In Re Marriage of Katz

Citations: 201 Cal. App. 3d 1029; 247 Cal. Rptr. 562; 1988 Cal. App. LEXIS 521Docket: B026550

Court: California Court of Appeal; June 3, 1988; California; State Appellate Court

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Susie Katz appeals aspects of a trial court's modification of their marriage dissolution decree, specifically challenging three rulings: (1) the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to reinstate spousal support payments that lapsed seven years prior; (2) the decision to sell the family residence and divide the proceeds as community property since Susie no longer had primary custody of any children; and (3) the assertion that it could not award child support to a parent with secondary physical custody. The Court of Appeals agrees with the trial court on spousal support and the sale of the residence but remands for a factual determination regarding child support for parents with secondary custody.

The case stems from a 1978 dissolution judgment after a 12-year marriage with three children, where Susie received custody and spousal support until 1980, along with exclusive occupancy of the family home until July 1990, contingent on her residing with at least one child. In 1986, custody of their son Jeffrey was transferred to Marvin, leading to a stipulation that he would no longer pay child support for Jeffrey. Marvin subsequently petitioned to sell the family home, arguing that Susie no longer had a right to reside there since none of the children lived with her, and he claimed ongoing financial responsibilities for the children’s support and education. Susie sought modifications to regain custody of Jeffrey and restore child and spousal support.

Objection was raised against the respondent's request to sell the family home, asserting that it constituted spousal support, which was set to terminate in 1990 when their son, Jeffrey, turned 18. The appellant highlighted that Jeffrey would be spending time in the house, and that Ronald, presumably the respondent, would also use the house during summer vacations. The appellant criticized the respondent for attempting to sway the court by emphasizing his financial struggles, noting that he is a successful lawyer while she earns a modest income as a secretary and struggles to make ends meet. She expressed concerns that selling the house would make it difficult for her to find suitable housing for her children.

In response, the respondent agreed to joint legal custody but opposed the sale of the house, suggesting that the appellant's primary motive was to retain it. He also pointed out her lack of effort to see Jeffrey since he moved in with him and opposed the request for reinstated spousal support, indicating that the appellant had previously agreed to its termination in 1980. The respondent sought reimbursement for payments made toward the family residence.

A court hearing on January 27, 1987, included testimony from both parties and an in-camera interview with Jeffrey, leading to the court awarding primary physical custody to the respondent, with the appellant receiving secondary custody on alternate weekends and shared vacation time. Joint legal custody was established by stipulation. A follow-up hearing on February 6, 1987, addressed spousal support, child support, and the house sale, resulting in the court's findings that: (1) it lacked jurisdiction to extend spousal support payments; (2) the respondent could only be reimbursed for house payments made after February 1, 1987; (3) child support could not be awarded to the appellant due to her nonprimary custodial status; and (4) the family home was to be listed for sale by November 1, 1987. Additionally, the court ordered the respondent to pay $3,000 in attorney's fees to the appellant.

The discussion also raised the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction regarding spousal support reinstatement, referencing Civil Code section 4801(d), which states that spousal support obligations terminate at the end of the specified period unless the court retains jurisdiction. The interlocutory judgment clearly indicated that the respondent's support obligation ended on September 11, 1980, without an express reservation of jurisdiction, thus terminating the court's authority to award further relief.

Appellant argues that her right to live in the family house while respondent makes payments constitutes "family support," encompassing both child support for the minor children and spousal support obligations. She contends this arrangement allows the trial court to maintain jurisdiction to reinstate direct spousal support payments. However, the court finds this theory flawed, noting that family support, as defined by statute, requires a formal agreement combining spousal and child support without distinguishing separate amounts, which is absent in this case. The existing interlocutory judgment includes separate provisions for child support and spousal support, along with property division, but lacks any integrated family support agreement.

The court acknowledges that awarding temporary possession of the family home to the custodial parent is generally considered a form of child support, with the intent to mitigate the adverse impact of separation on children. However, the trial court correctly determined that the family home award serves to preserve a stable environment for the minor children rather than functioning as spousal support. The interlocutory decree clearly states that the home award depends on at least one child residing there, and consequently, this award cannot be interpreted as a basis for reinstating spousal support payments, which were set to terminate in September 1980.

The trial court's order to sell the family residence was deemed appropriate based on the changed circumstances regarding the children and the living arrangements. The appellant contended that her exclusive occupancy should be maintained as long as any children lived with her, regardless of their age or time spent there. However, two of the three children had reached adulthood, with one living permanently with the respondent and the other's education funded by the respondent. The court ruled that maintaining a five-bedroom home for adult children visiting occasionally was not a valid argument for retaining the property. Furthermore, the respondent has primary custody of the couple's 16-year-old son, and the court found that the emotional impact of the sale on him was minimal compared to the economic detriment of denying the respondent his share of the sale proceeds, which were necessary for supporting the children. The court concluded that the reasons for selling the house outweighed the appellant’s claims. Additionally, if the appellant chose to remain in the house longer, the respondent was entitled to reimbursement for mortgage payments from the appellant's share of the sale proceeds, as it was reasonable under these circumstances.

Appellant is entitled to receive child support payments for Jeffrey according to California law, which mandates equal parental responsibility for supporting minor children, irrespective of custody arrangements. Civil Code section 4700 allows the court to order either or both parents to provide necessary support, maintenance, and education for their child. The statute's broad language accommodates complex custody situations, including cases where one parent has secondary physical custody and lacks financial resources. 

When determining child support beyond the minimum required by the Agnos Act, the trial court must follow statutory and judicial guidelines, considering factors such as parents' earnings, assets, employment capabilities, marriage duration, and standard of living, as outlined in Civil Code sections 4720 et seq. and section 246. The trial court's discretion in applying section 4700 is emphasized, although it failed to exercise this discretion in the current case, mistakenly believing it lacked the authority to make a child support order without legislative or appellate endorsement.

The court's decision is reversed regarding its failure to award child support to a parent with secondary physical custody, and the case is remanded for a factual determination on whether additional support is warranted. The state policy encourages shared parenting responsibilities, and while section 246 allows consideration of various circumstances, it does not absolve a financially capable parent from their obligation to support their child. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects, both parties' requests for attorney's fees are denied, and each party will bear its own appeal costs.

No final dissolution decree is present in the appeal record. Limitations placed on support awards in the interlocutory judgment are not relevant to this appeal. The respondent testified that the house's fair market value is between $625,000 and $650,000, with $36,000 still owed on it. The interlocutory judgment designates the house as community property, requiring equal division of sale proceeds between the parties. The trial court appropriately excluded evidence of the parties' intent regarding the family home, as extrinsic parol evidence cannot explain judicial orders. Section 4800.7, which allows retroactive application to family home awards made prior to its enactment, was deemed constitutional. Alterations to these provisions require a written agreement, of which there is no evidence in this case. The Agnos Act enables the trial court to factor shared physical custody into determining each parent's child support responsibilities. The statutory minimum child support is meant to cover basic living expenses, but the parties' financial circumstances indicate their focus is beyond mere essentials for their child, Jeffrey.