Burns v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board

Citations: 2 Cal. App. 3d 539; 82 Cal. Rptr. 678; 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 635; 1969 Cal. App. LEXIS 1436Docket: Civ. 12312

Court: California Court of Appeal; December 11, 1969; California; State Appellate Court

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Petitioner Donald G. Burns, an injured employee, seeks judicial review of a workmen's compensation award and the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board's denial of reconsideration regarding temporary total disability compensation. Burns sustained an injury while employed by United States Steel Corporation on December 12, 1968, which caused him to leave work that day. Due to a lack of medical facilities in Happy Camp, he was hospitalized in Sacramento on December 15, 1968. The workmen's compensation referee awarded temporary disability compensation starting from December 15, despite finding that Burns was temporarily totally disabled from December 13. Upon reconsideration, the board upheld the referee's decision, denying compensation for December 13 and 14. The key legal question is whether Labor Code section 4650 mandates compensation from the first day an employee leaves work due to injury, or only from the day of hospitalization. The statute, as amended, provides that compensation should commence from the first day of disability if hospitalization occurs during the waiting period; however, the board interpreted this to mean that liability begins at hospitalization, thus denying Burns compensation for the initial two days of his disability.

The board's decision in Coolman v. Continental Can Co. is central to the current case, with the board asserting that section 4650 is unambiguous. However, the 1959 amendment has introduced ambiguity into the statute regarding the timing of disability payments. The relevant language specifies that payments should commence when an injury results in either more than 49 days of disability or necessitates hospitalization. This creates uncertainty about whether payments should begin at the point of hospitalization or only after the waiting period. The legislative history does not clarify this intent, particularly since the amendment added provisions related to hospitalization while integrating them with pre-existing terms concerning disability duration. 

The principle of liberal construction in workers' compensation laws mandates that ambiguities should be interpreted favorably for injured employees. In comparing the current case to Coolman, key differences arise: in Coolman, hospitalization occurred post-waiting period, whereas in this case, the petitioner was hospitalized within three days of disability onset. This distinction undermines the applicability of Coolman's holding. The board's reliance on Coolman's interpretation, which claims clear meaning in section 4650, is criticized for failing to recognize the ambiguity created by the 1959 amendment. Additionally, Coolman's assertion that liability for temporary disability compensation starts from the day of hospitalization lacks supporting explanation and does not address the ambiguity or the principle of liberal construction.

Coolman's argument posits that the inclusion of "or is hospitalized" in the statute implies that hospitalization cannot create an exception to the employer's non-liability for the waiting period unless it occurs on the "first day" of disability. He contends that if the Legislature intended otherwise, it would have excluded the hospitalization clause. However, this interpretation fails to recognize the ambiguity of the term "the first day," which could refer to the first day an employee leaves work, potentially before hospitalization occurs. Additionally, hospitalization could be relevant for employees who are injured but not immediately incapacitated, such as those who may be hospitalized over a weekend or holiday after leaving work, thereby satisfying the intent of the statute to allow exceptions for established disabilities.

The board's reliance on case law, including Ruiz v. Industrial Acc. Com., is criticized for misapplying the rule of liberal construction, which should favor the petitioner in cases of ambiguity. The board's decision to deny temporary total disability compensation for specific dates is deemed erroneous, leading to an annulment of the award and a remand for further proceedings. The text also notes the legislative purpose behind the seven-day waiting period and the implications of temporary disability payment calculations, emphasizing that the definition of "leaves work" remains undefined in applicable statutes.