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Corona v. Lenawee County Road Commissioners

Citations: 194 N.W.2d 46; 36 Mich. App. 579; 1971 Mich. App. LEXIS 1338Docket: Docket 10111, 10112

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; October 26, 1971; Michigan; State Appellate Court

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In the case of *Corona v. Lenawee County Road Commissioners*, two 17-year-olds, Gregory Corona and Sherry Mason, died in an automobile accident at the intersection of Wilmoth Highway and Laberdee Road. Gregory Corona drove through a stop sign and collided with another vehicle. The plaintiffs, represented by Auto Owners Insurance Company, claimed that debris piled by the Lenawee County Road Commission obscured the stop sign, leading to the accident. The notice of injury was served to the county road commission within 60 days of the incident, detailing the accident and the injuries sustained by both the Corona vehicle occupants and the other vehicle's passengers, Constance and Wanda Wagner. Additionally, the letter from December 22, 1969, clarified the limited authority of the attorney who initially contacted the road commissioners regarding the case, emphasizing that the only communication received was from Auto Owners Insurance Company, not the Wagners. The plaintiffs sought to hold the road commission liable for the accident and potential injuries to the Wagners.

Auto Owners Insurance Company is currently the sole client involved, anticipated to implead the Lenawee County Road Commission if any injured parties pursue action against the driver or owner of the Corona vehicle. Mr. Prosser M. Watts, Jr. provided an affidavit explaining the notice given, which was submitted as evidence during the hearing on the defendants' motion for accelerated judgment. On December 24, 1969, Opal Corona and Pauline Sullins petitioned the probate court to be appointed as administratrixes for their respective sons' estates following their deaths. The probate court granted letters of administration to both on January 22 and January 26, 1970. A complaint was filed in the Lenawee County Circuit Court on February 13, 1970, against the Board of County Road Commissioners and the County of Lenawee, who subsequently filed motions to quash service and for summary judgment. A hearing was held on March 2, 1970, resulting in a stipulation to quash service on the Board. Notices of claim were served on March 12, 1970, by the administratrixes. After an amended summons and a renewed motion for accelerated judgment, arguments were heard on April 20, 1970. The court ruled on May 26, 1970, that the defendants were entitled to accelerated judgments due to insufficient notice of claim as per statutory requirements, referencing MCLA 224.21 and the case of Morgan v. McDermott. A judgment was entered on June 26, 1970, which was followed by a denied motion for rehearing by the plaintiffs on August 19, 1970. The trial court noted that the August 25, 1969 letter provided adequate notice regarding the accident details, but the defendants were not aware that the letter's author was not representing the plaintiffs until December 22, 1969. At the time of the trial court's ruling, the Michigan Supreme Court had not yet decided Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, which involved a plaintiff unable to serve the required notice due to injuries sustained in an accident.

On September 5, 1961, Keith Grubaugh filed a notice of claim against a city on behalf of the plaintiff. The trial court granted accelerated judgment in favor of the defendant, referencing precedents from Boike v. City of Flint and Trbovich v. City of Detroit. The Michigan Supreme Court's interpretation in Moulter v. Grand Rapids indicated that it is up to the legislature to confer rights and impose limitations on those rights. However, a legislative decision that deprives a plaintiff of a vested right without due process, particularly when the plaintiff is under legal disability during the notice period, is problematic. The statute allows a plaintiff to file a suit at varying times within a 60-day window post-injury, and failing to meet notice requirements after this period would strip them of their right to action without due process.

The purpose of notice provisions is to enable municipal authorities to promptly investigate claims. However, the necessity of such provisions has diminished due to the increased availability of resources for governmental units, including liability insurance and legal teams. This evolution has rendered the original policy considerations behind notice requirements less valid. The court condemned the arbitrary legislative power that strips claimants of their remedies when they fail to submit required notices. Consequently, the notice provisions of the relevant statute were deemed unconstitutional for violating due process. The court did not address potential equal protection violations, as the case involved minors without legal representatives during the notice period.

Grubaugh is deemed applicable as the plaintiffs' decedents were killed in an accident allegedly caused by the defendant, with no one able to issue the required notice within the 60-day window. Declining to recognize such a situation would unjustly favor defendants when a plaintiff is deceased rather than merely incapacitated. The notice provisions of MCLA 224.21 are ruled constitutionally void for violating due process. The defendant county road commission cannot claim prejudice, as timely notice was given regarding the accident, outlining the intent to hold them liable. The sole issue was that the notice was sent by a non-representative of the plaintiffs. The county road commission and its insurer had sufficient opportunity to investigate the accident. The County of Lenawee is not a proper party defendant, and the judgment in its favor is affirmed. The accelerated judgment against the Lenawee County Road Commission is set aside, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. Costs are awarded to the plaintiffs from the Lenawee County Road Commission and to the County of Lenawee from the plaintiffs. All judges concurred.