National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Gain

Citations: 100 Cal. App. 3d 586; 161 Cal. Rptr. 181; 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 2472Docket: Civ. 45596

Court: California Court of Appeal; November 30, 1979; California; State Appellate Court

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The case involves a challenge to California Health and Safety Code sections that prohibit adult possession and use of marijuana, initiated by the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) and 32 individual taxpayers against various city officials. Following an amendment of the complaint, the Attorney General intervened and moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, ruling that the statutes did not violate constitutional rights. The appellants asserted violations of rights to privacy, equal protection, due process, liberty, pursuit of happiness, and protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

The primary focus of the appeal is on the asserted violation of the right of privacy, which was established as an "inalienable right" under the California Constitution in 1974. While the scope of this right remains largely undefined, the court referenced prior rulings which suggest it is not limited to protection against governmental surveillance but does not extend to the right to access potentially harmful substances, such as marijuana. Specifically, the court noted that the right of privacy does not confer upon Californians the privilege of using marijuana privately, even if it is considered harmful. The decision draws on past cases to illustrate that constitutional protections do not necessarily encompass the use of drugs, regardless of personal or medical beliefs.

Appellants cite the Alaska Supreme Court case Ravin v. State, which establishes that the Alaska Constitution's right to privacy protects personal possession and use of marijuana in the home. This interpretation indicates a unique stance among states regarding privacy rights and marijuana. In contrast, California's legal framework does not recognize a violation of privacy rights in the challenged marijuana laws. 

Appellants also argue that the marijuana laws infringe on their equal protection rights, as alcohol and tobacco are legal despite being potentially harmful. This argument has been previously dismissed in California case law and is supported by similar rulings from other jurisdictions. The courts generally afford the legislature broad discretion in regulating substances deemed dangerous, and they presume that legislative enactments are valid unless the underlying rationale is debatable.

Moreover, the existence of a legitimate scientific debate over marijuana's harm suggests that the legislature's decision to regulate it is rational. This debate was highlighted by an affidavit from a psychiatry professor, indicating insufficient data to classify marijuana as harmless. Evidence from health reports further underlines this ongoing discussion within the scientific community.

Appellants submitted affidavits from three medical experts asserting that marijuana poses only minimal health risks. The court found these affidavits did not challenge the scientific debate surrounding marijuana but rather the conclusions drawn from it, leading to the affirmation of summary judgment against the equal protection claim. The court referenced *People v. Aguiar*, noting that the Legislature could reasonably differentiate between the social implications of alcohol and marijuana use. Consequently, the prohibition on marijuana possession was deemed not arbitrary or irrationally unjust.

Further, appellants argued that enforcing marijuana laws subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and California's Constitution. This argument was previously dismissed in *In re Jones*, which examined whether a five-year-to-life sentence for marijuana sales constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court highlighted that while the Legislature has broad discretion in setting penalties, judicial review is necessary to determine if such punishments exceed constitutional limits. The court emphasized that mere doubts about a statute's constitutionality are insufficient for invalidation.

The opinion outlined three evaluation techniques from *In re Lynch* for assessing whether a punishment is constitutionally excessive: (1) examining the offense's nature and the offender's danger to society; (2) comparing the challenged penalty with those for more serious offenses in the same jurisdiction; (3) comparing it to penalties for the same offense in jurisdictions with similar constitutional provisions. The court indicated that these guidelines apply only after a punishment has been imposed. Since the appellants’ claims did not demonstrate the clear and unmistakable unconstitutionality of the punishment for marijuana offenses, the court upheld the existing legal framework.

California and various other states have reached similar conclusions regarding the classification of marijuana. Appellants argue that classifying marijuana as a narcotic violates their due process and equal protection rights, citing the Illinois Supreme Court case People v. McCabe. In McCabe, the court found that classifying marijuana under the Narcotic Drug Act resulted in disproportionately severe penalties compared to other substances, as it mandated a 10-year minimum sentence for marijuana sales versus a maximum one-year term under a different act for similar offenses. However, California law classifies marijuana with hallucinogens and imposes penalties that are not more severe than those for other hallucinogens, thus not violating equal protection guarantees. The appellants claim the classification is irrational due to its consequences, such as licensing sanctions, but the court finds legislative action rational, supported by expert opinion on safety hazards related to marijuana use while driving.

Additionally, appellants argue that marijuana statutes infringe upon their rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness under the California Constitution. However, these rights are not absolute and do not prevent the legislature from enacting reasonable regulations, which the court deems justified. Lastly, as taxpayers, appellants seek to halt the enforcement funding for these statutes but must demonstrate that such expenditures are illegal to obtain injunctive relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.

In County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1967), the court affirmed the summary judgment against the appellants, with concurring opinions from Judges Caldecott and Rattigan. The appellants' petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied on February 20, 1980. The amended complaint challenged the constitutionality of several provisions of the Health and Safety Code regarding marijuana, as amended by Senate Bill 95, effective January 1, 1976. The provisions in question include:

1. **Section 11054(d)(10)** - Classifies marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance.
2. **Section 11357(a)** - Imposes up to five years imprisonment for possession of concentrated cannabis.
3. **Section 11357(b)** - Misdemeanor charge with a maximum $100 fine for possession of up to one ounce of non-concentrated cannabis.
4. **Section 11357(c)** - Imposes up to six months imprisonment or a $500 fine for possession of more than one ounce of non-concentrated cannabis.
5. **Section 11358** - Imposes severe penalties for cultivation, with up to 10 years imprisonment and life sentences for repeat offenders.
6. **Section 11359** - Imposes 2 to 10 years imprisonment for possession for sale, with increased penalties for prior convictions.
7. **Section 11360(a)** - Severe penalties for transporting marijuana, with life imprisonment for serious offenses and minimum sentences for prior felonies.
8. **Section 11360(c)** - Misdemeanor for transporting not more than one ounce of non-concentrated cannabis, punishable by a maximum $100 fine.
9. **Section 11366** - Imposes up to 10 years imprisonment for maintaining places for unlawful distribution or use of controlled substances.

The appellants argued that these provisions were unconstitutional both on their face and as they applied to the private possession and use of marijuana by adults.

Section 11369 mandates that if an individual arrested for violating specified sections may not be a U.S. citizen, the arresting agency must inform the relevant U.S. deportation authority. Section 11590 requires individuals convicted of certain drug offenses to register with the chief of police within 30 days of arriving in their new city or country of residence. Section 11591 obligates law enforcement officials to promptly notify the superintendent of schools when a school employee is arrested for specified offenses. Various sections of the Health and Safety Code, including 11350(d)(1) through 11570, outline increased penalties, forfeitures, and collateral consequences for drug-related offenses. Additionally, federal statutes banning marijuana possession were upheld against privacy challenges in a 1974 case. Health and Safety Code section 11032 clarifies that "narcotics" refers to controlled substances in Schedules I and II, with marijuana classified as a Schedule I controlled substance, thereby categorizing it as a narcotic under California law. This classification aligns with the Uniform Controlled Substances Act adopted by 38 states.

Appellant references several sections of the Vehicle Code pertaining to the issuance and renewal of driver's licenses in relation to narcotic offenses. Under Section 12809, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) may refuse to issue or renew a driver's license if the applicant has been convicted of transporting controlled substances for sale or compensation using a motor vehicle. If the applicant is on probation for related offenses and is subsequently convicted of another narcotic-related offense, the DMV can also deny the license irrespective of vehicle involvement. The maximum duration for such a refusal is three years post-conviction.

Section 13202 outlines the court's authority to suspend or revoke driving privileges upon conviction of narcotic offenses involving a motor vehicle. The court must revoke the license for specific Health and Safety Code violations when a vehicle was used, with the revocation period determined by the court but not exceeding three years.

Section 13800 allows the DMV to investigate potential grounds for suspending or revoking a driver's license upon receiving conviction records related to narcotic offenses, which serves as sufficient basis for such investigation.

Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 526a enables citizens or corporations liable for local taxes to initiate legal action against government officials for illegal expenditures or waste of public funds. This section does not impede actions by public entities and prioritizes injunctions against public improvement projects over other civil matters, except where equal precedence is granted by law.