Gorecki v. County of Hennepin, Dept. of Public Works

Citations: 443 N.W.2d 236; 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 866; 1989 WL 84076Docket: C1-89-391

Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota; August 1, 1989; Minnesota; State Appellate Court

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A jury found Hennepin County 55% contributorily negligent for injuries sustained by Steven B. Gorecki when his pickup truck slid over a snowbanked bridge railing and landed on the road below. The incident occurred on December 30, 1981, when Gorecki lost control of his vehicle while attempting to change lanes on a bridge over Minnesota Trunk Highway 77, amidst icy conditions. Although Officer Ronald Quittem noted signs of Gorecki's intoxication, including the smell of alcohol and beer cans at the scene, he did not charge Gorecki with DWI due to insufficient probable cause, despite a blood alcohol level of .08 upon hospital admission.

John Kirtland, the highway maintenance superintendent, testified about the county's snowplowing policy, which prohibited pushing snow off bridges. As a result, a snowbank formed along the bridge's railing, which Kirtland deemed not hazardous, as no similar accidents had been reported during his tenure. He acknowledged that snowbanks were removed from bridges with pedestrian crossings but not from vehicle-only bridges like the Crosstown bridge. The district court denied Hennepin County's post-trial motions for JNOV or a new trial, leading to the appeal, which was affirmed.

A motor patrol was responsible for clearing snow from a roadway, followed by loaders transferring the snow into trucks for removal. Kirtland indicated that the county's resources did not limit snow removal but affected its timing. Gorecki sued the State of Minnesota and Hennepin County for injuries from an accident. A jury found the State not negligent but held Hennepin County negligent for failing to clear snow from the Crosstown bridge. Gorecki was also found negligent while driving over the bridge. The jury apportioned fault, assigning 55% to the county and 45% to Gorecki, which the trial court recognized as proximate causes of Gorecki's injuries. The court reduced Gorecki's awarded damages from $90,000 to $40,000 under Minn. Stat. 604.01, subd. 1 (1986). Hennepin County's post-trial motions were denied, leading to an appeal regarding two issues: whether the county's snow removal decisions were discretionary acts that would grant it immunity from liability, and whether the trial court erred in denying a new trial. The county argued that it was immune from liability due to its snow removal decisions, but the court noted that while tort immunity was generally waived by legislation, an exception exists for claims based on discretionary functions. This discretionary function immunity applies similarly to both county and state actions, and courts interpret this exception narrowly to respect policy decisions made by government branches.

The supreme court has established that the discretionary function exception applies only to decisions that involve balancing competing public policy considerations. It distinguishes between planning level decisions, which assess public policy factors such as financial, political, economic, and social effects, and operational level decisions, related to day-to-day government operations. 

In evaluating Hennepin County's decisions regarding snow removal—specifically not plowing snow over bridges and not removing snow from vehicle-restricted bridges—the court emphasizes that the focus should be on whether these actions were planning (protected) or operational (unprotected) decisions. A claim based on the creation of a hazardous condition does not negate the discretionary function exception unless it demonstrates that the conduct stemmed from a broad policy decision. 

The adoption of standards, such as the Minnesota Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, is deemed a protected planning level activity as it involves numerous policy considerations. If government employees adhere to a policy, challenges to their actions become challenges to the policy itself, which courts will not second-guess. 

However, if the government does not provide evidence linking the alleged negligent conduct to a policy decision or balancing of policy objectives, the discretionary function exception may not apply. For instance, a challenge to the placement of a speed sign was deemed valid because there was no evidence of a policy mandate. Additionally, professional judgments not involving public policy formulation do not qualify for discretionary immunity. 

In this context, C. Gorecki argues that Hennepin County acted negligently by allowing snow to accumulate against a bridge's crash barrier and failing to remove it. Notably, on October 23, 1979, Hennepin County issued a policy requiring snowplows to reduce speed and take precautions to prevent snow and ice from being pushed over bridges.

The memorandum outlines the county's policy against snow being thrown from bridges by snowplows, adopted due to concerns about liability and public relations. In the 1978-79 snowplowing season, the county faced three damage claims related to this issue, leading to the decision being classified as a protected planning-level choice. Testimony from Engebrit confirms that snowplow operators complied with this policy by building snowbanks rather than plowing over bridges. A challenge to their actions would effectively challenge the county's policy decision, rendering Gorecki's negligence claim barred by the discretionary function exception.

However, Kirtland's testimony indicated that while the county had a policy for clearing snow from bridges with sidewalks, no policy existed for removing snowbanks from vehicle-only bridges. Kirtland asserted that this decision was not based on equipment or manpower constraints but rather on a lack of perceived danger. Therefore, Gorecki's claim regarding the snowbank removal was not barred, and the jury's finding of county negligence in this matter stood.

On appeal, the county sought a new trial, citing excluded evidence, refused jury instructions, and misstatements by counsel. A new trial is only granted when the jury's verdict appears to disregard evidence or is influenced by improper motives. After reviewing the record, the court found no prejudice against the jury's decision, especially given that Gorecki was found 45% at fault. As such, the trial court's denial of the county's post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial was affirmed. The case is differentiated from a prior decision (Hennes v. Patterson) regarding state policy on snow removal from state highway bridges.