Hayes v. County of San Diego

Citations: 658 F.3d 867; 2011 WL 2315191Docket: 09-55644

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 22, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

On September 17, 2006, San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputies Mike King and Sue Geer responded to a domestic disturbance call regarding Shane Hayes, who was potentially suicidal. Upon arrival, Deputy King spoke with Hayes’s girlfriend, Geri Neill, who reported that they had been arguing and that Hayes had attempted suicide earlier that night by trying to inhale car exhaust. Neill assured Deputy King that there were no firearms in the house but did not mention the possibility of Hayes having a knife. Deputy King, unaware of Hayes's past suicide attempts and intoxication, decided to enter the house for a welfare check.

Deputy Geer arrived shortly thereafter, and both deputies entered the dimly lit home without their guns drawn, although Deputy King carried a Taser. Upon locating Hayes in the kitchen, Deputy King ordered him to show his hands. Hayes complied but revealed a large knife in his right hand, prompting Deputy King to draw his weapon and fire two shots at Hayes, closely followed by Deputy Geer, who also fired two rounds. The entire encounter lasted only four seconds from the order to the gunfire. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the deputies and the County of San Diego on all claims, leading to the plaintiff’s appeal. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Deputy King testified that he believed Hayes would continue advancing with a knife because Hayes was not stopping, and despite acknowledging that a command to stop could have been given quickly, he felt there was no time. Witness Neill observed the shooting from behind Deputy Geer and noted that while Hayes approached with the knife raised, he was not charging and appeared confused, stating, "like nothing’s working upstairs." Just prior to the shooting, Hayes had asked the officers if they intended to take him to jail or prison. 

Chelsey Hayes, the deceased's minor daughter, filed a lawsuit against the deputies and the County of San Diego, claiming violations of her father's Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as her own Fourteenth Amendment rights. She included state law claims for negligent wrongful death and negligent hiring, training, and supervision by the County. Although the district court acknowledged Chelsey Hayes’s standing to pursue survival claims, it granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims except for negligent hiring, training, and supervision, which she did not appeal. The Appellees contested the standing for survival claims based on alleged constitutional violations. 

In § 1983 actions, survivors can assert Fourth Amendment claims if state law permits survival actions. The burden rests on the party to demonstrate the state's authorization for such actions. The district court used California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60 to determine Chelsey's standing but mistakenly applied it, as it pertains to wrongful death actions rather than survival actions. A survival action allows a decedent’s estate to recover for injuries sustained by the decedent, while a wrongful death action allows dependents to claim for their own injuries resulting from the death. California's requirements for survival actions are defined in California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.30.

A cause of action that survives a decedent passes to their successor in interest, allowing the decedent’s personal representative or successor to commence an action. If no personal representative exists, a successor in interest can proceed if they meet California law requirements. The Appellant claims to be the decedent's sole surviving heir but does not assert she is the personal representative or successor, nor has she filed the necessary affidavit to initiate a survival action under California law. As a result, it is unclear if the Appellant has standing to pursue survival claims related to her father's constitutional rights, leading to a remand for the district court to determine her standing.

Regarding alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations, a child has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship of a parent. Conduct that shocks the conscience, especially if it deprives a child of that interest, can violate due process. The assessment of whether excessive force shocks the conscience involves determining if the officer had the opportunity for actual deliberation. If so, deliberate indifference may suffice to shock the conscience; otherwise, a purpose-to-harm standard applies if the officer acts in a rapidly evolving situation. In this case, the district court correctly determined that the deputies acted based on an immediate threat when they used deadly force against Hayes after he revealed a knife. The decision to fire was made quickly, with only four seconds elapsing from the command for Hayes to show his hands to the first shot fired, indicating a lack of time for warnings.

Appellant contends that deputies could have prevented the incident involving Hayes by gathering more information or involving a psychiatric emergency response team (PERT) prior to their entry into the house, but acknowledges that this option lapsed once they entered. The use of deadly force by the deputies upon seeing a knife was deemed sudden and lacking deliberation. Appellant does not assert that the warrantless entry violated Hayes’s Fourth Amendment rights, recognizing that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement likely applies. The court found no evidence suggesting the deputies intended harm unrelated to lawful self-defense, leading to a failure to support Appellant's substantive due process claim. Consequently, the court affirmed summary judgment regarding the 1983 claim related to the Fourteenth Amendment.

Regarding Monell claims of municipal liability, the district court granted summary judgment to the County due to the absence of constitutional rights violations. The court agreed with this conclusion, affirming that no violation of Appellant’s rights existed under the Fourteenth Amendment and upholding the summary judgment on Monell claims. However, the court remanded the Monell claim concerning potential violations of Hayes’s Fourth Amendment rights back to the district court to determine Appellant's standing for survival claims.

For the negligent wrongful death claim against the deputies, Appellant argued negligence in both pre-shooting conduct and the decision to use deadly force. The district court ruled that the deputies owed no duty of care regarding their conduct before the shooting and determined that the use of force was objectively reasonable, thus not negligent. The court noted that while breach of duty and proximate cause are typically factual issues, the existence of a legal duty is a legal question. Citing California law, the court reiterated that a lack of due care by an officer can lead to negligence liability for an intentional shooting death.

A question remains regarding whether law enforcement officers can be liable for negligence due to inadequate preshooting tactical decisions, specifically concerning their duty of care. The appellant argues that Deputies King and Geer were negligent for not gathering sufficient information about Hayes or requesting a PERT team prior to confronting him. The district court ruled that the deputies owed no duty of care for these actions, citing public policy that prioritizes community safety and the necessity for officers to exercise discretion in emergencies over imposing tort liability. However, the California Supreme Court indicated that officers might face negligence liability for preshooting actions in Hernandez v. City of Pomona, which addressed the preclusive effect of a federal judgment on subsequent state wrongful death claims. The court found that although the federal judgment estopped the plaintiffs from pursuing their wrongful death claim, it did not definitively establish that officers owe no duty of care regarding preshooting conduct. Instead, it suggested that the officers' actions did not breach applicable care standards. The court's analysis implies that a duty of care is likely recognized, and the need to assess breach and causation remains. A concurring opinion highlighted the plaintiffs' right to amend their complaint to include preshooting negligence. Consequently, the district court's conclusion that Deputies King and Geer had no duty of care is reversed, and the case is remanded to evaluate the appropriate standard of care, any potential breach, and the causation related to Hayes's death.

Under California negligence law, police officers must exercise reasonable care when using deadly force, evaluated under an objective reasonableness standard similar to that of Fourth Amendment claims. Excessive force claims, akin to state battery and wrongful death claims, are informed by federal civil rights precedents. The assessment of reasonableness occurs from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, taking into account the context of the situation. Key factors include the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and if the suspect is actively resisting or fleeing. Additional considerations include the amount of force used, available alternatives, and the suspect’s mental state, while acknowledging that officers often make split-second decisions in high-stress situations.

In this case, it is undisputed that Hayes had committed no crime and was not actively resisting arrest at the time of the incident. Evidence suggests he complied with commands, raising his hands to show a knife but not threatening the deputies. The primary question is whether the deputies reasonably believed Hayes posed an immediate threat justifying deadly force, as opposed to less severe alternatives. The district court found the use of deadly force reasonable based on Hayes moving towards an officer with a raised knife. However, the argument against this reasoning posits that mere possession of a weapon does not suffice to justify deadly force, especially since Hayes had committed no crime and was in his home. There was no clear indication that he threatened the officers, as prior information indicated he only threatened self-harm, and the deputies did not observe erratic behavior. This situation diverges from prior cases where immediate threats were more evident, raising doubts about the reasonableness of the officers' actions in this instance.

Hayes was not ordered to drop the knife nor did he swing it at Deputy King, standing eight feet away in his kitchen without being suspected of any crime. The rapid and unclear circumstances of the encounter do not justify automatically accepting the officers' actions. A court must assess whether there are material facts that contradict the justification for the use of force. Genuine issues remain regarding whether Hayes posed an immediate threat, and the absence of a warning before the shooting is significant. Previous rulings indicate that not providing a warning can impact the assessment of reasonableness in using deadly force. The San Diego County Sheriff’s Department guidelines emphasize the necessity of warnings before employing deadly force, particularly when feasible. Deputy King claimed he lacked time to issue a warning, yet Hayes was still six feet away when shot, raising questions about the feasibility of a warning. The California Supreme Court has ruled that negligence cannot be removed from jury consideration if evidence supports the notion that the force used was unreasonable. Viewing the evidence favorably for Hayes suggests he was complying with Deputy King’s order when he raised the knife, indicating no clear threat existed at the time of the shooting. The situation could be interpreted in various ways, and the determination of reasonableness often requires careful evidence evaluation, making summary judgment inappropriate in excessive force cases. The court reverses the summary judgment regarding the deputies' use of deadly force and remands the issue for further proceedings.

The court reverses the district court's finding that Chelsey Hayes has standing to assert survival claims regarding her father's Fourth Amendment rights and remands for further proceedings, including the assessment of her standing for a Monell claim against the County. The summary judgment on Hayes's § 1983 claim for a Fourteenth Amendment violation and the Monell claim against the County is affirmed. However, the court reverses the summary judgment on Hayes's negligent wrongful death claim, remanding it for further proceedings. No party will recover costs on this appeal. The court notes that the district court did not address potential statutory immunity for the deputies or the County under California law and declines to do so here.

Circuit Judge Rawlinson concurs in part and dissents in part, agreeing that the substantive due process claim was inadequately supported and that summary judgment was correctly granted for the County on that claim. However, Rawlinson disagrees with other parts of the majority opinion due to a lack of material factual disputes regarding the amount of force used. The facts indicate that officers responded to a neighbor's report of screaming, and upon their arrival, they encountered Shane Hayes, who was wielding a knife and advancing towards Deputy King, leading to the shooting. The plaintiff did not contest the officers' account of events during the summary judgment motion, focusing only on the knife's position after Hayes fell, which did not create a material dispute. The case draws parallels to Reynolds v. County of San Diego, where the use of deadly force was deemed reasonable if the officer had probable cause to believe that the individual posed a significant threat.

The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of assessing events in real-time rather than with the benefit of hindsight, particularly in cases involving the use of deadly force. In this situation, Deputy King faced an immediate threat from Hayes, who approached while wielding a large knife. Hayes' demeanor suggested a lack of rationality, leading Deputy King to reasonably believe his life was in jeopardy. The majority opinion remands the case to the district court to determine the viability of a survivorship action; however, the author argues that no excessive force was employed by Deputy King and believes the district court's ruling should be affirmed. The author contests the majority's interpretation of relevant case law regarding the viability of a negligence claim, noting that the California Supreme Court did not address this issue in its decision. The author maintains that the majority overlooks the lack of duty of care for pre-shooting conduct, aligning with the district court's conclusion that no such duty existed. Ultimately, the author supports affirming summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, asserting that Deputy King acted within reason under the circumstances.