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Estate of Getty
Citations: 85 Cal. App. 3d 755; 149 Cal. Rptr. 656; 1978 Cal. App. LEXIS 2020Docket: Civ. 52807
Court: California Court of Appeal; October 25, 1978; California; State Appellate Court
Anne Catherine Getty contests the 21st codicil to her grandfather Jean Paul Getty's 1958 will, claiming he lacked testamentary capacity or was under undue influence when it was executed on March 11, 1976. The trial court determined she was not an interested person under Probate Code sections 370 and 380, dismissing her case without leave to amend. The original will established a distribution plan directing real property and an art collection to the J. Paul Getty Museum, with the estate's residue also intended for the museum's endowment fund. Subsequent codicils modified trustee appointments and the distribution of the estate, including a 1967 codicil that removed Gordon Peter Getty as trustee and replaced him with his brothers. The 21st codicil reinstated the museum trustees as beneficiaries of the estate's residue, which includes a substantial stake in Getty Oil Company valued at over $700 million. Following Getty's death on June 6, 1976, the appointed trustees, including Jean Ronald and Gordon Peter Getty, manage the estate and trusts created under the will. The appeal concerns whether the petitioner, a contingent trustee under a will, qualifies as an "interested person" according to Probate Code sections 370 and 380, thereby permitting her to contest the 21st codicil's validity. The court concludes she does not meet this definition and upholds the trial court's decision. Under the Probate Code, an "interested person" is generally defined as someone whose estate interest would be harmed by the probate of a will or who would benefit from its invalidation. The right to contest a will is primarily based on the potential loss of property rights due to an invalid instrument. Examples of interested persons include heirs eligible for intestate succession if a will is invalid and contingent remaindermen under a trust. The petitioner argues that as a contingent trustee, she has standing based on cases from other jurisdictions. However, the court finds both sides exaggerate their positions. The petitioner specifically contests only the 21st codicil and does not challenge the validity of the original will or its prior codicils. She lacks a basis for claiming an "interest" related to possible intestate succession due to the existence of a valid prior will that provides a complete scheme of charitable bequests. Furthermore, her financial situation indicates she derives significant income from another trust, suggesting her interest in the estate is limited to her role as a contingent trustee. Consequently, a testamentary trustee holds legal title to the trust property, while beneficiaries possess equitable title and enforcement rights. A trustee holds legal title to trust property solely for the benefit of beneficiaries and does not possess a personal pecuniary interest. However, a trustee may contest a will if it threatens the beneficiaries' interests, especially if the will is not genuine or resulted from undue influence or mental incapacity. A testamentary trustee, akin to an executor, can challenge a later testamentary document if it adversely affects the beneficiaries' financial interests. In this case, the petitioner, a contingent trustee, claimed the right to contest a codicil, but analysis revealed that the museum (the beneficiary) would actually benefit from the change, as it would receive all income directly and avoid trustee fees from a prior trust. Thus, the museum's financial interest was enhanced, disqualifying the petitioner as an interested person under the Probate Code. The petitioner's arguments regarding the testator's intent were deemed irrelevant. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment, finding the petitioner's lack of standing moot regarding other procedural contentions. The decision was upheld, with no further hearings granted. In the case of In re Maricich's Estate and other cited precedents, the legal standing of beneficiaries to contest wills is addressed, particularly emphasizing that even contingent interests can provide standing for such actions, as illustrated in Estate of Plaut. The 19th codicil of a significant estate specifies that executors and trustees are to receive statutory commissions per California law, which allows for reasonable compensation determined by the court. Given the estate's substantial value of $700 million, the potential fees and commissions are considerable, raising questions about whether the legislative framework adequately addresses estates of this magnitude. The museum's board of trustees faces conflicts of interest, complicating their ability to challenge the high fees paid to executors and attorneys. As a result, the duty to act on behalf of the charitable beneficiary may fall to the Attorney General of California, who is invited to intervene and take necessary actions regarding the estate's administration. The document also highlights the legal obligations of public agencies to oversee charitable trusts to ensure they are managed in the beneficiaries' best interests, referencing relevant sections of the Government and Civil Codes. Notably, individual trustees named in the estate's later codicils also serve as trustees of the museum, further complicating potential conflicts.