In Re Marriage of Steinberg

Citations: 66 Cal. App. 3d 815; 136 Cal. Rptr. 299; 1977 Cal. App. LEXIS 1180Docket: Civ. 48377

Court: California Court of Appeal; February 7, 1977; California; State Appellate Court

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Sylvia Steinberg appeals a judgment from a bifurcated trial concerning the division of community property from her marriage to Samuel Steinberg. The couple, married in 1965, separated in August 1969, and this case marks the third trial and second appeal in a lengthy dissolution process initiated in 1969. Samuel brought assets into the marriage, while Sylvia had no property. Key issues addressed include:

1. **Crest Drive Property**: Determined to be Samuel's separate property, with no true joint tenancy established.
2. **Joint Bank Accounts**: Ruled as community property, with each party entitled to half of the funds.
3. **Salkin Promissory Note**: Conceded by Sylvia that the proceeds were already disposed of by trial time.
4. **Pickford Street Property**: The $26,000 from its sale was meant to remain Samuel's separate property despite being in a joint account.
5. **Cemetery Crypt**: Initially deemed a gift to Sylvia but awarded to Samuel in error, as the court cannot transfer one spouse's separate property to another.
6. **Samuel's Pension**: The trial court failed to classify a portion of the pension accrued during the marriage as community property.
7. **Bonds**: Found to be Samuel's separate property, purchased with proceeds from stocks inherited from his first wife.
8. **Automobile**: Sylvia did not provide evidence regarding the automobile, thus cannot contest its exclusion from community property.

The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment regarding property rights and instructed a reevaluation consistent with the appellate court's findings. No costs or attorney fees were awarded on appeal, leaving it to the trial court's discretion to determine these matters in a just manner.

At the third trial, the court limited the evidence to three specific issues identified by the appellate court: joint bank accounts, a pension plan, and one cemetery crypt. On June 6, 1975, the court issued a memorandum confirming the cemetery crypt as Sylvia's separate property and various assets as Samuel's separate property, including real estate, a trust deed, and pension payments subject to a community interest. Community assets were distributed, with Sylvia receiving furniture and 12.5% of Samuel's pension payments, while Samuel retained his furniture.

The court found that the joint bank accounts previously identified as separate property no longer existed and had been accounted for by Samuel. It also ordered Samuel to pay attorney's fees to Sylvia's attorney. Sylvia's subsequent request for findings of fact was denied as untimely, and a further judgment was filed in line with the memorandum. Sylvia appealed the judgment, challenging the court's application of "law of the case," the lack of findings of fact, and the allocation of joint account funds to Samuel. She asserted that the evidence did not support the judgment.

Sylvia argued that the trial court wrongly applied "law of the case" by not allowing a full retrial of community property issues, contending that the doctrine pertains to legal, not factual issues. She cited the principle that an unqualified reversal generally allows for a complete retrial. However, it was noted that an appellate court is not compelled to permit a retrial on all issues when the error affects only specific, distinct issues. This practice of partial reversals is established and should apply where errors impact only certain aspects of a case.

The appellate court's decision centers not on the applicability of the "law of the case," but on whether its reversal of the judgment was partial or qualified. Notably, even an unqualified reversal prompts inquiry into the court's true intent regarding qualification. The court in this instance did not simply reverse; it specified that the trial court should redetermine the parties' property rights per its opinion, avoiding the need for a full retrial. The court expressly declined to award costs or attorneys' fees, directing the trial court to resolve those matters. Given the lengthy litigation stemming from a four-year marriage that ended in 1969, the appellate court aimed to avoid unnecessary additional trials over property rights, including items like a 1966 automobile and cash proceeds from a property sale. The court emphasized that a third trial could lead to further appeals and disputes over property items, which it did not intend. 

Regarding procedural issues, Sylvia's request for findings of fact and conclusions of law was denied because it was submitted late, which the trial court correctly ruled against based on procedural requirements. Additionally, Sylvia challenged the trial court's finding that Samuel had adequately accounted for the proceeds of their joint bank accounts, which were community property. However, her argument failed to consider key factors: the couple's monthly financial situation, Samuel's withdrawals for significant purchases, and the classification of a $26,000 deposit as Samuel's separate property from a prior sale. Overall, the court found no error in the trial court's refusal to reopen the case or in its handling of the property accounting.

Withdrawals from accounts were made by Sylvia, including a $2,600 withdrawal from Great Western Savings and an $8,000 withdrawal from Home Savings. The trial court placed the burden on Sylvia to demonstrate that there was insufficient evidence supporting its conclusion that Samuel accounted for his withdrawals, which she failed to do. Sylvia argued that the division of community property lacked evidentiary support due to no valuation being placed on various items; however, this was deemed without merit as most property was determined to be Samuel's separate property. The court recognized that 25 percent of Samuel's pension payments were community property, awarding Sylvia 12.5 percent of those payments, a point she did not contest. Since the joint bank accounts were no longer existent and accounted for by Samuel, no further valuation was necessary. Sylvia's primary concern was the absence of a valuation on furniture and furnishings. The court reasonably assumed the retained furnishings were substantially equal, as no evidence was provided regarding their individual values. The judgment was affirmed, with concurrence from Justices Stephens and Ashby. A petition for rehearing was denied on March 1, 1977, and the Supreme Court declined to hear the case on April 7, 1977. Sylvia's record for appeal included various selected documents and exhibits, but the court noted the full reporter's transcript was provided, addressing her claims regarding the trial court's refusal to include certain testimony in the settled statement. Although Samuel waived claims to the $8,000 withdrawn by Sylvia, this amount remained relevant to assessing whether he adequately accounted for the proceeds.