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In Re Henson

Citations: 123 Cal. App. 3d 518; 176 Cal. Rptr. 693; 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 2075Docket: Crim. 21581

Court: California Court of Appeal; September 8, 1981; California; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In the case of In re Larry James Henson, the California Court of Appeals examined the equal protection implications of California Penal Code section 2292 concerning parole hearings for life prisoners convicted under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law (ISL). Larry James Henson, convicted of first-degree murder in 1973 and sentenced to life, petitioned for habeas corpus after the enactment of the Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL) in 1977, which altered parole procedures. The pivotal legal issue revolved around whether section 2292 violated equal protection by distinguishing between life prisoners based on the timing of their parole release date determination. The court found that this distinction did not withstand strict scrutiny as it failed to serve a compelling state interest, thus infringing upon the fundamental right to liberty. Consequently, the court ordered that Henson be granted a parole hearing under ISL guidelines to potentially obtain an earlier release date. The decision acknowledged procedural delays and the inadequacy of administrative convenience as a justification for the disparate treatment. The petition for habeas corpus was granted to the extent of ensuring fair parole consideration under the ISL, with the court bypassing the need to address the petitioner's ex post facto claim.

Legal Issues Addressed

Equal Protection under California Constitution and Fourteenth Amendment

Application: The court found that section 2292's classification of life prisoners based on the establishment of their release dates failed the strict scrutiny test as it lacked a compelling state interest.

Reasoning: The court recognized that the right to liberty is a fundamental interest, requiring any classifications to undergo strict scrutiny. The Attorney General failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest justifying the distinction made by section 2292, citing only administrative convenience as a rationale.

Parole Hearing Rights under Indeterminate Sentencing Law (ISL) and Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL)

Application: The court directed the Board of Prison Terms to provide the petitioner a hearing under ISL regulations to determine a parole release date, ensuring the earlier release date is applied.

Reasoning: The Board of Prison Terms is directed to grant the petitioner a hearing under ISL regulations to determine a parole release date and to provide him the earlier of the two release dates established at this hearing or during a January 10, 1979 hearing.

Standard for Classification Procedures in Parole Hearings

Application: The court held that strict scrutiny is not required for classification procedures unless they impact a fundamental liberty interest, differentiating this case from In re Flodihn.

Reasoning: The standards for classification procedures do not require strict scrutiny unless they impact a fundamental liberty interest. In the case of In re Flodihn, the criteria used were less directly related to an inmate's custody time compared to the current matter.