People v. Swearingen

Citations: 84 Cal. App. 3d 570; 148 Cal. Rptr. 755; 1978 Cal. App. LEXIS 1898Docket: Crim. 32245

Court: California Court of Appeal; September 5, 1978; California; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

After his motion to suppress evidence was denied, Christopher Michael Swearingen pled guilty to possession of hashish for sale, subsequently appealing the denial of his suppression motion. Swearingen argued that the police and prosecution's failure to preserve material evidence, as mandated by People v. Hitch, rendered testimony regarding probable cause inadmissible. The Court of Appeals determined that the lost or destroyed physical evidence was crucial to resolving conflicts between police and Swearingen's testimony regarding probable cause. The prosecution failed to demonstrate that the police had implemented effective procedures to preserve evidence. Consequently, the court ruled that the trial court erred in considering prosecution testimony about the missing evidence and reversed the judgment.

The case arose from a traffic stop on March 23, 1977, when police observed Swearingen driving a van without a front license plate. During the stop, an officer noticed a transparent vial containing marijuana in the van. This led to Swearingen's arrest and subsequent confession. Swearingen contested the officer's claim about the vial's transparency, stating it was opaque and thus its contents could not be seen without light. The officer acknowledged the vial's evidentiary significance but failed to locate it for Swearingen's preliminary hearing, despite other evidence being retained. The vial's disappearance was central to the appeal's arguments regarding the validity of the search and seizure.

The prosecution failed to provide evidence regarding the preservation of a vial in the property room, which is critical to the case. According to the precedent set in People v. Hitch, the prosecution is responsible for demonstrating that proper procedures for preserving evidence were followed. If the prosecution cannot prove this, the court must impose sanctions for nondisclosure, which in this instance involves excluding testimony about the vial. The trial court incorrectly denied Swearingen's motion based on Hitch, resulting in prejudicial error. The determination of whether Boissier could see marijuana in the vial from outside the van directly impacts the legality of the vehicle search and Swearingen's subsequent confession and consent to search his apartment. If the vial was opaque, the search would be deemed illegal and the evidence obtained would be inadmissible. The Attorney General's argument that Hitch applies only to intentional destruction of evidence is flawed; the rule is intended to ensure fair trials regardless of the nature of evidence loss. The prosecution did not adequately demonstrate that the evidence was merely lost rather than destroyed. Additionally, the argument that other evidence supports Swearingen's guilt overlooks the fact that all evidence is tainted if the initial arrest was unlawful. Consequently, the judgment granting probation is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings on the motion to suppress and the Hitch motion, with a retrial mandated if the suppression motion is denied. Judge Hanson dissents, believing that Hitch is distinguishable and not applicable to this case.

Extending the Hitch principle to assess the credibility of law enforcement witnesses during evidence suppression hearings under Penal Code section 1538.5 is deemed unwise for the interests of criminal justice. In the current case, defendant Swearingen faced three charges related to possession of controlled substances and pleaded guilty to possession of hashish after his motion to suppress evidence was denied. The suppression hearing allowed the trial court to evaluate witness credibility and resolve conflicting testimonies, with its findings upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.

Officer Boissier observed a vial containing a substance resembling marijuana in Swearingen's van, while Officer Zalkowski testified about the vial's characteristics. Swearingen contended that the vial was opaque, but the court concluded there was substantial evidence supporting that the contents were visible under the circumstances observed by Boissier. The court chose not to apply the Hitch principle regarding the empty vial and resolved the conflicting testimonies against Swearingen. The case of People v. Hitch is distinguished from this situation, as it involved the preservation of evidence critical to the defense's ability to challenge the accuracy of a breathalyzer test, whereas this case centers on the visibility of contraband within a vial.

The federal court's ruling in Bryant provides guidance for handling chemical breath tests under Vehicle Code § 13353, emphasizing the importance of preserving and disclosing test evidence, specifically the test ampoule and its contents, as they are critical to determining a driver's guilt or innocence regarding DUI charges. Investigative agencies are mandated to maintain such evidence, and should it be unintentionally destroyed, sanctions will apply unless the prosecution can demonstrate that rigorous preservation procedures were in place and followed in good faith. If the prosecution fulfills this burden, the breathalyzer results may still be admissible, despite the loss of the evidence; failure to meet this burden will lead to the exclusion of the test results but does not necessitate dismissal of the case.

The current case differs from Hitch, where the ampoule and its contents were inseparable and deemed essential evidence. Here, the plastic vial holding marijuana is considered separable and of no evidentiary value on its own, as the marijuana was preserved separately for analysis. The excerpt also critiques the notion of expanding the exclusionary rule's application to credibility issues regarding police officers in suppression hearings, arguing that such expansion could hinder the criminal justice system, increase costs, and undermine public confidence. The author advocates for exploring alternatives to the exclusionary rule rather than complicating it with additional principles like that of Hitch. The petition for a Supreme Court hearing was denied on November 1, 1978.

Large quantities of marijuana were discovered in the van of the defendant after his arrest, including marijuana in a pocket of his peacoat, cash, and additional marijuana in various compartments of the vehicle. Hashish was also found in the defendant’s apartment. The defendant pled guilty to possession of hashish for sale as part of a plea bargain. The judgment could be affirmed under the harmless error doctrine, but due to the precedent set by People v. Hill, this doctrine does not apply to guilty pleas following erroneous denials of motions to suppress evidence. The defendant received a three-year probation sentence with a condition of 180 days in local custody, though this condition is stayed pending appeal, and he is currently free on his own recognizance.

The exclusionary rule, which prevents evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizures from being admitted in court, has roots dating back to 1886 and was applied in federal courts in 1914. It was adopted by California in 1955 and extended to state courts by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1961. The rule aims to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment but has faced criticism. Many legal professionals question its effectiveness and the significant costs it imposes on the justice system, suggesting it diverts focus from the defendant’s guilt or innocence to the conduct of law enforcement. Chief Justice Warren Burger highlighted the detrimental impact of the exclusionary rule in his dissent in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, emphasizing the high costs associated with its application.

Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, critiques the exclusionary rule as ineffective and outdated, arguing that it is paradoxical for a nation that values innovation to rely on a poorly designed legal mechanism for over fifty years. He suggests that Congress should create an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy to provide compensation for violations of Fourth Amendment rights, emphasizing that states could implement similar schemes independently. Burger believes that such measures would promote responsible law enforcement while moving away from the extreme consequences of the suppression doctrine.

Chief Justice Weintraub's opinion in State v. Bisaccia reinforces the idea that truth and justice are interconnected, arguing that suppressing evidence of guilt can lead to false acquittals. He questions the fairness and effectiveness of the suppression doctrine, suggesting that it does not effectively ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment. He asserts that the primary purpose of government is to protect individuals from harm, underscoring the importance of maintaining social order.

The Bill of Rights was not designed to undermine the fundamental purpose of government, which is to safeguard individual rights, including protection from criminal activity. The conflict lies not between the State and individuals but among competing individual rights. When truth is ignored and criminals are released, it is the victims, not the State, who suffer the consequences. This situation arises from the Mapp decision, which denies innocent individuals necessary protection and fosters a lack of respect for criminal law by allowing guilty parties to evade justice. The complex, case-by-case application of Mapp has created confusion for law enforcement regarding expectations, leading to inefficiencies in both state and federal courts as they become bogged down with motions and appeals rather than focusing on timely adjudication of cases.

Justice Macklin Fleming critiques the fragmentation in criminal law, highlighting the two opposing views on the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. The older perspective allows such evidence to be used, arguing that a second violation should not negate the pursuit of justice, while the prevailing Exclusionary Rule prevents any use of evidence acquired through unlawful means, even if the initial violation was minor. This latter approach has led to a focus on restricting police actions rather than addressing criminal behavior, ultimately resulting in the release of guilty individuals and diminishing the deterrent effect of criminal law. Fleming advocates for a more comprehensive factual inquiry, criticizing the tendency to suppress evidence and disregard the reality of events surrounding criminal investigations, effectively rewriting history to ignore illegally obtained evidence.

Justice Fleming critiques the exclusionary rule, arguing it undermines factual inquiry and credibility by excluding verifiable facts. This leads to negative consequences: criminals evade scrutiny, victims feel unprotected, and potential offenders view the law as ineffective. Such a system promotes rational and emotional criminal intent while diminishing deterrence and prioritizing prosecution processes over crime prevention. Fleming advocates for discipline of abusive officers rather than evidence suppression, suggesting that illegally obtained evidence should generally be admissible unless its use condones a more significant crime. He recommends shifting from compulsory to discretionary suppression of evidence, similar to the English system, which emphasizes that justice must not only be achieved but also perceived as achieved. Fleming asserts that these proposals, supported by Chief Justice Burger, are reasonable alternatives to the exclusionary rule, promising to decrease court congestion, restore public trust in the justice system, and save taxpayers money currently spent on suppression motions.