United States v. Pretlow

Citations: 770 F. Supp. 239; 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16339; 1991 WL 153403Docket: Crim. No. 90-328

Court: District Court, D. New Jersey; August 13, 1991; Federal District Court

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Bilal Pretlow faces charges for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise that allegedly involved the intentional killing of two individuals, violating 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). The government intends to seek the death penalty and has filed motions concerning the penalty phase. One motion seeks to amend notices of aggravating factors, which outline the basis for the death penalty, while the other requests the release of Pretlow's juvenile records from the New Jersey Superior Court. Pretlow opposes both motions.

The court determined that the government must demonstrate good cause to amend the notices and found that it had met this requirement. The court also ruled that only portions of Pretlow's juvenile record relevant to 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(4) are pertinent to the case, and, based on principles of comity and federalism, the court will not order the release of these records.

The government previously filed two notices of aggravating factors in January 1991 related to the murders of Melanie Baker and Mutah Sessoms, alleging intentional killing, substantial planning, and Pretlow's leadership in a cocaine distribution enterprise targeting individuals under 21. The June 1991 superseding notices added allegations of Pretlow's intent to kill and prior convictions for serious drug offenses.

The notice regarding the Sessoms murder was amended to include "torture" and changed "and" to "or" in the aggravating factors as per section 848(n)(12). Pretlow argued that these amendments were legally void, asserting that only the court could permit changes to the original notices upon showing good cause, a requirement he did not concede was necessary. The government, while not admitting to needing court permission, moved to amend the original notices and submitted an affidavit from Assistant U.S. Attorney Kevin McCarthy explaining the reasons for the amendments but not addressing the delay in making these changes.

In cases involving the death penalty under 21 U.S.C. 848(e), section 848(h) mandates that the government must file and serve a notice of aggravating factors a reasonable time before trial. The court may allow amendments only with good cause shown. The government argued that filing a superseding notice within a reasonable time negated the need for court permission, a position deemed contrary to the statute's intent. It was determined that the original notice must be filed within the specified timeframe, with any amendments thereafter requiring court approval based on good cause, which is not defined in the statute.

Views on what constitutes good cause differ; Pretlow suggested it should be limited to excusable neglect, while the government argued for a more lenient standard focused on their good faith and lack of prejudice to the defendant. The court ultimately found the government’s argument more compelling, emphasizing that the critical factor in permitting amendments should be whether the defendant received adequate notice in time to prepare a response, rather than the substantive changes made.

The court finds no need to apply a strict excusable neglect standard regarding the government's amendments to the notices of aggravating factors, asserting that a definition of good cause focusing on the government's good faith and the potential prejudice to the defendant suffices to ensure adequate notice. The government has shown good cause, as the amendments have a plausible connection to the case, and the defendant, Pretlow, has not disputed this. While the amendments could have been included in the original notices, the government's delay was attributed to a slow case analysis rather than bad faith. The court believes Pretlow is not significantly prejudiced, having received the superseding notices on June 17, 1991, with ample time to adjust his trial strategy before the November 4 trial date. Furthermore, Pretlow has until September 13, 1991, to file pretrial motions, allowing him to address any issues related to these amendments.

The court then considers the government's request for access to Pretlow's juvenile records, arguing that they contain information relevant to aggravating factors, potential impeachment if Pretlow testifies, and responses to possible mitigating factors. Pretlow contests this, citing the confidentiality of juvenile records under New Jersey law and their lack of relevance. The court will first evaluate the relevancy arguments before addressing its authority to order the release of the records. The government seeks to access information regarding juvenile offenses that could fulfill criteria outlined in 21 U.S.C. 848(n)(4), which allows for the consideration of prior convictions punishable by over one year in prison as aggravating factors. Pretlow counters that, under New Jersey law, juvenile dispositions are not equivalent to adult convictions and therefore do not meet the definition of "offense" in this context. The court currently disagrees with Pretlow's interpretation, acknowledging that juvenile dispositions do not carry civil disabilities or equate to criminal status but can still be relevant in sentencing considerations.

Juvenile dispositions are relevant at the sentencing phase of a capital case, as section 848(n)(4) applies to any offense, juvenile or adult, punishable by over one year of imprisonment. Under New Jersey law, a family court judge can impose sentences exceeding one year for juvenile offenses equivalent to third-degree crimes or higher, as specified in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(1)(a). Thus, only the portion of Pretlow's juvenile record related to offenses that could lead to such incarceration is deemed relevant in this case. The government's arguments for broader access to Pretlow's juvenile records— for impeachment purposes or to counter potential mitigating factors— are rejected, as Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d) prohibits using juvenile records against a defendant, supported by case law emphasizing the confidentiality of juvenile offenses and their limited admissibility. Furthermore, the claim that access to these records is necessary to rebut mitigating factors is dismissed as speculative and insufficient to warrant an extensive investigation into confidential records. New Jersey law mandates strict confidentiality of juvenile records, allowing access only under specific conditions, such as to courts, prosecutors, and certain authorized individuals, as outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60(a). The court finds it cannot order the release of Pretlow's juvenile records to the government.

Law enforcement agency records may be disclosed for law enforcement purposes to other state law enforcement agencies as per N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60(b). However, the court does not have the authority to order the release of Bilal Pretlow's juvenile records to the government. While section 60(a)(1) allows for the release of records to the court, it does not permit the court to subsequently disclose them to other parties. Section 60(a)(6) permits release for good cause, but “the court” refers specifically to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Family Part, not any other entity. Section 60(b) allows law enforcement agencies to share juvenile records among themselves without a court order but does not extend to court records or potentially to federal agencies. The state's intent is to protect the confidentiality of juvenile records, limiting their availability under strict conditions. Therefore, the court concludes that it lacks the authority to release Pretlow's records but believes the Superior Court could. The court emphasizes the importance of federalism and comity, opting to deny the government's motion for the release of Pretlow's records while granting its motion to amend notices of aggravating factors.