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State v. Durant

Citations: 156 S.W.3d 524; 2005 Mo. App. LEXIS 339; 2005 WL 465541Docket: WD 64030

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; March 1, 2005; Missouri; State Appellate Court

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Robert Durant was convicted of damaging property belonging to the Missouri Department of Corrections under section 217.385, receiving a six-year prison sentence as a prior and persistent offender. Durant, an inmate at Crossroads Correctional Center, had an altercation with a corrections officer, during which he attempted to grab the officer's keys and subsequently shattered a window by striking it with a food tray. At trial, Durant denied breaking the window, although he admitted to a prior conviction for possession of cocaine and denied other serious offenses. The prosecution introduced a Department of Corrections record detailing his prior convictions, which Durant objected to. 

On appeal, Durant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence to prove he knowingly broke the window. The court's review of evidence supports that a reasonable juror could conclude Durant was aware that hitting the cell window with a food tray would likely result in breaking it. The court emphasized that intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and the act itself, ultimately affirming the conviction based on the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial.

A reasonable inference suggests that striking a glass window with a hard object, such as a food tray, could result in the window breaking. Mr. Durant contends he was unaware of this risk due to the window's location in a prison cell, implying it might be shatterproof and that he did not intend to break it. However, he provided no evidence to support this belief. Testimony indicated he struck the window three times with significant force, leading to a reasonable inference of his intent to break it. Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly broke the window, resulting in the denial of his first appellate point.

In his second appellate point, Mr. Durant claims the trial court improperly admitted a Department of Corrections record of his prior convictions to challenge his credibility. He argued this evidence was hearsay and violated his right to confrontation, as well as the best evidence rule. The court had previously determined his status as a prior and persistent offender based on this record. Although Mr. Durant acknowledged a prior conviction for possession of cocaine, he denied others, prompting the State to use the record to impeach his testimony. He objected again, but the court permitted the jury to see only the relevant page of the record.

In his motion for a new trial, Mr. Durant only contested the use of the record for establishing his prior offender status and did not raise objections regarding the rebuttal evidence or hearsay claims. As a result, he did not preserve this issue for appeal as required by Rule 29.11(d). The appellate review is thus limited to plain error under Rule 30.20, which allows consideration of substantial errors that may have resulted in manifest injustice. This review involves determining whether the claimed error is evident and if it meets the criteria for manifest injustice. If it does not, the court will not review the issue.

A defendant testifying in court is subject to cross-examination and can be impeached like any other witness. Prior convictions of the accused can be used for impeachment, and a prosecutor may question a defendant about these convictions if the defendant does not disclose them initially. The State can establish prior convictions through records or cross-examination, and the witness must respond to relevant questions, with the cross-examiner not limited by the witness's answers. The use of Mr. Durant's Face Sheet for impeachment was not deemed an obvious error. The prosecutor used this Face Sheet to establish Mr. Durant as a prior and persistent offender prior to trial and later on rebuttal to counter Mr. Durant's claim of having only one prior conviction. On appeal, Mr. Durant does not contest the initial use of the Face Sheet for proving his prior status but challenges its use for impeachment. However, since he does not dispute its introduction for establishing prior convictions, his claim regarding its use for impeachment does not indicate a substantial likelihood of manifest injustice. Thus, the court found no clear error, denied Mr. Durant's request for review under Rule 30.20, and affirmed the judgment of conviction.