Durham v. Marberry

Citations: 156 S.W.3d 242; 356 Ark. 481; 2004 Ark. LEXIS 179Docket: 03-874

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; March 25, 2004; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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David Ashley Durham and Ruthie Mae Durham, co-administrators of Amanda Lynn Durham's estate, filed a lawsuit against Harold D. Marberry and Advantage Mobile Homes, Inc. after a mobile home transport vehicle collided with Amanda's vehicle, resulting in her instant death. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants regarding "loss of life" damages, ruling that a period of life between injury and death is required for recovery. The appellants appealed this ruling, arguing that such a period is not necessary. The Supreme Court of Arkansas agreed with the appellants and reversed the lower court's decision.

The case also involved a contingent settlement agreement between the parties, which was stated not to moot the appeal. The appeal centered on the interpretation of the Arkansas survival statute, specifically Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-101(b), which allows for the recovery of loss-of-life damages as an independent element. The court noted that statutory interpretation is conducted de novo to ascertain the legislature's intent, as established in prior cases.

Additionally, the appellees initially raised a constitutional issue concerning the potential punitive nature of the statute but later abandoned this argument on appeal, leading the court not to address it. The court underscored its jurisdiction over the matter due to the statutory interpretation involved.

Statutory interpretation relies on the ordinary meaning of the statute's language; if the language is clear and unambiguous, further interpretation is unnecessary. Prior to Act 1516 of 2001, Arkansas lacked statutory provisions for loss-of-life damages, which were historically compensated under survival statutes along with pre-death incurred damages such as medical expenses and lost wages. The appellees contended that loss-of-life damages did not constitute a new damage element but were simply a form of pain and suffering. However, the statute explicitly states that loss-of-life damages are in addition to existing damages, indicating they are indeed a new category. The Arkansas Model Jury Instructions were amended to reflect loss-of-life damages as a distinct element in wrongful death cases. On appeal, while conceding that loss-of-life damages are new, the appellees argue they are synonymous with loss-of-enjoyment-of-life damages, which they claim are incurred pre-death. This claim is complicated by inconsistent definitions in case law and scholarship regarding "loss of enjoyment of life." The appellees cite cases that do not support their argument, as both Sterner and Willinger distinguish between loss of enjoyment of life and loss of life itself. The court has maintained that loss of enjoyment damages are compensable only for living plaintiffs, with pain and suffering recoverable only for the period between the injury and death.

In Sterner v. Wesley College, Inc., the court determined that under Delaware’s survival action statute, plaintiffs cannot recover for the hedonic value of a decedent's lost life as a separate basis for recovery. This conclusion was reached within the context of a diversity action. However, the Sterner court acknowledged that in federal section 1983 actions, such damages are recoverable, despite state law restrictions. The court referenced a Seventh Circuit decision, which asserted that state laws preventing recovery for loss of life are incompatible with the deterrent purpose of section 1983, thereby allowing federal common law to prevail in such cases. The Sterner ruling affirmed that in section 1983 actions, estates can claim damages for loss of life, conscious pain and suffering prior to death, and punitive damages.

Furthermore, while loss-of-life damages and hedonic damages are distinct, some courts have conflated the two terms. The Seventh Circuit's ruling also indicated that federal law supports the recovery of loss-of-life damages, superseding restrictive state statutes in cases involving constitutional violations. Additionally, various states permit the recovery of loss-of-life damages. For instance, the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized hedonic damages as separate from economic value in Montalvo v. Lapez, and later allowed loss-of-life damages in Ozaki v. Association of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay. New Mexico’s statutes permit "fair and just" damages in wrongful death actions, with the state Supreme Court affirming that the value of life itself is compensable. Similarly, Connecticut has recognized damages for the loss of a decedent's life value in Katsetos v. Nolan.

In wrongful death actions, plaintiffs are entitled to "just damages," which encompass necessary medical, hospital, nursing services, and funeral expenses. "Just damages" specifically include: (1) the value of the decedent's lost earning capacity, adjusted for necessary living expenses and present cash payment considerations; (2) compensation for the loss of the decedent's ability to engage in life's activities; and (3) compensation for conscious pain and suffering. In the case of Katsetos, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a jury's damages award for a mother who died during childbirth, noting her age of 41, her 32-year life expectancy, and her active life as a dedicated mother, homemaker, and business co-owner. The defendants contended the award was excessive, arguing it implied an annuity of $20,000 per year, based solely on lost earning potential from her hairdressing and pizza business. However, the court emphasized that the damages accounted for both the loss of life and the destruction of the decedent's capacity for enjoyment, not merely her earning capacity. The distinction between "loss of life" and "loss of enjoyment of life" is significant, as some jurisdictions award pre-death enjoyment damages while others award damages starting at death until the expected end of life. Legal scholarship indicates that loss of life damages are more contentious than loss of enjoyment damages. This context influenced the Arkansas legislature's amendment to the survival statute in 2001.

Evans v. United States establishes that statutory terms are presumed to have their common-law meanings. The Arkansas General Assembly recognized the distinction between "loss of life" damages and "loss of enjoyment of life" damages in its survival statute. Appellees argue that only damages incurred by a decedent between injury and death are recoverable, asserting that Miss Durham's estate cannot claim loss-of-life damages because she died instantly in the accident. They contend that her injury equated to her death. However, the statute's language in Ark.Code Ann. 16-62-101(b) clearly refers to "loss of life damages" without indicating a requirement for the decedent to live for a period post-injury. Since "loss of life" inherently presupposes death, it cannot occur before death. The amended statute allows loss-of-life damages as a distinct category, meaning they can be claimed even if the decedent did not survive an injury. The court concludes that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment on this basis and reverses the decision. Additionally, while the appellees raised concerns regarding expert testimony on loss-of-life damages, the trial court did not address this issue due to its earlier ruling. The court reiterates that there are no established rules for calculating compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses such as loss of life, pain, or mental anguish.

In W.E. Clark, Sons v. Elliott, the court acknowledges that determining damages is primarily a jury's responsibility. However, without a trial court ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony, the issue cannot be considered at this time. The appellees express concern about the potential for duplicative damages, arguing that the appellants' claim for loss-of-life damages may overlap with future lost earnings, recoverable under the Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute. The appellants counter that they are not claiming pecuniary damages for wrongful death, eliminating the possibility of double recovery. The court concludes that, in the absence of a relevant ruling, this matter is not yet ready for consideration and orders the case to be reversed and remanded. Notes reference additional cases and literature discussing hedonic damages and the interpretation of compensation for losses related to the enjoyment of life.