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Galvan v. John Caretti Co.
Citations: 287 N.E.2d 90; 6 Ill. App. 3d 894; 1972 Ill. App. LEXIS 2603Docket: 55679
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; July 26, 1972; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Desiderio Galvan, the plaintiff, appeals an order from the trial court that granted Inland Construction, Inc. a credit of $41,264 against any potential award from the Illinois Industrial Commission related to his accidental injury on April 19, 1963. Galvan argues that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to make this order after 30 days post-judgment and claims that Inland's concurrent negligence should prevent its reimbursement rights. The case stems from an incident where Galvan, an Inland employee, was injured by a dislodged piece of lumber while Caretti's agent operated a motor scooter. In 1967, the court ordered that no judgment or settlement involving Caretti could occur without safeguarding Inland's interests. After a jury awarded Galvan $65,000 against Caretti in 1970, Caretti's motion for a new trial was denied. Inland later petitioned the court, asserting that Galvan had delayed his Industrial Commission claim since 1966 and that he had repudiated an agreement to dismiss that claim in exchange for Inland waiving its reimbursement for medical expenses. The court allowed Inland's petition and imposed restrictions on Galvan's disposal of the judgment proceeds. Ultimately, the court awarded Inland a credit of $41,264. Galvan contends that the trial judge exceeded jurisdiction by issuing the order after the 30-day window and that Inland's negligence should negate its reimbursement claim. The Workmen's Compensation Act stipulates that any judgment obtained against a third party must consider the employer’s compensation obligations to the injured employee. Section 5(b) stipulates that any release or settlement of a damage claim related to injury and any satisfaction of judgment in such proceedings require written consent from both the employer and employee, except when the employer is fully indemnified by court order. The statute also specifies that satisfaction of judgment in an employee’s action against a third party lacks validity without the employer's and employee's consent, unless the employer is protected by a court order. In this case, Inland, the employer, did not provide written consent for the satisfaction of judgment. The court had jurisdiction to issue an order on October 30, 1970, safeguarding Inland's reimbursement rights, as the satisfaction of the April 7, 1970, judgment was contingent upon this order. Inland properly intervened in the plaintiff's action against the third-party tortfeasor, Caretti, following the correct statutory procedure for reimbursement. The trial court's order was upheld, affirming that Inland was entitled to reimbursement as outlined in Section 5(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The plaintiff's argument regarding Inland's concurring negligence as a barrier to reimbursement was rejected, as established by the Illinois Appellate Court in Reeves v. Tepen, which ruled that such negligence is irrelevant to the employer's right to reimbursement under the Act. Consequently, the Circuit Court of Cook County's order is affirmed.