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Stainko v. Tri-State Coach Lines, Inc.
Citations: 508 N.E.2d 1362; 1987 Ind. App. LEXIS 2779Docket: 64A03-8609-CV-280
Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; June 25, 1987; Indiana; State Appellate Court
Andrew Stainko appealed a summary judgment in favor of Tri-State Coach Lines, Inc. and Shoup Buses, Inc. after he fell into an uncovered, unlighted, and unguarded work pit in the defendants' garage. The trial court ruled that Stainko had incurred the risk as a matter of law. Key issues for appeal included whether Stainko was a licensee or an invitee on the property and whether he voluntarily exposed himself to the danger of the pit. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, emphasizing that evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Stainko, the non-moving party. Stainko, a salesman for Monogram Fasteners, had previously accessed the garage without incident, typically entering through a side door to meet with the purchasing agent. On the day of the incident, he was directed to the dark garage to find the agent but fell into the pit, which he had not noticed due to its usual lighting and safety precautions. The court noted that, according to Indiana law, summary judgment is only appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and emphasized that conflicting material facts should prevent such judgments. Tri-State's argument that Stainko was merely a licensee was rejected, as the court found merit in his claim of being an invitee engaged in business with the defendants. Tri-State contends that Stainko's presence on their property was unrelated to their business since he was neither purchasing a ticket nor riding a bus. However, the court disagrees, highlighting that Tri-State allows unsolicited vendors in the garage for solicitation, and Stainko had a history of visiting and selling items there. This established an ongoing business relationship that benefits both parties. In terms of incurred risk, the court notes that this is typically a factual question for the jury, with the legal standard requiring that a plaintiff must have actual knowledge of a specific risk and consciously consent to it. The Indiana Supreme Court clarifies that incurred risk involves a deliberate choice to engage in conduct with knowledge of its risks, which goes beyond mere awareness of potential hazards. In reviewing Stainko's situation, the court finds that, while he knew bus garages have repair pits, he believed these pits were usually lighted and guarded. Therefore, he did not knowingly and intentionally approach the garage pit with awareness of the specific dangers present. Stainko had the right to expect Tri-State to maintain a reasonably safe environment until given notice otherwise, paralleling the circumstances in the case of Borton, where the plaintiff's general awareness of risk did not equate to actual knowledge of the specific risk that led to his injury. Consequently, the evidence allows for multiple inferences regarding Stainko's knowledge and acceptance of the risk, indicating that summary judgment was inappropriate. The court reverses the summary judgment and remands for further proceedings, affirming that Tri-State's argument about Stainko's lack of authorization to be in the garage is irrelevant given the context of their prior interactions.