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People v. Frank F.

Citations: 90 Cal. App. 3d 383; 153 Cal. Rptr. 375; 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 1488Docket: Crim. 32999

Court: California Court of Appeal; March 13, 1979; California; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of California addressed the case of Frank F., a minor found to have violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 by committing vehicular manslaughter under Penal Code section 192, subdivision 3. The evidence showed that Frank, while intoxicated with a blood alcohol level of .23 percent, drove recklessly, causing an accident that led to another driver’s death after colliding with his abandoned vehicle. On appeal, Frank contended that the juvenile court should have proceeded under Vehicle Code section 23101, which concerns felony drunk driving and includes provisions for causing death. He argued that this special statute should take precedence over the general manslaughter statute.

The court, however, rejected this argument, emphasizing that legislative intent governs whether a special statute supplants a general one. The court highlighted that if the Legislature intended for section 23101 to replace the vehicular manslaughter statute for intoxicated drivers, it would have adjusted the penalties accordingly. Under vehicular manslaughter laws, each victim represents a separate violation, while section 23101 does not increase penalties for multiple victims. Thus, the court affirmed the juvenile court's decision based on the legislative framework and intent regarding the applicable statutes.

The argument asserts that it is illogical to interpret section 23101 as reducing the number of crimes for intoxicated drivers who cause multiple fatalities. The minor claims that the precedent set in People v. De Casaus is outdated, suggesting that the principle from Neal v. State of California, which allows for multiple punishments for multiple victims, does not apply when a defendant's actions are merely negligent. However, existing law, as demonstrated in People v. Lockheed Shipbuilding Constr. Co., contradicts this view. Even if the minor's point were valid, it would only pertain to the issue of multiple punishments rather than multiple violations. The court affirmed the decision, with Justices Stephens and Ashby concurring, and denied the appellant's request for a Supreme Court hearing on May 10, 1979. 

The statutory history reveals that section 23101 was amended in 1972, with subdivision (b) addressing cases involving death or injury from its inception, while subdivision (a) was updated five years later to include such language. The text of subdivision (a) now specifies that it is unlawful for individuals under the influence to drive in a manner that proximately causes death or injury to others. Questions arise regarding the implications of the minor's claims not being raised in the trial court, and which of the two statutes involved is considered 'special' versus 'general,' with felony drunk driving being more specific in conduct but general in consequences, while vehicular manslaughter is more specific regarding outcomes but general in conduct.