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Pyka v. Village of Orland Park
Citations: 906 F. Supp. 1196; 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17050; 1995 WL 680556Docket: 92-C-7888
Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; November 8, 1995; Federal District Court
Pamela and Richard Pyka, along with Danielle Pyka, have filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against the Village of Orland Park and several police officers, following the suicide of Christian Pyka, who was in police custody. The incident occurred on November 8, 1991, when the 18-year-old hanged himself in his cell. The lawsuit raises issues concerning the circumstances surrounding his death, including claims of excessive force, refusal of bail, punishment, failure to provide medical care, and municipal liability. The case includes extensive evidence, including eyewitness accounts, expert testimony, and a videotape of the booking and take-down processes. The court will evaluate claims related to qualified immunity for the officers, the constitutional violations alleged, and the applicable legal standards for summary judgment. The complexities of the case are underlined by the tragic nature of Pyka's death and the unanswered questions it raises. Pyka's death on November 8, 1991, remains unclear, with key evidence stemming from police statements, his friend Lyle Healy, and Joseph A. Padin, a nearby detainee. A videotape exists of events prior to Pyka's incarceration, but the evidence is primarily circumstantial, disputed, and inconclusive, allowing for multiple interpretations. Officer Timothy McCarthy, involved in the case, is a Vietnam veteran and accident reconstructionist, while Pyka, an 18-year-old student, was notably smaller in stature and well-regarded by peers. He had not expressed suicidal thoughts or signs of distress before his death. On the night of the accident, Healy was with Pyka in a Chevy Blazer when they skidded on ice, causing the vehicle to tip over. Healy confirmed that Pyka wore his seatbelt and sustained no visible injuries. After the accident, Healy and two friends attempted to right the vehicle but were unsuccessful until Officer Duggan arrived on the scene. Officer Duggan initially identified Chris and another individual as the only ones involved in an incident, directing other participants to leave the scene. As emergency vehicles arrived, officers confirmed the involvement of Chris and the other individual in an accident, prompting paramedics to request their presence in the ambulance to complete waivers. Chris identified himself as the driver, leading an officer to detain him. The other individual entered the ambulance to fill out medical paperwork and was later instructed to follow an officer for questioning. Upon exiting the ambulance, he observed Chris being arrested and inquired about the reason for the arrest, to which Officer McCarthy responded vaguely. Subsequently, the other individual was taken by Officer Loewe to the police station, reassured he was not under arrest. During transport, Loewe questioned him and expressed his negative views towards local youth, while the individual disclosed having consumed some alcohol prior to the incident. Officer McCarthy arrived at the scene later and was informed by Officer Duggan that Chris was the driver of the vehicle involved in the crash. McCarthy noted that Chris, leaning against a squad car, self-identified as the driver. He separated Chris from the other individual, checked for injuries, and, observing signs of intoxication, attempted to obtain Chris’s driver's license. Upon Chris's refusal and disruptive behavior, McCarthy arrested him on suspicion of driving under the influence. Both parties were subsequently transported to the police station in separate vehicles. Officer Michael Loewe arrived at the accident scene on November 8, 1991, where he observed the driver, Christian Pyka, speaking with Officer Duggan. Loewe noted that Officer McCarthy decided to arrest Pyka, who did not resist and was subsequently handcuffed and transported to the station. Loewe was also tasked with transporting Lyle Healy, the passenger. Officer Duggan, who was the first to arrive, identified Pyka as the driver after conducting a preliminary investigation that revealed no serious injuries. He informed Officer McCarthy about the crash and then handed over the investigation to him. Duggan recalled that when McCarthy arrived, he removed Pyka from the back of Duggan's squad car, performed a pat down, and cuffed him for transport in McCarthy's vehicle. Duggan also stated that Loewe discovered alcohol in the vehicle, and he did not see Pyka resist arrest. In the lock-up, Lyle Healy provided a written statement detailing the events. He observed McCarthy administering sobriety tests to Pyka, who performed well on both tests. After waiting for a breathalyzer test, Pyka blew a .11, leading to his arrest for D.U.I. As Pyka attempted to make a phone call, an argument ensued with Officer Loewe, resulting in a confrontation where McCarthy put Pyka in a chokehold while Loewe hung up the phone. McCarthy then restrained Pyka against the wall as Loewe handcuffed him. Officers brought Chris into the holding area, where loud yelling and slapping sounds were heard. Chris challenged an officer, stating, "come on cop, hit me again." Officer McCarthy returned with another pair of handcuffs, indicating that he had tightened Chris's cuffs. After leaving the holding area, McCarthy told a witness that Chris was his own worst enemy and lucky to be alive. The witness inquired about bailing Chris out, and McCarthy provided instructions regarding the required payment. Chris yelled for the witness to call his mother, but Officer Loewe denied the request and fabricated a phone number instead. Healy, a witness, later testified that he observed similar events upon arriving at the police station during Pyka's arrest. He described McCarthy applying a chokehold on Pyka, who appeared subdued but not fighting back. Healy recounted hearing McCarthy make aggressive remarks to Pyka, who responded defiantly. McCarthy’s account of the incident stated that he processed Pyka's arrest, asserting Pyka was intoxicated and uncooperative. He noted that Pyka failed field sobriety tests and a breathalyzer, and claimed Pyka was allowed to make phone calls. McCarthy observed Pyka during a phone call with his mother, noting Pyka became increasingly agitated, yelling and using offensive language. Believing his mother was upset about his arrest, McCarthy intervened to take the phone, leading to a physical struggle between them. McCarthy eventually subdued Pyka by laying him on the ground and applying his knee to Pyka's back while handcuffing him, asserting that the cuffs were not too tight. Afterward, McCarthy and Officer Loewe placed Pyka in an empty cell. Officer Loewe corroborated that the handcuffs were not overly tight but provided a different account of events. He mentioned giving McCarthy evidence found in Pyka's vehicle and observed Pyka's erratic performance during field sobriety tests, including excessive yelling and gesturing. Loewe noted that Pyka asked to make a phone call to arrange bail, during which he exhibited disruptive behavior, yelling at both McCarthy and the person on the phone. Despite McCarthy's repeated requests for Pyka to lower his voice, Pyka continued to scream and wave the phone around. When McCarthy attempted to take the phone, Pyka resisted, making a motion that suggested he might strike McCarthy with it. This prompted McCarthy and Loewe to restrain Pyka, leading to the handcuffing process, which Loewe described as met with resistance from Pyka. After subduing him, they escorted Pyka to a cell filled with other inmates, with the cell door remaining open. McCarthy and Loewe entered the cell with Pyka, where McCarthy proceeded to remove Pyka's belongings, including items from his pockets, a belt, shoes, and a stud earring, while Pyka was handcuffed. McCarthy positioned Pyka on the bed face down and informed him that they would complete processing once he calmed down. McCarthy remained in the cell until around 10:45 p.m., briefly leaving for 10-15 minutes before returning to remove Pyka's handcuffs. When questioned about an injury on Pyka's forehead, McCarthy initially did not recall seeing it but later acknowledged observing an abrasion. At approximately 11:00 p.m., McCarthy spoke with Todd Sherman, a friend of Pyka's, regarding bonding Pyka out. McCarthy refused to assist Sherman in locating Pyka's driver's license, suggesting that Pyka would "sit in jail and rot." McCarthy later communicated with Pyka's father, Richard Pyka, explaining that his son needed time to calm down for processing and advised Mr. Pyka to delay his arrival. After completing the bond information sheet around 11:15 p.m., McCarthy went off duty. It was noted that McCarthy had never before dealt with a detainee who committed suicide while in custody. Loewe provided his account, confirming that he left Pyka with McCarthy in the cell while he briefly stepped out to retrieve keys. Loewe stated he was gone for less than a minute and claimed he did not return to the cell after that, resuming patrol around 10:10 or 10:15 p.m. The movements of Pyka, McCarthy, and Loewe were monitored by telecommunications officers in the dispatch room, including Officers Bill Gaidis and Phyllis Krisik, along with intern Patricia H. Kowalski. Officer Gaides recalled observing Pyka during field sobriety tests earlier that night and noted McCarthy's actions during a phone call. Gaides, during his deposition, could not recall seeing Pyka's journey to his cell or the objects that were thrown out of it, despite earlier statements to investigators indicating otherwise. Initially, he did not remember Officer McCarthy uncuffing Pyka or any officer checking on him until prompted by his previous statements. In an investigative report, Gaides noted he observed McCarthy closing the cell door and adjusting the audio monitor volume due to difficulty hearing patrol units. He did not recall hearing any cries for help from the cell. Patricia Kowalski, an intern, reported observing Pyka's conduct and the officers' demeanor during his arrest. She noted Pyka appeared tense and angry, while McCarthy remained composed. Kowalski saw Pyka perform a high kick during the sobriety test and remarked that Gaides turned off the audio monitor when other radio transmissions occurred. During an altercation over the phone, she witnessed Gaides turn the audio back on, capturing Pyka's abusive language. Kowalski observed shoes and clothing being thrown from the cell and noted McCarthy exiting the cell with a belt, appearing visibly shaken. He mentioned that Pyka was lying in his cell and crying. Officer Piatanesi arrived at the police department around 10:50 p.m. and was asked to check on the prisoners at about 11:20 p.m. He observed three prisoners in their cells, noting their positions and behaviors before signing the cards and returning to patrol. Detainee Padin reports witnessing another inmate, referred to as "the kid," being escorted into a cell by multiple officers while still handcuffed. After some verbal exchanges, a slight push was made towards the kid, but no physical beating occurred. The kid expressed fear of police violence, claiming that local law enforcement in Orland Park abuses their power and targets residents and non-residents alike. The kid also voiced suicidal thoughts, stating he wished he could just end his life to escape his situation. Despite reassurances from Padin that he would be okay, the kid continued to express despair. Subsequently, an officer uncuffed the kid, who then complained about not being allowed to make a phone call. After a brief period of silence, Padin heard gasping sounds from the kid's cell and attempted to call for assistance, but received no response. After a significant delay, an officer checked on the kid and discovered him hanging from the cell bars, indicating he had taken his own life. Officer Hartsock found the kid hanging around midnight and took immediate action to secure his weapon and call for assistance. He returned to the cell with another officer, Duggan, and together they attempted to lower the body. Sgt. Doll arrived shortly after in response to the transmission for help, finding several officers present. Upon checking for vital signs, he found none and noted the body was cold. Photos were taken before the body was removed from the bars, and no CPR was performed by the officers. Paramedics, including Lt. Steve Smith, were dispatched shortly after the incident occurred. Smith arrived at the scene after being informed of a "DOA" and found Pyka's body against the cell bars. He attempted CPR but detected no signs of life, including pulse or blood pressure, and noted Pyka's body temperature was "warm." Smith assessed Pyka as cyanotic and in full cardiac arrest upon arrival. Expert testimony revealed a lack of suicide prevention training for the Orland Park Police Department. Plaintiff’s expert, Joseph R. Rowan, emphasized that inebriated individuals like Pyka should have been under strict supervision, as outlined in General Order G89-8, though "strictest supervision" lacks a clear definition. Rowan argued that timely medical intervention, including CPR within four minutes, should be standard, but acknowledged that Illinois has no legal requirements for such practices. He noted that the Illinois Jail Standards do not mandate video monitoring or immediate CPR for deceased individuals. Defendants’ expert, Thomas Walton, concurred that there are no specific obligations for police to administer CPR in this context. Rowan also stated there are no laws requiring suicide awareness training for law enforcement, indicating that police officers were not liable for recognizing Pyka's potential suicidal behavior without prior knowledge. The only lapse noted was the failure to provide CPR. Prior to his death, Pyka had refused medical treatment after a rollover car incident, which Walton asserted did not constitute a denial of care. Autopsy findings by Dr. Shakus S. Teas confirmed Pyka's weight at 117 lbs and documented multiple bruises and wounds. Injuries sustained by Pyka include multiple abrasions and bruises across various body parts: a circumferential groove with abrasions, pinpoint abrasion on the left forehead, bruise on the right upper arm, abrasions on both wrists and shins, and areas of petechiae and ecchymosis on the buttocks and thigh. Dr. Teas indicated that the small abrasion on the forehead was recent, while abrasions on the legs were likely caused by blunt force, though he could not confirm the precise source of these injuries. A videotape from the lock-up on November 8, 1991, provides objective evidence of the events, although the audio is nearly inaudible and the visual quality poor. This tape supports the accuracy of testimonies from Lyle Healy and Officer McCarthy while contradicting Officer Loewe's account. The court reviewed the tape multiple times and noted a timeline of events: - 9:16 p.m.: Officer McCarthy cuffs Pyka to a bench and converses with him for about 10 minutes. - 9:18-31 p.m.: McCarthy administers field sobriety tests. - 9:31 p.m.: Healy arrives and sits where Pyka had been. - 9:34-9:41 p.m.: Officers McCarthy and Loewe converse, while Healy and Pyka also engage in conversation; Healy leaves to use the restroom. - 9:41 p.m.: A third officer enters and speaks to McCarthy and Loewe before exiting. - 9:44 p.m.: McCarthy and Loewe leave the frame, and Pyka performs push-ups and stretches. - 9:45 p.m.: McCarthy re-enters, directing Pyka to take a breathalyzer test, which lasts about 4 minutes. - 9:49:30 p.m.: Pyka sits down as McCarthy discusses bonding out with him. The timeline culminates with Pyka being allowed to approach McCarthy at the table to make a phone call at 9:50:16 p.m., with Loewe positioned behind McCarthy during this interaction. At 9:50:29 p.m., Pyka lifts the phone receiver, turns to McCarthy, and starts dialing, while Loewe walks away from him. By 9:50:38 p.m., Pyka turns away from the camera to face officers. McCarthy loudly instructs Pyka to "shut up" at 9:50:49 p.m. and grabs his arm, prompting Pyka to step back while still holding the phone. Loewe intervenes to take the phone from Pyka and places it back on the receiver. McCarthy then turns Pyka around, applies a chokehold, and drags him towards the south end of the room at 9:51:10 p.m. He subsequently places Pyka face down on the floor, applies a knee to his back, and cuffs him with Loewe's assistance. By 9:52 p.m., the officers lead Pyka out of the lock-up. Post-take-down, at 9:52:24 p.m., loud voices can be heard, and by 9:54:09 p.m., two new officers enter the lock-up. McCarthy and Loewe re-emerge around 9:54:30 p.m., after which McCarthy gestures towards Healy before returning to the table. At 9:56:02 p.m., McCarthy directs Healy to leave, and Healy exits with another officer shortly after. The timeline continues with Loewe and McCarthy returning to the cell and engaging in paperwork until Loewe leaves at 10:14:57 p.m. and McCarthy cleans and departs shortly thereafter. Regarding the events surrounding Pyka's death, audio recorded around 11:18:14 p.m. is nearly undiscernible, and the tape remains blank until 11:58:57 p.m., when Officer Hartsock enters the lock-up. Hartsock calmly makes a phone call at 11:59:09 p.m. and hangs up shortly after. Notably, the tape is cut at 11:59:45 p.m. and resumes at 12:04:51 p.m. with several officers present in the area. At 12:05:16 p.m., paramedics arrived with a stretcher through the same door Pyka had entered earlier, approximately three hours prior. Pyka's estimated time of death was 11:58 p.m., indicating a critical six to seven minutes during which Officer Hartsock was reportedly "running back and forth" from the cell to the lock-up, rendering the videotape unreviewable and marking an absence of evidence during that timeframe. Summary judgment is deemed appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, allowing the moving party to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). A genuine issue for trial exists only if reasonable evidence could lead a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Materiality is evaluated based on whether a disputed fact, if proven, would influence the case's outcome. Courts must view evidence favorably for the nonmoving party and make inferences accordingly. Summary judgment can be granted if the evidence presented is merely colorable or lacks significant probative value. In assessing constitutional violations under Section 1983, it is essential to identify the specific violations attributed to the defendants. Plaintiffs allege several constitutional violations that they claim led to Pyka's suicide: (1) a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Officers McCarthy and Loewe during arrest; (2) a Fourteenth Amendment refusal of bail claim against Sgts. Doll and Slewoski and Officers McCarthy, Loewe, and Cavender; (3) a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claim for summary punishment against Officers McCarthy and Loewe; (4) a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim regarding medical needs against Sgt. Doll and Officers McCarthy, Loewe, Duggan, and Cavender; (5) a Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-train claim against the Village of Orland Park regarding suicide prevention; and (6) a Fourteenth Amendment claim regarding deprivation of rights to continued relationships with Pyka against the individual officers and the Village. The Court first assesses whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity following identified constitutional violations. Qualified immunity serves to protect government officials from undue burdens in civil litigation, particularly in summary judgment motions. Plaintiffs are attempting to hold several police officers liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the death of Pyka, requiring proof that the officers, acting under state law, caused a deprivation of federal rights. Individual liability under § 1983 can be established without evidence of a policy or custom, but official capacity liability necessitates such evidence. The defendants argue that Pyka did not suffer any deprivation of federal rights and assert immunity in both individual and official capacities. The plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence of policy or custom, leading to the conclusion that defendants are immune in their official capacity. The inquiry then shifts to individual capacity immunity. According to Harlow v. Fitzgerald, government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability unless their actions violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would recognize. The determination of qualified immunity relies on whether a reasonable officer would perceive their conduct as unlawful in the context of the situation at hand. Misinterpretations of the law that lead officers to mistakenly believe their actions are lawful do not negate immunity. The question of qualified immunity is a legal one, evaluated using undisputed evidence favorably towards the nonmoving party. If there are disputed facts affecting immunity, or if the conduct clearly violated established law, the case must proceed to trial. Qualified immunity for officials is assessed in two steps: first, the defendant must demonstrate that their actions were within the scope of discretionary authority at the time of the incident; second, the plaintiff must establish that the official’s conduct violated clearly established law. The Seventh Circuit further breaks this down into two inquiries: whether the alleged conduct constitutes a constitutional violation and whether the constitutional standards were clearly established at that time. The test requires that the defendant's actions be characterized by the specific facts of the case and then compared to existing law to see if they violated clearly established rights. The burden rests with the plaintiff to prove the existence of the claimed constitutional right. While the circumstances of the alleged violation do not need to match prior cases exactly, there must be closely analogous cases that predate the actions in question to establish that a constitutional right was clearly established. Alternatively, if the conduct is obviously in violation of constitutional rights, the plaintiff may present evidence to this effect without needing prior case law. In Count I, the complaint alleges excessive force by Officers McCarthy and Loewe, which includes verbal abuse, physical aggression, and improper treatment of Pyka during arrest. The first question regarding Officer McCarthy's actions is whether they fell within the scope of his discretionary authority. To demonstrate this, he must show that the circumstances necessitated his actions as part of his official duties. The evidence indicates that McCarthy's actions were intended to control an arrestee, which is within the discretionary authority of police officers, rather than constituting a beating, which is not permissible. No additional evidence has been submitted by the defendants on this matter, but the court recognizes the general obligation of police officers to control individuals after an arrest. Officer McCarthy believed it was necessary to exert control over Pyka, who was screaming, non-compliant, and attempting to strike him with a phone. The Court found that McCarthy's use of force fell within his discretionary authority, but this authority is limited by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on excessive force. The Seventh Circuit assesses whether a clearly established constitutional right has been violated by determining (1) if the right was clearly established, and (2) if the conduct in question violated that right. Establishing a constitutional violation is essential for evaluating claims of qualified immunity, allowing courts to dismiss cases lacking merit without requiring extensive defense preparation. If the actions do not constitute a prima facie constitutional claim, they cannot violate established standards. The determination of whether a reasonable officer would perceive their actions as lawful is critical. In this case, the assessment concluded that no reasonable officer could believe McCarthy's force during the take-down was lawful under the Fourth Amendment, considering the circumstances. The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens protection against unreasonable seizures, which encompasses the entire process from arrest to custody. Pyka was an arrestee under this protection when McCarthy employed a chokehold and forced him to the ground, making the constitutionality of such conduct subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. This reasonableness is evaluated objectively, focusing on the facts and circumstances faced by the officers rather than their intent or motivation. The Court evaluates reasonableness by weighing the intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment rights against governmental interests, as established in Graham. The right to arrest includes the right to use physical coercion, but the Court must assess each case's unique facts, such as the crime's severity, the suspect's threat level, and any resistance to arrest. The perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene is critical, and not every use of force that may seem excessive in hindsight violates the Fourth Amendment. The determination of whether conduct is objectively reasonable is a factual question, particularly when the law's applicable standards are unclear. In summary judgment motions, the plaintiff must provide evidence to raise reasonable doubts about the defendant's conduct, while the defendant must show that no reasonable jury could find their actions unreasonable. In this case, Officer McCarthy's actions during the arrest were found to be unreasonable. The videotape evidence revealed that the plaintiff, Pyka, was calm and merely making a phone call when the excessive force was applied. Despite claims from officers that Pyka posed a threat by raising the phone as a weapon, the footage contradicted this narrative, showing Pyka attempting to pull the phone away rather than using it aggressively. Even if Pyka's actions were interpreted as threatening, Officer McCarthy had already gained control before resorting to excessive force, including a chokehold, which clearly fell below the legal standard for reasonable use of force under the Fourth Amendment. The use of force against Pyka was deemed excessive since legitimate law enforcement reasons for initially restraining him ceased once he stopped resisting. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs have presented a valid constitutional claim under Count I. The Fourth Amendment requires that the right be "clearly established," meaning a reasonable official must recognize that their actions violate that right. Previous rulings indicate that the Fourth Amendment governs all acts of force against detained individuals from seizure until conviction. In the Seventh Circuit, excessive force is considered a form of punishment and thus unconstitutional. At the time of Pyka’s death, any unreasonable use of force by a police officer on a pretrial detainee constituted a constitutional violation. The Court found Officer McCarthy's actions objectively unreasonable as a matter of law, stripping him of qualified immunity for potential civil damages related to the Fourth Amendment violation. Additionally, there is a division among circuits regarding whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment applies to individuals in custody before arraignment, which complicates the analysis of immunity in this case. The Court will further explore this split to resolve the merits of Count I. The excerpt addresses the ongoing legal question regarding Fourth Amendment protections against excessive force during the transition from arrest to pretrial detention, a matter not definitively resolved by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor. The majority of circuit courts agree that Fourth Amendment protections extend from the moment of arrest until formal charges are filed, with pretrial detention commencing at arraignment. Key cases supporting this interpretation include Powell v. Gardner, which affirms that Fourth Amendment standards apply prior to arraignment while suspects remain in custody, and Hammer v. Gross, which acknowledges the application of the Fourth Amendment during the arrest process. Additional cases such as Austin v. Hamilton and Pride v. Does also uphold the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard for excessive force claims in the post-arrest phase. However, some circuit courts, like in Brown v. Doe, have applied the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to pretrial detainee excessive force claims without addressing Fourth Amendment protections. Furthermore, district court decisions, including Sweatt and Gonzalez v. Tilmer, have similarly applied the Fourth Amendment in evaluating excessive force and mistreatment claims during the post-arrest, pre-charge period. In Henson v. Thezan, 717 F.Supp. 1330 (N.D.Ill. 1989), the court examined the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to claims of excessive force by police officers during the period following arrest but before a formal Gerstein hearing. This case was set against a backdrop of prior decisions, including Jones v. County of DuPage, which questioned the Fourth Amendment's relevance during the pre-charge phase of a warrantless arrest. The ruling in Reed v. City of Chicago notably rejected the Fourth Amendment's application to claims of unlawful confinement. In contrast, the court in Edwards v. May affirmed that detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment between arrest and trial. The case of Sweatt v. Bailey highlighted the prohibition of excessive force under both amendments within the Eleventh Circuit, showing a trend where circuit courts increasingly affirm Fourth Amendment protections extending beyond arrest. Henson's plaintiff alleged severe police brutality during and after his arrest for serious charges, including being pushed down stairs, beaten in a squad car, and coerced into confessing while enduring significant physical and emotional harm. The district court acknowledged the ongoing legal debate over which amendment governs excessive force claims in this context, ultimately allowing both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims to proceed without deciding a definitive stance. The Supreme Court's decision in Graham allows for the application of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard to incidents involving police conduct after an initial seizure, contrary to the earlier ruling in Wilkins, which suggested that a seizure ends once an individual is securely in custody. The court highlighted that Graham implies the Fourth Amendment continues to govern police conduct even after they gain control over a suspect, thereby challenging Wilkins' conclusion that the seizure concludes at that point. In contrast, cases involving detainee suicides typically invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment. Courts in these suicide cases generally apply a "deliberate indifference" standard, which requires evidence that police had prior knowledge of a detainee's suicidal tendencies to establish liability. For instance, in Hall v. Ryan, the court noted a genuine issue regarding whether officers were aware of a detainee's suicide risk based on their history. In Bragado v. City of Zion, the court upheld a jury verdict against the police due to substantial evidence of the detainee's psychological issues known to law enforcement. Conversely, without actual knowledge of suicidal tendencies, courts have dismissed claims of deliberate indifference, as seen in cases like Smith v. City of Joliet and Hinkfuss v. Shawano County. Moreover, if a detainee lacks a known history of suicidal behavior, establishing that officers had the requisite knowledge becomes more challenging. Knowing that a detainee exhibited violent or erratic behavior does not equate to having awareness that such behavior could lead to self-harm. In the case of Camic, the Seventh Circuit noted that police took some suicide precautions, such as removing the detainee's belt and shoelaces, indicating a lack of deliberate indifference regarding the risk of suicide, despite not adhering to all jail monitoring procedures. This ruling has been frequently referenced by other courts in the circuit to define deliberate indifference in pretrial suicide risks. For instance, in Smith and Brooks v. City of Chicago, the detainees' concerning behaviors did not sufficiently alert officers to potential suicidal intentions. In the current case regarding Christian Pyka, there is no evidence that the defendants had any knowledge of his potential for suicide, as he had no prior history of suicidal thoughts or threats, nor had he interacted with the police before. A comment made by another detainee about Pyka's suicidal thoughts is not relevant without proof that an officer was informed or overheard this statement. The Camic decision is significant but does not directly address the applicability of the Graham standard, which raises issues about whether the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections or the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard should apply to conduct occurring post-arrest but pre-charge. The Seventh Circuit's legal stance on this matter is unclear, having shifted from recognizing protections under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments after arrest to applying the Fourth Amendment to all claims from arrest until conviction. The Titran case supports the notion that pretrial detention begins only after the booking process is complete, thus leaving ambiguity in the legal standards applicable to detainees in this context. Titran's application of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard for the detention period post-arrest complicates legal interpretations. The Seventh Circuit has provided inconsistent guidance regarding whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment governs the period immediately following an arrest but prior to formal charges. Titran and Wilkins agree on delineating arrest from detention but advocate different constitutional standards. The Court finds neither case aligns with Supreme Court precedents in Graham and Bell or with each other. Following Titran, some district courts, like Reed v. City of Chicago, have rejected the Fourth Amendment for claims of unlawful confinement, favoring the Fourteenth Amendment protection for detainees. In contrast, other rulings, such as Stewart, follow Titran’s reasoning. The Seventh Circuit has not definitively adopted either viewpoint. Notably, in Salazar v. City of Chicago, the court assumed the Fourteenth Amendment applies to pre-charge detainees, while Kinney v. Indiana Youth Center affirmed that due process prohibits punitive force during the arrest-to-conviction period. Garcia v. City of Chicago highlights that, post-Gerstein hearing, the Fourth Amendment no longer applies, leaving due process as the governing standard. Recent Supreme Court rulings, including Albright v. Oliver, raise concerns about the delineation of "seizure," potentially redefining claims under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg's separate opinion in Albright suggests that past precedents may have narrowly construed the Fourth Amendment’s protections, emphasizing the evolving nature of these legal standards. The Ginsburg opinion asserts that the Fourth Amendment remains applicable even after a defendant's initial bond hearing and release because the defendant is still considered 'seized' for trial as long as they are required to appear in court. Judge Cudahy, while dismissing Ginsburg’s views as "dicta," introduces a significant interpretation that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable" seizures aligns with the Fourteenth Amendment's protections against liberty deprivations without due process, citing Justice Blackmun's dissent in Albright as his sole authority. The Garcia concurrence suggests that in the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Amendment applies to actions occurring post-arrest and pre-Gerstein hearing. Although Wilkins does not establish a strict boundary at the Gerstein hearing, Judge Posner in Wilkins indicates that Fourth Amendment protections extend until the conclusion of the "first seizure." In Villanova, Posner refines this view, stating that the Fourth Amendment governs confinement following a warrantless arrest until a preliminary hearing, while due process applies thereafter. Courts must first determine if an arrest was warrant-based and if formal charges were presented at a preliminary hearing, as the applicable constitutional standard hinges on these factors. The majority of circuit courts favor applying the Fourth Amendment to actions after an initial arrest but before a formal hearing. In the absence of clearer Seventh Circuit guidance, the court concludes that the defendants' actions regarding Pyka's death should be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, as Pyka was not formally charged or brought before a neutral judicial officer following his warrantless arrest. The court confirms that the Fourth Amendment protections were in place for Pyka at the time of his death, referencing established circuit law. Regarding Officer McCarthy's use of force against Pyka, the court must determine whether this application of the Fourth Amendment standard necessitates summary judgment for the plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit has indicated that if a defendant's actions clearly contravene established norms, the case must proceed to trial, underscoring the notion that qualified immunity and the merits of the underlying claim are conceptually distinct. The finding of excessive force by Officer McCarthy supports the conclusion that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment, leading to the denial of qualified immunity. The issue of excessive force, governed by an objective standard, is contested, necessitating submission to the trier of fact, as reasonable minds could differ on the matter. A juror might perceive from the videotape that Pyka attempted to use a phone receiver as a weapon prior to Officer McCarthy's intervention. Despite the Court's skepticism regarding the reasonableness of the force depicted, it defers to the trier of fact to evaluate Officer McCarthy's conduct's objective reasonableness on November 8, 1991. The determination regarding Officer Loewe's potential liability and qualified immunity remains unresolved. The Amended Complaint inadequately addresses the claims against him. Although there is insufficient evidence for a finding of excessive force by Loewe, the facts support a failure to intervene claim, which was not included in the pleadings. According to precedent, a state actor may be liable for failing to intervene when they have reason to know excessive force is being used and have the opportunity to act. The videotape indicates that Officer Loewe had both the opportunity to intervene and the knowledge that the force used exceeded what was necessary to restrain Pyka. Officer Loewe observed an incident where Officer McCarthy restrained Pyka, including holding him around the neck and dragging him across the floor. Loewe helped remove a phone from Pyka's hand but then turned and exited the room while McCarthy continued to apply force. Although Loewe appeared to check his gun before approaching, it is unclear why he chose to leave at that moment, especially given the potential danger of being present with an uncuffed detainee. The court is examining whether Loewe's failure to intervene was objectively reasonable. It has previously determined that McCarthy's use of force was unreasonable, and Loewe cannot be held to a lesser standard. Evidence, including a statement from Loewe expressing concern about Pyka's mother thinking they were harming him, does not sufficiently support a claim for immunity. The court concludes that a reasonable officer would have intervened rather than leaving the room as McCarthy restrained Pyka. Consequently, Officer Loewe is not entitled to qualified immunity for his inaction. The underlying Fourth Amendment claim against him, characterized as a failure to intervene, presents genuine issues of material fact, specifically regarding Loewe's belief about the reasonableness of McCarthy's actions and his decision to walk away. The court will submit these issues to a jury. In summary, both Officers McCarthy and Loewe are denied qualified immunity based on the court’s assessment of the facts and video evidence. A reasonable officer would determine that Officer McCarthy's use of force was excessive, and Officer Loewe's failure to intervene was objectively unreasonable. However, genuine issues of material fact regarding the objective reasonableness of the defendants’ conduct regarding Fourth Amendment violations alleged in Count I must be resolved by a trier of fact. In Count II, plaintiffs allege that Sgts. Doll and Slewoski, along with Officers McCarthy, Loewe, and Cavender, failed to process and allow Pyka's bail to be posted in a timely manner, despite prior calls from Pyka's friend and father before his estimated time of death. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this count as the right to bail is not clearly established as a constitutional right under federal law. The Supreme Court has not recognized a fundamental right to bail, and previous cases have only addressed related issues without establishing such a right. The Seventh Circuit has similarly not decided whether a fundamental right to bail exists under the Eighth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. As there is no clear judicial recognition of a right to bail, qualified immunity applies, and summary judgment will be granted in favor of the defendants on Count II. Plaintiffs allege that Officers McCarthy and Loewe violated Pyka's constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments due to pre-trial detention that constituted punishment. The autopsy findings indicate multiple abrasions and bruises, suggesting the infliction of corporal punishment through various physical actions. The Court determined that the Fourth Amendment governs the defendants' actions during Pyka's custody, requiring an assessment of the alleged violence under an objective reasonableness standard. The Court found that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for some conduct alleged in Count III, particularly where the claims of grabbing and choking are already addressed in Count I, making them duplicative. Regarding the allegations of pushing and restraining Pyka in handcuffs, the Court concluded that these claims are underdeveloped and lack sufficient evidence to support a constitutional violation. The Court cited precedent stating that not every minor use of force violates the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, allegations of verbal abuse and the removal of Pyka's clothing to prevent suicide did not provide a basis for a constitutional claim, as no reasonable officer would view this conduct as unlawful under the circumstances. However, the Court acknowledged that some allegations of striking have merit, as certain injuries on Pyka’s body remain unexplained and cannot be attributed to the circumstances described, including a chokehold or other standard detention procedures. The specific injuries noted included abrasions and ecchymosis in various locations on Pyka's body, which warrant further scrutiny in light of the disputed facts surrounding his death. Dr. Teas identified that the abrasions on Pyka's forehead and legs were recent and likely caused by blunt force, such as from a collision with a table, although he could not determine the exact source of the injuries. Testimonies from depositions indicate that Pyka exhibited no injuries post-car accident, suggesting these injuries occurred after a Fourth Amendment seizure. The nature of the injuries raises concerns, as mere pushing would not suffice to explain them without contact with a solid object. While there was a brief struggle during the cuffing process, it was insufficient to account for the injuries observed, with only potential neck bruising resulting from the restraint. Testimony from Healy suggests Pyka was assaulted inside his cell, countering the defendants' claims that no physical harm was inflicted. This conflicting evidence generates a genuine issue of material fact regarding potential violations of the Fourth Amendment by Officers McCarthy and Loewe. As there is no footage of the events in the cell, the question cannot be resolved as a matter of law, leading to the denial of qualified immunity for the "striking" allegations. Summary judgment on Count III related to these allegations will also be denied. In Count IV, plaintiffs allege that Sgt. Doll and Officers McCarthy, Loewe, Duggan, and Cavender failed to provide necessary medical care to Pyka during custody, particularly neglecting signs of potential suicide risk and failing to administer CPR when he was found hanging. The defendants are granted qualified immunity concerning these claims, as their actions are deemed not to have directly caused Pyka's death. Defendants are entitled to immunity regarding allegations of failing to provide CPR and recognize Pyka's suicidal tendencies, as these actions do not constitute constitutional violations without evidence of deliberate indifference to Pyka's medical needs. Although the right to medical care is established under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, there is no evidence suggesting the defendants were aware or should have been aware of Pyka's suicide risk or need for CPR when they found him. Pyka did not express suicidal threats, and the defendants lacked training in suicide awareness. Upon discovering Pyka, they checked for a pulse and found him deceased, leading them to reasonably conclude that CPR was unnecessary under state and local rules. Although a paramedic believed Pyka was in cardiac arrest upon arrival, the defendants were not privy to this information, and attempts at reviving him were unsuccessful. Consequently, the court grants the defendants qualified immunity for Count IV and denies summary judgment. In Count V, plaintiffs argue that the Village of Orland Park should be liable for Pyka's suicide due to inadequate training of police officers in suicide detection and prevention. This claim is based on the assertion that proper training would have made officers aware of symptoms indicating suicidal tendencies, thus enabling intervention. The Supreme Court has recognized that inadequate training can support a Section 1983 claim, but liability only attaches under specific conditions: the failure to train must result from a deliberate choice by the municipality, and there must be a direct causal link between this failure and the constitutional injury. In a related case, Judge Plunkett found that the need for specialized training was not obvious enough to constitute deliberate indifference, supporting summary judgment for the city. Judge Plunkett concluded that the jail had a low incidence of suicide attempts, with only two recorded over many years, and that officers took preventative measures, such as removing items that could be used for self-harm and monitoring potentially suicidal individuals. The judge also noted that the plaintiff did not establish a causal link between the officers' training regarding suicide risks and any differing actions, as it was uncertain whether the officers would have responded differently even if they had identified the deceased as a high suicide risk. In *Hinkfuss v. Shawano County*, the court found no deliberate indifference to a detainee's medical needs, as the detainee did not require immediate medical attention. The current case similarly lacked evidence of a significant suicide issue at the Village's jail, despite claims of past suicides. Additionally, there were no legal requirements for officers to perform CPR or undergo suicide awareness training, leading to the conclusion that the officers' actions did not constitute a failure to train or an unconstitutional policy, resulting in a summary judgment favoring the defendants on Count V. In Count VI, plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' actions described in previous counts were the proximate cause of Pyka's suicide. Proximate cause in Illinois law is defined as any cause that naturally leads to the injury, not necessarily the only or nearest cause. Relevant case law indicates that if a defendant's negligence violated a constitutional provision and contributed to a suicide, liability may arise. Evidence suggested that the actions of Officer McCarthy and the failure of Officer Loewe to intervene potentially violated Pyka's Fourth Amendment rights. If a fact-finder agrees with this assessment, they may determine that these actions contributed to Pyka's suicide. Proximate cause determinations are factual matters designated for the trier of fact, and this issue will proceed to trial. Evidence of striking and slapping conduct, while weak, could potentially establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment and serve as a basis for proximate cause regarding Pyka's suicide. Detainee Padin's testimony, indicating that Pyka expressed fear for his life and made alarming statements to an officer, is critical for the plaintiffs' case. The jury may infer that Pyka's fear was a result of excessive force used by Officer McCarthy, suggesting a possible link to his suicide. This matter will be submitted to the jury since sufficient factual basis exists, resulting in the denial of summary judgment on Count VI. Regarding the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Rule 12(c) allows parties to seek judgment after pleadings are closed, treated as a motion for summary judgment if external matters are presented. Such motions are subject to the same standards as Rule 12(b)(6) motions, where all facts are taken as true and inferences favor the plaintiff. A motion may only be granted if no material factual issues remain. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs' claim for survivorship should be dismissed, arguing that siblings cannot recover damages under Seventh Circuit precedent, as the case is brought by Pyka’s parents on behalf of his sister, Danielle Pyka. Danielle Pyka lacks standing to recover for loss of society and companionship under established case law (Bell v. City of Milwaukee, McBride v. Lindsay). As a result, the court grants the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding Danielle. The individual defendants are granted qualified immunity for allegations in Counts II (refusal of bail) and IV (failure to provide medical care), leading to the granting of defendants' motion for summary judgment on these counts. The Village of Orland Park is also not liable under Count V (municipal liability), resulting in a summary judgment in favor of the defendants for this count as well. The court directs judgment to be entered against the plaintiffs on Counts II, IV, and V, and grants judgment against Danielle on Count VI. However, the court denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Counts I (excessive force), III (punishment), and VI (proximate cause), determining that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the violation of Christian Pyka's Fourth Amendment rights. The alleged conduct by Officers McCarthy and Loewe will proceed to trial, as they are not entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs are instructed to file a Second Amended Complaint against Officer Loewe regarding the failure to intervene within 14 days. Claims against the Village include allegations of punishment as a pre-trial detainee (Count III) and inadequate medical attention (Count IV). The plaintiffs assert that Pyka's death resulted from the Village's failure to train officers in suicide awareness (Count V), along with an unspecified claim for survivorship benefits against all defendants (Count VI). Evidence includes a videotape, which is of poor visual and audio quality. Defendants are instructed to enhance the tape and provide a transcript to allow the trier of fact to discern the events and conversations in the lock-up. The defendants must also clarify the missing six minutes of footage between Officer Hartsock's call for help and the arrival of paramedics, as well as the audio cessation at 11:18:14 p.m. The court recounts the events of November 8, 1991, based on testimony and exhibits, noting that many facts are disputed yet form the basis for proceeding to trial. Missing deposition pages hinder the court's ability to review relevant information. There is ambiguity regarding whether only certain pieces of Pyka’s clothing were removed, which remains unexplained. Officer Hartsock's actions are documented, showing he walked to the phone without securing his weapon. Doll testified about witnessing multiple suicides within the department yet reported no specialized training in suicide prevention. Missing pages from Dr. Teas' deposition also limit clarity on critical evidence. The court emphasizes that material factual disputes are necessary to prevent summary judgment, as only those that could affect the case's outcome under governing law are pertinent. A finding that a defendant violated clearly established constitutional rights, based on undisputed facts, negates the necessity for a trial on the merits regarding qualified immunity. The Court emphasizes the need to assess Officer McCarthy's actions without hindsight, yet maintains a consistent view that the videotaped actions displayed a clear constitutional violation of Christian Pyka's rights. The opinion will explore the differing legal authorities on this issue, particularly highlighting the ambiguity in Seventh Circuit cases. The Fourth Amendment is argued to extend beyond excessive force claims to encompass the treatment of arrestees during seizure and confinement conditions before arraignment following warrantless arrests. The decision in Wilkins is viewed as inconsistent with Graham; while Wilkins suggests a seizure concludes once an individual is in custody, Graham applies the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard throughout the entire incident, emphasizing that the standard remains relevant even after the initial seizure. Additionally, Wilkins is seen as inconsistent with Titran, as it applies a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard instead of the Fourth Amendment standard during the post-arrest precharge period. Historical cases indicate that the substantive due process standard was becoming less influential by the time Wilkins was decided, with implications that its foundation may no longer be valid. Titran, decided after Graham, neglects the core issue of whether the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from the use of force after an arrest but before pretrial detention, instead framing the matter as whether the Fourth Amendment applies during pretrial detention. This reframing overlooks Bell v. Wolfish, which established that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause governs pretrial detention claims. If Titran asserts that detention begins immediately after the initial seizure—a determination that is often ambiguous without formal arrest—then Bell necessitates the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, casting doubt on Titran's authority. Despite plaintiffs not formally pleading a failure to intervene claim in their First Amended Complaint, the Court finds sufficient record support to warrant such a claim, directing plaintiffs to file a Second Amended Complaint against Officer Loewe within 14 days. There are also disputed facts regarding whether all of Pyka's clothing was removed in the cell; however, without additional discovery or a legal theory supporting a claim of "punishment," these facts are deemed immaterial to a Fourth Amendment violation. Certain injuries sustained by Pyka, such as bruises from steel handcuffs and injuries from hanging himself with his t-shirt, are explained and deemed consistent with those circumstances. Since these injuries do not create genuine material issues, they will not proceed to trial. Additionally, while defendants acknowledge that Danielle Pyka may pursue a state claim for loss of society under Illinois law, they note prior dismissal of her state-based claims due to statute of limitations. The Court vacates a previous minute order and enters judgment for the defendants on Count VI regarding Danielle.