Aroonsakul v. Shannon

Citations: 664 N.E.2d 1094; 279 Ill. App. 3d 345; 216 Ill. Dec. 166Docket: 2-95-0706

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; April 26, 1996; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Dr. Chaovanee Aroonsakul and A.P.M.C., a not-for-profit corporation, filed a lawsuit against 11 defendants, including Kathleen Shannon and Jacob Fox, alleging defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, and conspiracy to defame due to statements made in WBBM-TV broadcasts. The trial court dismissed the claim against Shannon for false-light invasion with prejudice and the claim against Fox for conspiracy to defame without prejudice. The plaintiffs are appealing these dismissals, while claims against other defendants remain active.

The second amended complaint states that Dr. Aroonsakul is a physician practicing at the Alzheimer's and Parkinson's Treatment Center in Naperville, Illinois, claiming she developed an effective treatment for neurodegenerative diseases related to hormonal imbalances and holds multiple patents for her methods. The defamation claims arise from a November 5, 1992, WBBM-TV broadcast titled "Alzheimer's Investigation," where the plaintiff was identified by name and accused of exploiting patients with unproven treatment claims involving growth hormones and steroids. The broadcast implied that the plaintiff's treatment was unverified, and she declined an interview for the report.

On November 6, 1992, a broadcast titled "Medical Scam" featured Adele Arakawa introducing allegations against a doctor (the plaintiff) who purportedly claimed to cure incurable diseases but faced fraud charges and potential license revocation. Pam Zekman criticized the plaintiff’s treatment, labeling it as a "so-called cure" involving questionable substances, and introduced neurologist Kathleen Shannon, who compared the plaintiff's claims to the absurdity of toenail polish curing Parkinson's Disease. The plaintiff alleged that Shannon's statements placed her in a false light and were made with malice and recklessness despite Shannon's knowledge of the treatment's potential validity. The plaintiff claimed that Shannon's comments contributed to patients discontinuing their treatment. Shannon moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting her statements were protected opinions, not directed at the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs failed to plead special damages. The trial court granted the dismissal, likely questioning whether Shannon's statements were sufficiently related to the plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued their complaint adequately stated a cause of action for false-light invasion of privacy. The court emphasized that for a motion to dismiss under section 2-615, it must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and determine if they could entitle the plaintiff to relief. To establish a false-light claim, three elements must be satisfied: the plaintiff must show they were placed in a false light, that such a light would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and that the defendant acted with actual malice.

The tort of false-light invasion of privacy safeguards an individual's right to be free from offensive publicity. Similar to defamation, actions for false-light claims may be subject to certain limitations, such as the requirement that the statement must be "of and concerning the plaintiff." Publicity must be reasonably interpreted as identifying or pointing to the plaintiff. In a case involving a couple who were allegedly misidentified in a media report about an in-flight incident, the court ruled that the airline's statements could not be considered "of and concerning" the couple because the statements lacked identification of the plaintiffs, despite reporters later identifying them. The court emphasized that the context rule applies only when the same author composes the surrounding material, which was not the case here. Thus, the airline's statements were not actionable as defamatory under Illinois law, as it could not be inferred they referred to the plaintiffs based solely on the statements made.

Shannon's statements were deemed incapable of being understood as referring to the plaintiffs, lacking a direct connection to them. Any potential link arises only from external information not controlled by Shannon. Case law cited by the plaintiffs, including Weinstein and Jacobson, differs significantly as those statements contained specific details that could identify the plaintiffs. In contrast, Shannon's statement was vague, referring generically to "brochures like this" without identifying any individual or specific brochure. The Chapski case is also distinct as it involved authors responsible for their own statements. The trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint was upheld, as there was no basis for a conspiracy claim. The evaluation of Shannon's statement should focus solely on her interview with Zekman, not the broader CBS broadcast. Even with a hypothetical allegation linking Shannon's comments to the plaintiffs’ brochure, the statement remained too generalized to imply a direct reference. Furthermore, Shannon's comments were classified as constitutionally protected opinions about matters of public concern, requiring provable falsehood for defamation liability. This aligns with the precedent set in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., which safeguards rhetorical expressions from defamation claims to preserve public discourse.

In Milkovich and relevant case law, conflicting medical opinions can affect the assessment of allegedly defamatory statements. In Erickson, the court found that a chiropractor's treatment was labeled unreasonable by a non-physician, which was deemed a non-innocent interpretation, distinguishing it from Anderson, where a physician's criticism of another's treatment was considered a difference of opinion among doctors. In Barakat, the court ruled that derogatory remarks about a physician's practice constituted factual statements rather than protected opinions, as they directly impacted the physician's professional conduct. Conversely, Dr. Shannon's comments were deemed a constitutionally protected opinion, as they reflected a subjective view on treatment methods without attacking the plaintiff's character or competence. The court emphasized the importance of allowing physicians to express opinions on debatable treatments. The appeal against defendant Fox was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction, and the lower court's judgment was affirmed. Presiding Justice McLaren concurred, noting that Dr. Shannon's statements could reasonably be understood to refer to the plaintiff, suggesting that the dismissal based on this interpretation was premature.