did not occur under the auspices of the program, thus section 5328 is deemed inapplicable.

Regarding federal confidentiality laws (21 U.S.C. 1175 and 42 C.F.R. 2.19), the petitioner claims these prohibit the use of informants in methadone clinics. The court affirms that these federal regulations apply to the Santa Maria Clinic, as they govern any drug abuse prevention function supported by federal agencies. Clinic administrators confirmed their adherence to these federal regulations.

The validity of 42 C.F.R. 2.19 is challenged by the People, who argue it exceeds the regulatory authority granted by 21 U.S.C. 1175. However, the court finds that regulations can be upheld if they reasonably relate to the original legislation's purpose. The regulatory authority granted by Congress is broader than typical language, supporting the conclusion that the informant prohibition is valid, even if tangential to record confidentiality.

Regulations under 21 U.S.C. 1175(g) allow for definitions, safeguards, and procedures to support the statute's purposes, particularly to prevent evasion and ensure compliance. Regulatory flexibility is permitted when congressional legislation is not exhaustive regarding the issues it aims to address, as established in American Trucking Assns. v. U.S. (1953). Regulation 2.19 serves to maintain the confidentiality of information in drug abuse programs, specifically prohibiting the enrollment of police informants in such programs to prevent the collection of confidential information. The Secretary of the agency is deemed to have the authority to enforce this prohibition.

The inquiry centers on whether law enforcement violated 42 C.F.R. section 2.19 by employing Lancaster, an undercover agent, who was enrolled in a methadone clinic to make drug purchases from another enrollee. The People's argument is that regulation 2.19 aims to protect patient confidentiality and that Lancaster did not access or disclose confidential records. However, the regulation explicitly prohibits informants from enrolling in drug treatment programs for criminal investigations of other enrollees.

Lancaster's actions fit the definition of an informant as outlined in 42 C.F.R. section 2.19(a) because he was requested by law enforcement to observe and report on another enrollee while using a transmitting device. Consequently, it is determined that the Santa Barbara County Sheriff violated 42 C.F.R. section 2.19 by directing Lancaster to conduct a drug purchase from another clinic enrollee.

Suppression of evidence obtained by an informant is deemed inappropriate unless it results from a violation of constitutional rights, statutory transgressions embodying such rights, or when specifically mandated by statute. The court affirms that the petitioner lacked awareness of the relevant federal statute and regulation. Although 21 U.S.C. § 1175 mandates suppression of certain records obtained in violation of its provisions, the court determines that the evidence collected by informant Lancaster does not qualify as a record intended for protection under this statute. The origins of § 1175 reflect a focus on confidentiality regarding drug and alcohol treatment records, not on voluntary disclosures by patients to informants. Regulations, including 42 C.F.R. § 2.19, were designed to protect patient confidentiality but do not imply that informants cannot interact with other patients unless the information pertains to protected matters. The court concludes that suppressing the evidence would not serve any purpose since the informant did not acquire any information protected by federal law. Consequently, the petition for a writ of mandate is denied, and the alternative writ is discharged.

Petitioner argues that the sheriff's use of informant Lancaster to relay conversations between petitioner and Lancaster, both inside and outside a clinic, infringed on his Fourth Amendment rights, which are linked to his reasonable expectation of privacy. Relevant case law, including *People v. Brannon* and *Katz v. United States*, supports this interpretation. Additionally, the petitioner claims that admitting the evidence obtained during this surveillance would violate his due process rights, which will be explored later in the opinion.

Penal Code section 632 prohibits recording "confidential communications," but this does not extend to police informants as specified in section 633, supported by *North v. Superior Court*. Although there is a California legislative policy aimed at protecting citizens from improper use of listening devices (Pen. Code. 630), it was determined that this policy should not impose stricter limitations on law enforcement than those in place in 1967, the year the relevant sections were enacted. 

Further, the excerpt outlines provisions from 21 U.S.C. § 1175 regarding the confidentiality of patient records related to drug abuse prevention functions. It states that such records can only be disclosed under specific circumstances, including the patient's written consent, for medical emergencies, for research purposes without patient identification, or by court order after demonstrating good cause. The court must balance public interest and the need for disclosure against potential harm to the patient and the physician-patient relationship when considering such orders, and must impose safeguards against unauthorized disclosure.

No records mentioned in subsection (a) may be used to initiate or substantiate criminal charges against a patient or to investigate a patient unless authorized by a court order under subsection (b)(2)(C). The term "undercover agent" refers to law enforcement members whose identities are concealed in treatment programs, while "informant" describes individuals observing program participants at the request of law enforcement agencies. There is a general prohibition against the employment or enrollment of undercover agents or informants in alcohol or drug abuse treatment programs, with specific exceptions if a law enforcement officer enrolls solely for their own treatment and discloses their status to the program director. 

The regulation was amended in 1974 to broaden its applicability, emphasizing the negative impact of informants on program morale and effectiveness. The prohibition against informants was reinforced by feedback from drug abuse program officials, particularly following an incident where an undercover agent accessed confidential records. The overarching concern is that the presence of informants could undermine patient confidentiality and trust, with the possibility of severe penalties for violations, including fines up to $5,000 for repeat offenses. The regulation aims to protect the integrity of treatment programs and ensure confidentiality, while minimizing any potential distrust among program participants.