People v. Watson

Citations: 150 Cal. App. 3d 313; 198 Cal. Rptr. 26; 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 2556Docket: Crim. 12347

Court: California Court of Appeal; December 29, 1983; California; State Appellate Court

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In the case of *People v. Watson*, the Court of Appeals of California addressed the appeal following a trial where Robert Lee Watson was convicted of two counts of second degree murder and one count of felony driving while intoxicated resulting in bodily injury. The pivotal issue arose from a prior California Supreme Court decision affirming that second degree murder can be charged in vehicular homicides where implied malice is established. The trial court initially dismissed the murder charges but was reversed. 

During the trial, evidence was presented that Watson had consumed significant alcohol after visiting multiple bars before the incident. A bartender had expressed concern over his ability to drive, resulting in Watson's keys being withheld. Witnesses reported that he ran a red light before colliding with another vehicle, which resulted in the deaths of Penny Maillet and her daughter, Michelle. Watson's blood-alcohol level was recorded at .23 percent shortly after the accident. The trial court later modified the murder convictions to vehicular manslaughter, sentencing him to three years for each count to run concurrently, staying these sentences pending completion of a separate vehicular offense. The People appealed the modification, and the court decided to reverse the trial court's order, remanding the case for a reassessment of Watson's motion for a new trial.

An accident reconstruction expert indicated that the defendant was driving between 71 and 76 miles per hour before braking at an intersection, suggesting the accident could have been avoided had the defendant adhered to the speed limit. Both the defendant and a witness testified that the traffic light was green for westbound traffic on Cypress and red for the victims' vehicle entering from Athens. The defendant acknowledged being heavily intoxicated and exceeding the speed limit but did not believe his driving posed a high probability of death. 

The trial court granted a motion for a new trial, modifying the murder verdicts to vehicular manslaughter, based on the belief that the jury's finding of implied malice was not supported by evidence. The People argued on appeal that the trial court erred by considering facts not presented to the jury. The court has broad discretion under section 1181, subdivision 6, to weigh the evidence but must respect the jury's role as the exclusive finder of fact. 

The trial court expressed that the implied malice finding could not stand due to evidentiary gaps, specifically noting that a critical fact about Henderson Road's access was not presented during the trial, which affected the credibility of a key witness, Tate. The court also found that the defendant's intoxication alone did not suffice to infer malice.

The court determined that the defendant's excessive speed was a significant factor in the victims' deaths, fulfilling the gross negligence requirement for felony vehicular manslaughter. However, it found insufficient evidence to imply malice, as there was no indication of the defendant's subjective awareness of a high risk to human life. The court noted that the jury might have been misled regarding the significance of the posted speed limit, as Cypress Avenue functioned like a freeway, with typical speeds around 50 mph during peak hours. It emphasized that evidence regarding safe speed limits should have been presented to the jury, especially considering that a safe speed at 1 a.m. might exceed the posted limit. The court upheld the appropriateness of taking judicial notice of commonly known facts, but questioned whether the trial court could base its decision on judicially noticed matters not referenced in the record while ruling on a motion for a new trial. It cited section 1181, subdivision 6, which restricts the trial court's review to evidence presented during the trial. The court clarified that its review scope is broader than that of an appellate court, yet it does not replace the jury's role in fact-finding. Ultimately, the trial court overstepped its authority by reweighing evidence based on facts not presented to the jury, which were crucial to the case, particularly concerning the issue of malice.

Tate's testimony suggests the defendant acted with malice, indicating that his vehicle ran a red light shortly before the fatal accident and nearly collided with Tate's car. This could imply the defendant was consciously disregarding a high risk to human life. However, the trial court expressed doubts about Tate's credibility and introduced a "safe speed" standard that was not presented to the jury, undermining the evidentiary weight of the defendant's excessive speed. This deviation from the statutory standard of review led to the conclusion that the trial court improperly found the evidence insufficient to support a finding of malice necessary for murder convictions. Consequently, the order of modification must be reversed, and the trial court is directed to reconsider the new trial motion without considering evidence outside the jury's purview. 

The court also noted that the murder verdicts are legally flawed regardless of credible evidence. Since the trial court acknowledged credible evidence for vehicular manslaughter, the jury should have been instructed on this lesser charge, which is necessarily included within the murder charge. The definitions indicate that vehicular manslaughter, defined as an unlawful killing without malice due to gross negligence, is implicitly part of murder charges, despite arguments to the contrary. Legal precedents affirm that manslaughter is always included in murder charges, and thus, the failure to instruct on this lesser offense constitutes a reversible error, warranting a new trial.

Murder can involve a vehicle as an instrument, but involuntary manslaughter under subdivision 2 of section 192 explicitly excludes vehicular homicides. While murder may occur without a misdemeanor inherently dangerous to life or actions involving high risk of death, involuntary manslaughter under subdivision 2 occurs during the commission of an unlawful act that is not a felony or a lawful act done unlawfully or without due caution, excluding vehicular acts. The subdivisions of section 192 define different circumstances of manslaughter rather than creating separate offenses, with all forms of manslaughter characterized as an unlawful killing without malice. This interpretation aligns with case law, such as People v. Collins, which determined that different subdivisions of a statute do not create distinct offenses. The recent decision in People v. Lohbauer clarifies the standards for necessarily included offenses, emphasizing that they must be consistent with statutory elements and specific charging allegations to ensure due process. The manslaughter elements as included in murder are identified as an unlawful killing without malice, and the subdivisions merely outline the contexts for such killings. Trial courts assess evidence to determine the appropriateness of specific manslaughter instructions in murder cases, and recognizing subdivisions as additional elements would limit judicial discretion.

The three subdivisions of section 192 define distinct forms of the crime of manslaughter, which is characterized as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. This crime is inherently included in the offense of murder. In cases where the evidence supports it, the court is obligated to provide jury instructions regarding manslaughter even if not requested by the defense. The absence of such instruction in this case renders the murder verdicts invalid. Consequently, the trial court's options upon remand are limited to either modifying the murder verdicts to manslaughter if the evidence justifies a lesser conviction or, if not, granting a new trial. The previous order to modify the verdicts has been reversed, and the trial court is directed to reassess the defendant's motion for a new trial in line with this opinion. Notably, the motion for a new trial was prompted by the court's acknowledgment of its failure to instruct on vehicular manslaughter. Additionally, legal precedent confirms that a lesser crime is included if the accusatory pleading encompasses all elements of that offense. Section 192 outlines that manslaughter can be voluntary or involuntary and specifies conditions under which it applies, including involuntary manslaughter in the context of vehicle operation.