Lincoln Property Co. No. 41, Inc. v. Law

Citations: 45 Cal. App. 3d 230; 119 Cal. Rptr. 292; 1975 Cal. App. LEXIS 1680Docket: Civ. 33639

Court: California Court of Appeal; February 11, 1975; California; State Appellate Court

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Arthur W. Law and the Citizens Committee for the Preservation of the San Carlos Foothills appeal a lower court's judgments that granted a preliminary and permanent injunction, as well as orders denying motions to intervene and set aside judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. The case revolves around a real estate development by Lincoln Property Company, which acquired a tract of land known as 'Lands of Roth' in San Carlos, previously annexed to the city and zoned as a Planned Community (PC). 

A development plan was approved for the previous owner in 1969 but was never executed. After Lincoln acquired the land in 1971, the city adopted a new development plan with specific conditions, which was less extensive than the earlier proposal and did not involve zoning changes. The City Council approved this new plan on January 24, 1972, following public hearings.

In May 1972, Lincoln submitted detailed plans to the City for approval, which the City Council accepted on December 11, 1972. Subsequently, on January 9, 1973, the Citizens Committee filed a referendum petition to challenge the City Council's December resolution. In response, Lincoln initiated a lawsuit on January 29, 1973, aiming to prevent the City from holding an unlawful referendum election and to stop the circulation of the petition by private individuals.

The trial court initially issued a temporary restraining order on the same day as the complaint, followed by a preliminary injunction on March 20, 1973. After a series of procedural steps, including the dismissal of the second cause of action and a permanent injunction granted only against the City and its employees, the appeal arose from these judicial actions.

A permanent injunction was issued on April 24, 1973, and entered on April 25, 1973. On that date, a non-party Committee filed a motion to intervene, which along with a motion to vacate the judgment, was denied by the trial court on May 10, 1973. The current appeal follows these denials. The appellants, supported by amicus curiae, challenge the judgments and orders primarily on the basis that the trial court's injunction against the City processing their referendum petition violated rights under article IV, section 1, of the California Constitution, constituting reversible error. The court disagrees, noting that while the initiative and referendum powers are liberally construed, they are only applicable to strictly legislative matters. Established precedent confirms that administrative or executive acts are outside the scope of the referendum process to ensure efficient municipal administration. The core issue is whether the December Resolution is legislative or administrative. Legislative acts involve declaring public purpose and means for its achievement, whereas administrative acts implement existing legislative policies. The court concludes that the zoning change was a legislative act occurring on January 24, 1972, with the December Resolution merely approving this plan, thus affirming the trial court's decision.

In cases where an appeal is based solely on the clerk's transcript, it is presumed that the trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence. The January 1972 resolution from the City Council established the legislative objectives and conditions for development, while the acts approved at the December 1972 meeting were merely administrative, implementing previously declared policies. Consequently, the December Resolution is not subject to the referendum process. 

Precedents such as Andrews v. City of San Bernardino and Valentine v. Town of Ross support this conclusion, as they established that similar approvals were administrative rather than legislative acts, which fall outside the scope of referendum power. The Millbrae Assn. for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae and Wheelright v. County of Marin cases are distinguished due to their substantial alterations of the general plan, which is not applicable here since the December Resolution involved changes that decreased the size of buildings in accordance with the earlier plan. 

As a result, additional issues raised by the appellants, including motions to intervene and to set aside judgment, are deemed inconsequential. The judgments and orders are affirmed, with no participation from Sullivan, J. in the decision-making process.

The trial court's memorandum decision granting the preliminary injunction establishes that the San Carlos City Council's actions on December 11, 1972, were administrative and executive in nature, rather than legislative. The council's legislative actions relevant to a referendum petition occurred in January 1972, prior to the December meeting. Planning Consultant Byce confirmed during the December hearing that the plan discussed was previously approved as a development plan. He reiterated in a sworn statement that a new amended development plan for the property in question was adopted by the council on January 24, 1972. On December 11, 1972, the council approved a specific development plan, which was represented in an attached map. This map, alongside a tentative subdivision map and grading plan, detailed the development in accordance with the conditions set by the council on January 24, 1972. The approval of the precise plan and grading plan was contingent upon these conditions.